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Chapter 1
Introduction
“Science is the great antidote to the poison of enthusiasm and superstition.”
Adam Smith
This introductory chapter provides an informal introduction to the concepts used,
presents the motivation of the topics under study, and gives a roadmap for the rest of
the dissertation.
1.1 Public goods games
Game theory is the mathematical discipline of decision-making in strategic situa-
tions. The minimal requirements needed to describe such situations – games – are the
interacting agents – players –, the possible decisions the players can make – strategies –,
and the players’ preferences over the outcomes of their decisions. Under some permis-
sive assumptions, these preferences can be represented by numerical (von Neumann-
Morgenstern) utility functions – called payoffs. Crucially, the models of game theory
allow a player’s payoffs to (partially or fully) depend on the other players’ decisions.
Games with only these three components are called normal-form games. Depending
on the complexity of the model, games may have several other components describing
the timing of the decision-making process, the information available to the players,
and the heuristics by which they evaluate information and make their choices. As it is
apparent by the number and difficulty of these concepts, game theory is a particularly
rich, deep field, with close ties to real-life situations.
Zero-sum games have the property that in every outcome the sum of payoffs of
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all players is always zero (or, equivalently, always the same constant). These games
capture situations where the players are in direct conflict with each other: one player’s
gain is another’s loss and vice versa. It was the study of two-player zero-sum games by
John von Neumann in 1928, titled Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele that is counted
as the first contribution to modern game theory.
Conversely, non-zero-sum games allow for mutual gains via coordination and coop-
eration. Some animals associate into social groups in order to realize the gains from
playing non-zero-sum games. Arguably, the defining characteristic of the homo sapi-
ens is the innovative drive to seek out and play non-zero-sum games. Civilization and
high economic development is associated with a society’s ability to design, create, and
maintain institutions that ensure coordination and cooperation in those games.
The public goods game is one of the most well-known and most relevant of non-
zero sum games. The original version of the game reads as follows: There are n > 2
agents with an endowment of 100 euros each. Every agent decides individually and
simultaneously on how much of the endowment they wish to contribute to a common
pot. Once the decisions are made, the amount of money in the pot is multiplied by a
number 1 < m < n and redistributed among the agents equally. In this game every
euro of a player’s contribution increases the wealth of the whole society by m > 1 euros,
meaning that contributing the entire endowment of 100 euros is the socially optimal
choice. However, as every euro of contribution increases the wealth of every player,
including the donor’s, only by m/n < 1 euros, every donor loses 1 − m/n euros for
each euro of contribution, making the contribution of 0 euros the individually optimal
choice. Hence, payoff-maximizing agents will not contribute. This game, together
with its generalizations, is one of the most widely studied problems of game theory
with applications in every field of economics, as well as in sociology, biology, medicine,
computer science, political science, and psychology. Such profound interest in what is
a simple tradeoff between self-regard and prosocial behavior is due to the synergy of
individual efforts towards the collective good, universally found in every human and
animal society.
1.2 Networks
While the depth of the public goods game, especially given its simplicity, makes it an
attractive choice to model a variety of situations, its original form cannot capture the
intricacies of real societal interactions. There are two points of critique of the original
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game. The first is the process by which the societal gain is created. In the original
version, the extra money is provided by an external source, i.e. the arbitrator, repre-
senting society’s joint benefit from the public good created by a centralized institution,
i.e. the government. However, value may also be created by private individuals, i.e.
the players themselves, in which case the gains are possibly realized by only a subset
of players. Second, in real societies, agents are not symmetric with respect to their
benefits gained from centrally created public goods either. In fact, many public goods
are spatially excludable. For example, an investment into a city’s commuter train net-
work benefits the city’s residents unequally, those living in the city center will realize
lower gains than those living in the metropolitan area. An elegant way to resolve these
critical points and construct a more closely applicable model in the spirit of the public
goods game is by describing the nature of interactions within the population by the
use of networks. In this setting, the players reside in the nodes of the network, and
players contribute to create localized goods in the nodes they inhabit. Players gain
benefits from the goods they themselves created, as well as the goods to which they
are connected in the network.
Networks are a representation of pairwise relations between abstract objects. De-
pending on what type of objects are considered, we may distinguish social networks,
biological networks, computer networks, and many others. By only considering pairs,
the number of parameters that define a network is kept low, a polynomial function of
the number of objects. Because of this, the framework strikes a balance between rich-
ness and efficiency, making networks accurate, elegant, and comprehensive descriptions
of complex spatial systems. In this dissertation three types of networks are considered.
In order of increasing generality these are simple graphs, weighted networks, and di-
rected networks.
In simple graphs relations are binary, two objects may be either linked or not
linked. This is the most common framework to capture social networks. For ex-
ample, scientific collaboration networks are typically imagined as simple graphs with
researchers being the nodes and co-authorships being the links. In these models, every
link is assigned the same (or similar) meaning, such as friendship, communication, or
some other type of connection. While not always an accurate representation of reality,
such networks are widely used since they allow for concise graphical representations
of even a large number of nodes and links. Chapter 3’s model is a game played on a
simple graph.
Weighted networks are generalizations of simple graphs, allowing each link to
have a unique meaning. This is accomplished by assigning numbers – weights – to
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links, usually indicating a stronger relationship in case of a large weight or a weaker
one in case of a small weight. Weighted networks constitute a richer model, more
closely capturing the details of a web of real relationships, while still allowing for good
representations. Depending upon the application the weights may be positive integers,
indicating a multiplicity of links, such as multiple joint papers in a scientific collabo-
ration network, positive real numbers, indicating intensity, strength, or capacity such
as the value of a collaboration, or both positive and negative real numbers. A possi-
ble interpretation is positive numbers indicating good/beneficial/healthy relationships
and negative numbers indicating bad/detrimental/toxic relationships, with the abso-
lute value of the weight measuring its strength. A game played on weighted networks
is discussed in Chapter 2.
Both simple graphs and weighted networks make the assumption that links go both
ways between pairs, and, in case of weighted networks, the weight of a link is equal for
both players. Directed networks, a generalization of both, is a framework that exists
to capture situations which do not adhere to this property. These situations include
unequal relationships, where one participant is more important or more powerful than
the other, parasitic relationships, from which one party benefits but the other is hurt,
and hierarchical relationships, where one party is affected by the other but not the
other way around. A game played on directed networks is discussed in Chapter 4.
1.3 Learning
Any analysis of a normal-form game begins with the application of a solution con-
cept. A solution is an ex-ante prediction of the outcome of the game satisfying some
intuitive properties. Players may be expected to agree on the solution as a result of
some bargaining process, or the solution may be the benchmark at the initiation of
the process. Unless the option to cooperate is specified by the rules of the game we
typically assume that players have no regard for each other’s payoffs and therefore
such solutions, especially when viewed as a possible outcome of the game, must be
multilaterally self-enforcing. By far the most commonly used and well-known concept
is the Nash equilibrium. Developed by John Nash in 1950, the Nash equilibrium is
a combination of the players’ strategies such that no player can be strictly better off in
payoffs terms by unilaterally deviating from it. The Nash equilibrium is an intuitive,
succinct, and powerful concept, as its existence is proven for every normal-form game
(possibly requiring a probabilistic extension of the game). Its predictive potential,
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however, is limited.
The main issue of Nash equilibria which hinders its use in real life situations is
multiplicity. Even in the simplest case of two players and two strategies the existence
of a unique Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed, and even for a handful of players
and strategies the number of Nash equilibria may be in the dozens or hundreds. The
average number of Nash equilibria in games with 4 players and 6 strategies for each
player is above 2000.
This vast multiplicity causes inaccuracy of the predictions on two levels: coordina-
tion and selection. Many realistic scenarios feature a lack of coordination mechanisms
(e.g. binding agreements), meaning that even a few players are unlikely to choose
strategies that correspond to the same Nash equilibrium. In a 2 × 2 game with two
pure (not requiring probabilistic mixing of strategies) Nash equilibria, such as coordina-
tion games, both players may justifiably play both of their strategies. This means that
all four outcomes may be reached, the likelihood of a successful coordination is 50%,
and the Nash equilibrium’s predictive power is nil. In case of larger games coordination
becomes much harder.
Even if the game rules include ways to achieve coordination, the problem of equilib-
rium selection persists. The original equilibrium concept gives no insight into which of
the dozens, hundreds, or thousands of Nash equilibria should be expected to be played.
As these equilibria may lead to very different combinations of payoffs, both coordina-
tion and selection remain key obstacles to making plausible and useful predictions.
Other solution concepts exist to address these issues, many of them are refinements
of the Nash equilibrium, but, just like the original concept itself, they have proven
extremely hard to validate in general classes of games.
Learning is the way by which agents accumulate, evaluate, and react to new
information. For a wide range of games learning has proven to be highly successful
in providing motivation for various equilibrium concepts, and specifically for the Nash
equilibrium. In a game featuring learning, the players are playing slightly different
versions of the same normal-form game many times. As players discover more about
the game and their opponents, they make improvements on their strategies the result of
which should, in time, resemble equilibrium play. This approach is attractive from an
applied point of view, as, rather than one-shot game with near-simultaneous decision-
making, most strategic interactions take place in a repeated setting. The improvements
happen as the players receive revision opportunities, the timing of which, and the
heuristic by which the revisions themselves are made, depend on the model.
The concept of learning is central to all chapters appearing in this dissertation.
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Chapter 2 studies how well the use of Nash equilibria is motivated in public goods
games played on weighted networks. Chapter 3 presents a probabilistic learning model
in a public goods game played on a simple graph with two types of decision makers,
farsighted and myopic. Chapter 4 examines a simple learning process, the best-response
dynamic, in public goods games played on directed networks. In the learning models
of Chapters 2, 3, and 4, the processes governing the asymptotic behavior of strategies
are one-sided, meaning that the revision opportunities are assigned to only one player
in each time period, while the strategy of every other player in the player sets remains
fixed. In subsequent periods, the identity of the player holding that period’s revision
opportunity may change, but the set of players remains fixed throughout, irrespective
of how the players perform. In Chapter 5’s model of the immunotherapy of cancer,
the tumor’s reaction to various forms of therapy is analyzed. This model takes an
evolutionary approach, meaning that players – cells – using strategies yielding high
payoffs in the given circumstances will thrive, while those with strategies yielding low
payoffs will perish. The modeling choices in the four chapters were made to reflect
the plausible ways by which populations in their respective applications learn to play
the game. As a general rule of thumb, we can say that short-term economic and
biological interactions (compared to the lifespan of the model’s subjects), as well as
sociological models have a fixed player set with players accumulating information as
they learn through trial and error. In long-term economic and biological interactions,
in genetic algorithms of computer science, and in intergenerational sociological studies
the player set is typically fluctuating with new players arriving to the game, possibly by
having more successful players proliferate, as well as living players exiting it, possibly
by less successful players dying off. By this process, the population goes through the
Darwinian dynamics of evolution via natural selection.
1.4 Public goods and tumors
A tumor is a group of body cells which have undergone mutations to an extent that
they satisfy five properties not found in normal cells: (1) Self-sufficiency in growth
signals; the ability of a cell to reproduce in the absence of hormones or other signals
from the body. (2) Insensitivity to anti-growth signals; the resistance to environmen-
tal conditions that would halt proliferation in normal cells. (3) Evading apoptosis;
apoptosis is a type of programmed cell death occurring in response to, among other
factors, genetic instability or infections, which tumor cells have evolved to disobey. (4)
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Limitless replicative potential; normal mammalian cells are unable to reproduce after
about 60-70 doublings, called the Hayflick limit, which is overcome via mutation in the
order of one in every ten million cells, producing an immortalized cell with unlimited
doubling capability. (5) Sustained angiogenesis; angiogenesis is the process by which
new blood vessels are formed from pre-existing ones, a process which tumor cells are
able to hijack in order to ensure a continuous supply of oxygen and nutrients into the
tumor. These five properties are present in malignant and benign tumors alike. Malig-
nant tumors satisfy an additional property: (6) Metastatis; the ability to break away
from their original site, invade neighboring tissues and organs and spread through the
body. These six properties are collectively known as the Original Hallmarks of Cancer.
In recent years further hallmarks were added as typical characteristics of malignant
tumors, only one of which is touched upon by this dissertation: (7) Immune evasion;
the ability to withstand, evade, or suppress attempts by the body’s immune system to
destroy the tumor.
Cancer is an umbrella term for over 100 diseases of multi-cellular organisms involv-
ing malignant tumors. It is one of the leading causes of death in the world, affecting
up to 14 million people each year, killing up to 9 million (2015), and costing over 1
trillion USD annually (2010).
In 1971, U.S. President Richard Nixon signed the National Cancer Act, starting an
increased research effort into finding a cure for cancer, a project nicknamed the “War
on Cancer”. In spite of significant research achievements into the causes, prognosis,
and new forms of therapy of cancer, the reduction in cancer death rates has remained
modest and is mostly attributed to lifestyle improvements and a greater awareness
rather than advances in therapy. The war rhetoric, with its positive effects on public
awareness notwithstanding, allows the persistence of potentially harmful paradigms.
The most widely known paradigm in therapy is that of the Maximum Tolerated Dose
(MTD).
Unlike bacteria or viruses, cancer cells are highly similar in structure to the normal,
unmutated cells of the human body, meaning that any non-targeted therapy that is able
to destroy tumors, such as chemotherapy, is also highly toxic for the patient. MTD
is the highest dose of a drug or treatment the patient can receive without causing
unacceptable side effects. One of the standards of cancer treatment is to identify the
MTD of the given drug, typically chemotherapy, introduce it to the patient, ceasing
only when the toxicity caused by the drug becomes as bad as the cancer prognosis.
By doing so the treating physician is waging his or her own war with the patient’s
cancer, and the therapy becomes a race between cancer’s resilience to the drug, and the
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patient’s resilience to the cancer and the drug. The only two outcomes of such therapies
are a cancer-free patient, with all detectable tumors eradicated, or a deceased patient.
In both outcomes the patient pays a high price both in financial terms and in enduring
the painful side effects. While viewing the ongoing efforts to cure cancer as a war both
on a macro level (by rushing to develop new, revolutionary forms of treatment) and on
a micro level (by trying to completely eradicate all tumors of a patient) is helpful in
taking the necessary immediate, decisive, and radical actions, it may obscure situations
when treating to kill as many cancer cells as quickly as possible is a suboptimal strategy.
This is because, although MTD treatments provide good initial results in shrinking the
tumor, the high dose of treatment promotes the evolution of resistance by cancer cells.
Due to their defective DNA, cancer cells accumulate mutations with an increased rate,
hence adaptation happens rapidly. Since cancer cells without resistance are wiped out
by the high dose, the time during which the entire tumor adapts, and therefore the
disease remains sensitive to the therapy is minimized by applying the MTD.
The game theory of cancer emerged as a direct response to the war-on-cancer
paradigm, treating cancer cells as payoff-maximizing players rather than the enemy.
The intention was to model cancer’s response to existing therapies, but the field has
quickly grown beyond this level. Today, game theoretic papers exist or are in prepa-
ration modeling many properties of tumors from the initial evolution of the hallmarks
of cancer, to tumor growth and metastasis, to more effective timing of treatments. As
any successful society, cancer cells play their own non-zero-sum games, notably the
public goods game, between themselves. Examples include the joint efforts by cancer
cells to promote angiogenesis and attract nutrients, to systematically destroy stromal
structures and thus metastasize into different tissues, and to suppress the immune sys-
tem. Game theory’s insights into these areas are potentially extremely valuable. Thus
far the most consequential insight comes from the direct application of evolutionary
game theory and it states that the best control for cancer cells resistant to therapy are
non-resistant cancer cells. Hence, by lowering the dose of treatment, the time until re-
sistance can be greatly increased while at the same time keeping the cancer burden low
enough that the patient does not succumb, rendering cancer into a chronic disease. The
lower dose means that this approach is also less costly and less painful for the patient.
By applying treatment to control the tumor rather than destroy it, called “adaptive
therapy”, Moffitt Cancer Center has achieved two extremely promising results: animal
trials have shown that prostate cancer may be kept under control indefinitely, while
presently ongoing clinical trials with human patients living with advanced prostate
cancer have shown that the time until cancer progression and death may be at least
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tripled compared to the standard of care. As the clinical trials are still continuing,
with new trials currently under development at the time this dissertation is written,
the true potentials of adaptive therapy, and other applications of game theory in cancer
are still yet to be determined.
Chapter 5 of this dissertation presents a model of the immunotherapy of cancer.
Some immune evasion strategies of cancer cells, specifically the tumor’s immunosup-
pression, are modeled as public goods games played by the cancer cells. Immunotherapy
is a form of treatment that induces or enhances immune response. In recent years forms
of immunotherapy have proven successful in what appeared to be hopeless cases of can-
cer, which resulted in widespread mainstream attention. Its general efficacy, however,
is still uncertain, as a successful application requires much more tailoring than existing
methods of treatment.
1.5 Structure
This dissertation is structured as follows. The introduction is followed by four self-
contained chapters. Three of them, Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are related to public goods
games played on networks, and one, Chapter 5, is related to the immunotherapy of
cancer. The dissertation is concluded by a valorization addendum, exploring the value-
creating potential of the research presented in the four chapters.
Chapter 2 examines the convergence of basic one-sided learning processes in public
goods games played on weighted networks. It is shown that adaptive learning converges
to the set of Nash equilibria of a game as long as two conditions are satisfied. First,
all players must receive revision opportunities with some frequency. It does not matter
how often or how rarely a player gets a revision opportunity as long as we can specify a
length of time such that during any interval of that length every player revises at least
once. Second, every revision must take the updating player closer to his contemporary
best response. Crucially, we do not impose that players always take the optimal action
at the time of their updates, or that they must have a higher payoff after their revisions
than before. The condition merely states that the distance from their optimal choice,
given the other players’ contributions, must decrease as a result of the update. If a
third condition, the finiteness of the set of Nash equilibria, also holds then every such
process converges to a single Nash equilibrium point. Finally, the chapter proves that
this third condition is generically satisfied.
Chapter 3 builds a model of exploitation with two player types with different abil-
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ities. One sophisticated agent plays against a group of myopic agents and is trying to
maximize his payoffs by manipulating his neighbors into producing the public good.
The players are connected by a simple graph, hence the game involves asymmetries in
both ability and position. Sophistication is modeled as a form of foresight, the ability
to take future payoffs into account, while the rest of the population’s myopia represents
a general societal naivete´. As in Chapter 2, the game’s dynamics take place in discrete
time with one player receiving a revision opportunity in each period, while every other
player’s actions are kept the same. In each period the player who receives the revision
opportunity is assigned randomly, independently from past periods, and with a uniform
distribution across players. The chapter shows that an optimal exploitative strategy
exists for the farsighted player and it is Markovian, meaning that every choice depends
only on the current state of the world rather than the game’s entire history until that
point. Furthermore, playing optimally guarantees that the game eventually reaches a
rest point, at which the myopic players are playing their best-response contributions
and the farsighted player has no ways to advance the game such that he receives a
higher expected payoff. This result is driven by the fact that in an unweighted setting,
the best-responding behavior of myopic players propagates a rising inequality between
players, reflecting increased production of players with lower access to the public good,
and increased free-riding behavior by players with more access to it. Since the asymp-
totic behavior of this game in equilibrium is once again converging to the rest points of
the system, Chapter 2’s own convergence results are shown to be robust with respect
to the inclusion of a farsighted player for games played on unweighted graphs. Fi-
nally, the consequences of changes in the network are explored. Adding a link between
the farsighted player and a previously unlinked myopic player makes the farsighted
player better off, while adding a link between two of the farsighted player’s previously
unlinked myopic neighbors will make the farsighted player worse off.
Chapter 4 considers games played on directed networks. In both Chapters 2 and
3 the reciprocal nature of the interactions, guaranteed in simple graphs and weighted
networks, is strongly exploited. Both convergence results rely heavily on the fact that
a player moving towards a best response always advances the game towards one of its
Nash equilibria, a property derived through the theory of potential games. The results
of this strand of literature can only be used in undirected networks. This chapter
provides insight for the thus far unexplored, but more general case of directed networks.
Examples and situations that lead to either cycling, and therefore non-convergence are
shown. Two classes of networks are identified with acyclical best-response dynamics:
hierarchical relationships with a clear, unambiguous ranking of players, and networks
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where the internal effects of a player’s own production to his own payoffs are larger
than their external effects on the rest of the population.
Chapter 5 presents an ecological model of immunotherapy based on game theoretical
concepts. Two populations are considered, cancer cells and killer T-cells engaged in
direct conflict. Cancer cells have two types with respect to their immune evasion
strategies, selfish and cooperative. Selfish cells employ strategies that benefit no cancer
cell other than itself. These strategies involve the evolution of crypticity by down-
regulating tumor-specific antigens on the cells’ surface, resulting in a failure by the killer
T-cells of the immune system to recognize them as cancerous cells. Cooperative cells on
the other hand use strategies that benefit every tumor cell within the neighborhood.
Such strategies involve immunosuppression by sending signals to regulatory T-cells
that will in turn deactivate killer T-cells. Selfish and cooperative cells may be viewed
as defectors and contributors in a public goods game, as being selfish is always the
individually optimal strategy – maximizing the proliferative potential of the given cell
– while cooperation is the socially optimal one – maximizing the proliferative potential
of the tumor. The chapter contains analytical results as well as simulations, considering
multiple types of immunotherapy with two main results: (1) Introducing treatment
focusing on the selfish phenotype, e.g. by unmasking the cells evolving crypticity and
activating the killer T-cells, pushes the tumor towards cooperation. As the cells’ private
incentive to be selfish diminishes, cooperation inside the tumor will evolve and cancer’s
immunosuppression will intensify. As a result, the patient’s prognosis may worsen by
the treatment. (2) Introducing treatment interfering with cancer’s immunosuppressive
ability has less effect on the cancer’s composition, as cancer cells have an incentive to
be selfish with and without the therapy. As a result, the tumor’s immunosuppression
will diminish, and patient prognosis improves by the treatment.
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Chapter 2
Adaptive learning in weighted
network games
“Learning never exhausts the mind.”
Leonardo da Vinci
This chapter1 studies adaptive learning in the class of weighted network games. This class
of games includes applications like research and development within interlinked firms, crime
within social networks, the economics of pollution, and defense expenditures within allied
nations. We show that for every weighted network game, the set of pure Nash equilibria
is non-empty and, generically, finite. Pairs of players are shown to have jointly profitable
deviations from interior Nash equilibria. If all interaction weights are either non-negative or
non-positive, then Nash equilibria are Pareto inefficient. We show that quite general learning
processes converge to a Nash equilibrium of a weighted network game if every player updates
with some regularity.
2.1 Introduction
The theory of learning is of fundamental importance in game theory. With most of
the focus in the non-cooperative game theory literature being devoted to the study
of equilibria – various concepts, characterizations of the equilibrium set, properties,
1This chapter is based upon Bayer, Herings, Peeters, and Thuijsman (2017). I would like to thank
Pe´ter B´ıro´, Yann Bramoulle´, and Mark Voorneveld for their comments, as well as Sebastian Bervoets
and Mathieu Faure for feedback and suggestions.
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refinements – it is critical to understand how equilibrium is reached. However, the main
concepts of equilibrium theory, and in particular, the concept of Nash equilibrium,
have proven difficult to validate, especially in one-shot games. To quote Fudenberg
and Levine (1998): “One traditional explanation of equilibrium is that it results from
analysis and introspection by the players in a situation where the rules of the game,
the rationality of the players, and the players’ payoff functions are common knowledge.
Both conceptually and empirically, these theories have many problems.” One of the
main goals of learning in game theory is to provide such a motivation. For one-shot
games this is typically achieved by interpreting the equilibrium points as results of
a series of updates by the players acting in a recurrent setting of that game. These
updates are made in response to observed moves by their opponents, with various
assumptions on rationality. Ideally, as the players discover more about the game and
about their opponents, their collective decisions should, in time, resemble equilibrium
play. As such, the learning literature focuses mainly on the stability and convergence
properties of various learning processes.
The class of games in which we frame our analysis is the class of weighted network
games. This class of games corresponds to the private provision of local public goods
games introduced by Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2007) for undirected graphs and gener-
alized by Bramoulle´ et al. (2014) for weighted networks. For a comprehensive overview
of related models, see Sections 3 and 4 of Jackson and Zenou (2014). The main prac-
tical reason this class of games is worth studying, is its wide range of applications in
various subfields of economic theory, including R&D within interlinked firms (Ko¨nig
et al., 2014), crime within a social network (Ballester et al., 2006), and peer effects
with spatial interactions (Blume et al., 2010). Further applications include pollution
models as in Leontief (1970) as well as defense expenditures within an international
community as studied by Sandler and Hartley (1995) and Sandler and Hartley (2007).
Networks offer a simple way to model complex interactions between many decision
makers. The simplest network models are undirected graphs, in which a link between
a pair of players indicates a direct interaction. Since players may be indirectly affected
by the neighbors of their neighbors, and so on, each interaction may be relevant for
each player, resulting in a profoundly rich model. In weighted networks, interaction
weights with arbitrary values, either positive or negative, are used to characterize the
way that pairs of interacting players influence each other.
The parameters of a weighted network game are the weighted network itself, de-
scribing the interactions between the players, a vector of targets that describes the
players’ needs, and a vector of upper bounds representing the players’ highest possible
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activity levels. Each player has a concave benefit function of the weighted aggregate
activity and a linear cost function of his own activity. We show that the set of Nash
equilibria of weighted network games is non-empty and generically finite. Additionally,
we show that under quite general conditions pairs of players can jointly improve their
payoffs, so Nash equilibria are not strong. We also give conditions such that they are
not Pareto efficient.
We study a class of learning processes with the following features. The players
update their decisions at discrete points in time, maximizing their payoffs for a single
period. The updates determine the status quo of the next period. At any given period,
only one player is allowed to update, the actions of every other player remain the same.
This class of learning processes includes e.g. the improvement paths of Monderer and
Shapley (1996).
Weighted network games are generalized aggregative games (Dubey et al., 2006),
as well as best-response potential games (Voorneveld, 2000), but may not belong to
the class of ordinal potential games (Monderer and Shapley, 1996). Since weighted
network games generally do not have an ordinal potential, better-response dynamics
may not converge, and we show the possibility of non-convergence by an example.
Our main results concern the properties of adaptive learning processes centered
around the best responses. We find that convergence to the set of Nash equilibria
requires two conditions: (1) each update has to take the player closer to his contempo-
rary best response, and (2) with some regularity, every player must have the possibility
to update. Furthermore, we show that such processes converge to a Nash equilibrium
point, if (3) the set of Nash equilibria is finite. The first and second condition concerns
the players and may be interpreted as assumptions of cautiousness and activity, re-
spectively. The third condition concerns the parameters of the weighted network game
and is generically satisfied. The main significance of our results is in the fact that the
convergence of learning processes to a Nash equilibrium can be achieved with relatively
weak assumptions on the behavior of the players. Our convergence conditions are less
demanding than those studied before, and weakening either of (1) and (2) would lead
to non-convergence.
As revision opportunities are generally scarce in real-life applications, the analysis
of general, discrete-time learning processes are necessary to provide motivation for the
use of Nash equilibria. To our knowledge, the paper on which chapter is based upon is
the first to do so in the setting of weighted network games. Bramoulle´ et al. (2014) and
Bervoets and Faure (2019) study best-response dynamics in continuous time. Bervoets
et al. (2016) considers a two-stage stochastic learning process with experimenting play-
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ers that converges with probability one. Eksin et al. (2012) considers a similar game
of incomplete information played on a graph. Unlike the papers examining continuous
learning processes, our results make full use of the global properties of the best-response
potential and hence we are able to make predictions on processes with erratic move-
ments. These processes may correspond to decision makers who make mistakes either
by result of a “trembling hand” or due to a lack of sophistication. Therefore, both our
setting and our results are behaviorally motivated.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 introduces weighted network
games. Section 2.3 contains the characterization of the set of Nash equilibria and
its welfare properties. In Section 2.4 we define learning processes and discuss their
cycling properties. Section 2.5 contains our main results, the convergence conditions
of learning processes. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Weighted network games
Let I = {1, . . . , n} denote the set of players with n ≥ 2. The action set of player i ∈ I
is Xi = [0, xi] with xi > 0. Let xi ∈ Xi denote player i’s action. The action profile
of all players is denoted by x = (xj)j∈I and the action profile of all players except
i by x−i = (xj)j 6=i. Similarly, X =
∏
i∈I Xi denotes the set of action profiles and
X−i =
∏
j∈I\{i}Xj the set of action profiles for all players other than i.
Definition 2.2.1. The tuple G = (I,X, (pii)i∈I) is called a weighted network game if
for every i ∈ I the payoff function pii : X → R is given by:
pii(x) = fi
(∑
j∈I
wijxj
)
− cixi,
with cost parameters ci > 0, interaction weights wij ∈ R, and benefit functions fi : R→
R.
Assumption 2.2.2. For every i ∈ I, wii = 1, and for every i, j ∈ I, wij = wji.
Furthermore, for every i ∈ I, the benefit function fi is twice continuously differentiable
and satisfies the following properties: (1) f ′i > 0, (2) f
′′
i < 0, and (3) there exists ti ∈ R
such that f ′i(ti)− ci = 0.
The interpretation is the following. Each player i ∈ I produces a specialized good using
a linear production technology. The costs of producing one unit of the good are equal
to ci. The production of player i is denoted by xi. Each player consumes his own good
as well as a weighted sum of his neighbors’ goods. The total amount of consumption
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of player i is
∑
j∈I wijxj and the benefit of consumption is fi(
∑
j∈I wijxj). The con-
sumption level ti where the marginal benefits of consumption are equal to ci is called
the target value. Note that since ti can be above or below values achievable by using
action profiles in X, property (3) of the benefit function is without loss of generality.
For player i, the interaction weight wij captures the substitutability of one unit of
player j’s good to his own. If wij > 0, then player j’s production generates positive
externalities for player i. Specifically, if wij = 1, then player i’s enjoyment of player
j’s good equals that of his own good. If wij ∈ (0, 1), then player i derives less benefits
from player j’s good than from his own. If wij ∈ (1,∞), then player i enjoys the good
of player j more than that of his own. Negative values of wij indicate that player
j’s production has negative external effects on player i’s benefits, with wij ∈ (0,−1),
wij = −1, and wij ∈ (−1,−∞) indicating that the negative effects are smaller, equal,
or greater in magnitude than the positive effects of equal amounts of the own good. The
assumption wii = 1 is a normalization. The symmetry assumption wij = wji for i, j ∈ I
is also made in previous studies like Dubey et al. (2006), Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2007),
and Bramoulle´ et al. (2014). The asymmetric case wij 6= wji is relatively unexplored
in the local public good setting and hence an interesting direction for future research,
see Bourle`s et al. (2017) for a model of transfers with asymmetric interactions. The
interaction weights are collected in a matrix W.
Example 2.2.3. Let I = {1, 2} be a set of two countries that have to decide on the
level of their defense expenditures. We take Xi = [0, Zi], where Zi denotes the GDP
of Country i ∈ I, and
W =
(
1 w12
w12 1
)
.
The increasing, concave functions f1 and f2 indicate the countries’ benefits from de-
fense. Let ti = 0.01Zi, indicating that both countries have a target value for defense
expenditure of 1% of their GDP. This is the amount they would spend on defense if
the other nation spends nothing.
If w12 = 0, then neither country benefits from the other’s defense expenditure, nor
are they threatened by it. This may indicate neutrality or a significant geographical
distance. If w12 > 0, the two nations are allies and the game becomes a game of
strategic substitutes. In this case both nations benefit from the other’s defense spending
and national defense expenditures are likely to be lower than 1% of GDP. If w12 < 0, the
two nations are hostile to each other, and the game is a game of strategic complements.
In this case the nations are hurt or threatened by the other’s defense spending and
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defense expenditures will likely exceed 1% of GDP.
In case w12 = 1, Example 2.2.3 results in the 2-player pure public good model of
defense expenditure between allies, while 0 < w12 < 1 gives the symmetric version of
the limited substitutability public good model of defense expenditure between allies,
developed by Sandler and Hartley (2001). They do not consider the case w12 < 0.
In the subsequent section, we discuss how the set of Nash equilibria of this particular
game depends on the parameters t1, t2, and w12 in more detail.
Our setup allows the modeling of more intricate relationships between players, as
illustrated by the following example.
Example 2.2.4. Let I = {1, 2, 3} be a set of three countries deciding on the level of
their defense expenditures, Xi = [0, Zi], and
W =

1 −1 1
−1 1 1
1 1 1
 ,
and t = (0.03Z1, 0.03Z2, 0.01Z3). In this example, Countries 1 and 2 are rivals, but
both of them are friendly to Country 3. An example of this type of relationship may
be that of Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the U.S. since the 2000s.
Example 2.2.4 and similar examples that feature intransitive relationships between
countries cannot be modeled in the spirit of Sandler and Hartley (2001). Our setup
therefore reflects more closely the possible intricacies of diplomatic relationships and
can be used to model any system of alliances and threats, provided that the relationship
between any two nations is symmetric.
Games with strategic substitutes and complements are of great relevance in the
economic literature. The game of Example 2.2.3 can be interpreted as a game where
two firms choose their output to maximize their profits, with the interaction weight w12
deciding whether their products are net substitutes or net complements. An interaction
matrix similar to the one of Example 2.2.4 may describe the relationship between two
competitor firms producing substitute goods, e.g. plane manufacturers Airbus and
Boeing, and a third firm producing a complementary good, e.g. a kerosene supplier
Exxon Mobil. Other such examples include gaming consoles, XBox and Playstation
with a game developer EA Sports, or tea companies Lipton and Twinings with a sugar
company Su¨dzucker. Weighted network games provide a framework to model any type
of relationship structure with any number of companies. As it will be apparent later,
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our main results extend to Bertrand and Cournot games of differentiated products and
linear demand curves, since weighted network games are best-response equivalent to
such games.
We denote the set of weighted network games satisfying Assumption 2.2.2 by G.
Since wii = 1 for every i ∈ I and wij = wji for every i, j ∈ I, the number of free
parameters in W is n(n−1)/2. Let w ∈ Rn(n−1)/2 denote the column vector of the upper
triangular elements of W . We define the set of parameters P = Rn++×Rn(n−1)/2×Rn.
Then, for (x,w, t) ∈ P, let G(x,w, t) be the set of weighted network games in G with
upper bounds x, interaction weights w, and targets t. A weighted network game in
such a set is characterized by the benefit functions fi and cost parameters ci.
The properties in Assumption 2.2.2 imply that for every x−i ∈ X−i, pii(xi, x−i)
has a unique global maximizer in Xi. For player i ∈ I, let bi : X → Xi denote his
best-response function, i.e. bi(x) = argmax xi∈Xi pii(xi, x−i) for every x ∈ X. We
now show that for a fixed configuration (x,w, t) ∈ P , all games in G(x,w, t) are best-
response equivalent, which implies that all games in G(x,w, t) have the same set of
Nash equilibria.
Lemma 2.2.5. Let (x,w, t) ∈ P and let G ∈ G(x,w, t) be a weighted network game.
For every i ∈ I and x ∈ X it holds that
bi(x) =

0 if ti −
∑
j 6=i wijxj < 0,
ti −
∑
j 6=i wijxj if ti −
∑
j 6=i wijxj ∈ [0, xi],
xi if ti −
∑
j 6=i wijxj > xi.
(2.1)
Proof. By differentiation of the payoff function we get
∂pii(xi, x−i)
∂xi
= f ′i(
∑
j∈I
wijxj)− ci.
The first order condition of unconstrained maximization is satisfied if f ′i(
∑
j∈I wijxj)−
ci = 0. Using property (3) of fi this is satisfied if
∑
j∈I wijxj = ti.
If ti −
∑
j 6=i wijxj ∈ [0, xi], then it follows that bi(x) = ti −
∑
j 6=i wijxj . Note that
the second order condition of maximization is satisfied due to the concavity of fi, and,
therefore, of pii.
If ti −
∑
j 6=i wijxj < 0, then for every xi ∈ Xi it holds that ti <
∑
j∈I wijxj .
Invoking properties (2) and (3) of fi, for every xi ∈ Xi we have f ′i(
∑
j∈I wijxj) < ci,
meaning that ∂pii(xi, x−i)/∂xi is uniformly negative. Therefore, pii is maximized for
the lowest possible value of xi, so bi(x) = 0.
19
Similarly, if ti −
∑
j 6=i wijxj > xi, then for every xi ∈ Xi it holds that ti >∑
j∈I wijxj . Properties (2) and (3) of fi guarantee that for every xi ∈ Xi we have
f ′i(
∑
j∈I wijxj) > ci, and that ∂pii(xi, x−i)/∂xi is uniformly positive. Therefore, pii
is maximized for the highest possible value of xi, so bi(x) = xi. This concludes the
proof. 
It is useful to define a player’s unconstrained best response, the contribution level a
player would choose if instead of [0, xi], the set of available actions were equal to R.
For player i ∈ I and action profile x ∈ X, let b̂i(x) = ti−
∑
j 6=i wijxj denote this value.
Clearly, b̂i(x) 6= bi(x) implies that ti −
∑
j 6=i wijxj 6∈ [0, xi] and therefore the actual
best response is on the boundary: bi(x) ∈ {0, xi}.
For i ∈ I, we define the numbers bi and bi by bi = minx−i∈X−i(ti−
∑
j 6=i wijxj) and
bi = maxx−i∈X−i(ti −
∑
j 6=i wijxj). Since the set X−i is compact, both bi and bi are
well-defined. It is easily seen that the unconstrained best response of player i always
belongs to the interval [bi, bi].
Lemma 2.2.5 shows that for every player i ∈ I and every action profile x ∈ X such
that bi(x) ∈ (0, xi), ceteris paribus changing player j’s action by ∆xj changes player
i’s best response by −wij∆xj .
2.3 Nash equilibria
Since this chapter’s main focus is on the convergence of adaptive learning processes to
the set of Nash equilibria, as a precursor we characterize the relevant properties of this
set.
We first show that a weighted network game from Definition 2.2.1 satisfying As-
sumption 2.2.2 is a best-response potential game (Voorneveld, 2000). A game with set
of players I, action space X, and payoff functions (pii)i∈I is a best-response potential
game if there exists a function φ : X → R such that for every i ∈ I and every x ∈ X it
holds that
argmax
xi∈Xi
pii(xi, x−i) = argmax
xi∈Xi
φ(xi, x−i). (2.2)
We call φ the best-response potential of game (I,X, pi). In the following proposition
we show that every weighted network game is a best-response potential game and use
φ to characterize the set of Nash equilibria. For (x,w, t) ∈ P, let X∗(x,w, t) denote
the set of Nash equilibria of a game in G(x,w, t).
Proposition 2.3.1. For every (x,w, t) ∈ P, it holds that:
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1. Every game G ∈ G(x,w, t) is a best-response potential game with the potential
φ : X → R defined by
φ(x) = x>t− 12x>Wx, x ∈ X.
2. X∗(x,w, t) 6= ∅.
3. x∗ ∈ X∗(x,w, t) if and only if x∗ satisfies the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) con-
ditions, i.e. for every i ∈ I, there exist λi, µi ∈ R+ such that
ti −
∑
j∈I wijx
∗
j + λi − µi = 0,
x∗i ≥ 0, xi ≥ x∗i ,
λix
∗
i = 0, µi(xi − x∗i ) = 0.
The proof of Proposition 2.3.1 can be found in the Appendix.
The best-response potential allows for a simple characterization of the set of Nash
equilibria as the solution set of a KKT problem. The existence of a Nash equilibrium
immediately follows due to the bounded action space. In case the action space is
unbounded, negative interaction weights may cause an infinite increase of best replies,
leading to nonexistence.
Proposition 2.3.1 is related to Lemma 1 of Bramoulle´ et al. (2014), which applies to
weighted network games for which φ is an ordinal potential in the sense of Monderer
and Shapley (1996). Weighted network games in our class G do not generally admit
an ordinal potential. In fact, Example 2.4.5 shows that better-response dynamics can
lead to cycles in our set-up, which is incompatible with the existence of an ordinal
potential. Proposition 2.3.1 therefore only makes the weaker claim that φ is a best-
response potential.
The existence of a best-response potential is of particular interest for a wide class
of games. Their significance in the aggregative/network games strand of literature
was first pointed out by Kukushkin (2004). Ewerhart (2017) studies this question in
the class of contest games. It is a pivotal step in our analysis as well for its strong
implications on the convergence properties of best-response dynamics.
Since weighted network games are also generalized aggregative games (Jensen,
2010), the existence of the best-response potential also follows from more general re-
sults in the literature. In particular, it can be shown that the pseudo-potential of
Theorem 1 in Dubey et al. (2006) simplifies into the quadratic function φ.
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In addition to φ being a best-response potential, for network games on unweighted
graphs, Bervoets and Faure (2019) show that locally, φ serves as an ordinal potential,
i.e:
sgn
(∂pii(xi, x−i)
∂xi
)
= sgn
(∂φ(xi, x−i)
∂xi
)
.
This property can be easily generalized for weighted network games.
In what follows we use the characterization of Proposition 2.3.1 to derive conditions
for the interaction matrix and the vector of targets that guarantee the equilibrium set
to be finite. For (x,w, t) ∈ P, let Ξ(x,w, t) denote the set of solutions (x, λ, µ) to the
conditions of Proposition 2.3.1. For H ⊆ I, let
ΞH(x,w, t) = {(x, λ, µ) ∈ Ξ(x,w, t) : ∀i ∈ H,λi = µi = 0, and
∀i ∈ I \H,max{λi, µi} > 0}.
In words, ΞH(x,w, t) denotes the set of solutions to the KKT conditions of Proposition
2.3.1 such that for every player in H neither complementarity condition is binding and
for every player outside H exactly one complementarity condition is binding. Note
that both complementarity conditions cannot be binding simultaneously.
The set X∗H(x,w, t) is obtained by taking the projection of ΞH(x,w, t) to the set
of action profiles X, X∗H(x,w, t) = projX ΞH(x,w, t), where projX is the projection
mapping into X. If x∗ ∈ X∗H(x,w, t), then x∗ ∈ X∗(x,w, t) and for every i ∈ I \H we
have x∗i ∈ {0, xi}. It follows that X∗(x,w, t) =
⋃
H⊆I X
∗
H(x,w, t). Then, clearly, the
set of Nash equilibria X∗(x,w, t) is finite if and only if for every H ⊆ I, X∗H(x,w, t) is
finite.
Let bounds x ∈ Rn++, interaction weights w ∈ Rn(n−1), and a set H ⊆ I be given.
The set of target vectors for which X∗H(x,w, t) is infinite is denoted by
TH = {t ∈ Rn : |X∗H(x,w, t)| =∞}.
The set TH denotes its closure. Further, let
T = {t ∈ Rn : |X∗(x,w, t)| =∞}
denote the set of target vectors that yield infinitely many Nash equilibria and let T
denote the closure of T .
Lemma 2.3.2. For every x ∈ Rn++, for every w ∈ Rn(n−1)/2, for every H ⊆ I, the set
TH has Lebesgue measure zero.
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Proof. Let some x ∈ Rn++, some w ∈ Rn(n−1)/2, and some H ⊆ I be given.
First consider the case H = ∅. Then, for every t ∈ Rn it holds that X∗∅ (x,w, t) ⊆∏
i∈I{0, xi}, meaning that for every t ∈ Rn we have |X∗∅ (x,w, t)| <∞. It follows that
T∅ = T ∅ = ∅.
Now consider the case H 6= ∅. We show that there exists a set UH ⊂ Rn of Lebesgue
measure zero such that TH ⊆ UH .
For every t ∈ Rn, for every x∗ ∈ X∗H(x,w, t), we have that
x∗i ∈ {0, xi}, i ∈ I \H,
ti −
∑
j∈H wijx
∗
j −
∑
j∈I\H wijx
∗
j = 0, i ∈ H.
Let WH = (wij)i,j∈H denote the submatrix of W that we obtain by removing every
row and every column whose index is not contained in H. Further, let WH,−H =
(wij)i∈H,j∈I\H , tH = (ti)i∈H , x∗H = (x
∗
i )i∈H , and x
∗
−H = (x
∗
i )i∈I\H . Now, the previous
system of equations can be written in matrix form as
WHx
∗
H = tH −WH,−Hx∗−H . (2.3)
Therefore, by the Rouche´-Capelli theorem, |X∗H(x,w, t)| =∞ implies rank(WH) < |H|.
So TH = TH = ∅ whenever rank(WH) = |H|. Consider the case where rank(WH) <
|H|. For y ∈ ∏i∈I\H{0, xi}, let UyH be the set of target vectors t such that tH −
WH,−Hy belongs to the span of WH . Notice that U
y
H is an (n − |H| + rank(WH))-
dimensional vector space and therefore a closed set of Lebesgue measure zero. Let
UH =
⋃
y∈∏i∈I{0,xi} UyH . Since UH is a union of finitely many closed sets of Lebesgue
measure zero, it is also closed and is of Lebesgue measure zero. Notice that t ∈ Rn\UH
implies that t ∈ Rn \ TH , since for every t ∈ Rn \ UH the system
WHx
∗
H = tH −WH,−Hx∗−H
has no solutions in x∗H . It follows that TH ⊆ UH . Furthermore, since UH is closed, we
also have TH ⊆ UH . 
We prove Lemma 2.3.2 for the closure of the set TH , which implies that the set of target
vectors with infinitely many Nash equilibria is not only small in a measure theoretic
sense, but also in a topological sense.
The intuition behind Lemma 2.3.2 is that for a fixed subset of players, the set
of interior Nash equilibria corresponds to the solution set of a linear system which,
generically, has only one solution. The case of infinitely many solutions, and hence, the
possibility of infinitely many Nash equilibria obtains only if the rank of the interaction
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matrix is not full and the target vector belongs to a vector space parallel to the span
of the interaction matrix, which is only the case for a set of target vectors of Lebesgue
measure zero.
As an illustation of Lemma 2.3.2 for the case where all targets are very large or very
small, i.e. for every i ∈ I we have ti > maxx∈X
∑
j∈I wijxj or ti < minx∈X
∑
j∈I wijxj ,
the set of Nash equilibria is a subset of the corners of the strategy space X, i.e.
X∗(x,w, t) ⊆∏i∈I{0, xi}, and is therefore finite.
Lemma 2.3.3. For every x ∈ Rn++, for every w ∈ Rn(n−1)/2, the set T has Lebesgue
measure zero.
Proof. We show that there exists a set U ⊆ Rn of Lebesgue measure zero such that
T ⊆ U .
Let U =
⋃
H⊆I UH . Since U is a union of finitely many sets of Lebesgue measure
zero, it has Lebesgue measure zero. Since T =
⋃
H⊆I TH , and TH ⊆ UH for every
H ⊆ I, it also holds that T ⊆ U . Once again, since U is closed, we have T ⊆ U . 
Corollary 2.3.4. For every x ∈ Rn++, for every w ∈ Rn(n−1)/2, for almost every
t ∈ Rn, the weighted network game G ∈ G(x,w, t) has a finite number of Nash equilibria.
The generic finiteness of the set of Nash equilibria is illustrated in the following example.
Example 2.3.5. Fix parameters x and w12 in a weighted network game with two play-
ers. We have shown in Corollary 2.3.4 that for almost every t ∈ R2 the set X∗(x,w12, t)
is finite. For every t ∈ R2, the set X∗∅ (x,w12, t) is trivially finite, and it is easy to see
that the sets X∗{1}(x,w12, t) and X
∗
{2}(x,w12, t) are finite in the case of two players.
We therefore only check the interior solutions to the KKT problem of this game as
defined in Proposition 2.3.1, i.e. where all Lagrange parameters λi, µi are zero. In an
interior solution x∗ ∈ X∗{1,2}(x,w12, t), we have b̂1(x∗) = x∗1 and b̂2(x∗) = x∗2, therefore
x∗1 = t1 − w12x∗2,
x∗2 = t2 − w12x∗1.
In case w12 is not equal to 1 or −1, rearranging yields
x∗1 =
t1−w12t2
1−(w12)2 ,
x∗2 =
t2−w12t1
1−(w12)2 .
Therefore, for every w12 ∈ R \ {−1, 1}, we have |X∗{1,2}(x,w12, t)| ≤ 1. Whether or not
the set of interior equilibria is empty depends on whether x∗ is an element of X.
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If w12 = −1, it is easy to check that t1 = t2 = 0 yields infinitely many Nash
equilibria x∗ with x∗1 = x
∗
2. There can also be infinitely many Nash equilibria when
t1 + t2 = 0. There are no interior Nash equilibria for different values of t as then the
system of best responses is inconsistent. Similarly, if w12 = 1 then there can only
be infinitely many Nash equilibria if t1 = t2. Indeed, if x1 + x2 > t1, then there are
infinitely many Nash equilibria x∗ with x∗1 + x
∗
2 = t1, if x1 + x2 = t1, then there is a
unique interior Nash equilibrium, and if x1 + x2 < t1, then there are no interior Nash
equilibria.
Our result makes use of the generic uniqueness of interior equilibria, but the network
structure allows for the existence of a finite number of corner equilibria. Ballester and
Calvo´-Armengol (2010), Belhaj et al. (2014) and Allouch (2015) provide results for the
uniqueness of Nash equilibrium.
We conclude this section by discussing efficiency properties of equilibria. We con-
sider efficiency in the Pareto sense. Other models consider efficiency in terms of mini-
mizing total efforts/production (Bramoulle´ and Kranton, 2007; Goyal, 2012), or max-
imizing total welfare (Bramoulle´ and Kranton, 2007; Helsley and Zenou, 2014). We
first show that a pair of players with a non-zero interaction weight can always jointly
deviate from an interior equilibrium to a better action profile. For a subset of players
H ⊆ I and δ ∈ R, let δH ∈ Rn denote the vector such that δHi = δ for i ∈ H and
δHi = 0 for i ∈ I \H.
Proposition 2.3.6. Let (x,w, t) ∈ P be given. Let x∗ ∈ X∗(x,w, t) be a Nash equi-
librium of a game G = (I,X, pi) ∈ G(x,w, t) such that x∗i ∈ (0, xi) and x∗j ∈ (0, xj). It
holds that:
1. If for some i, j ∈ I with i 6= j it holds that wij 6= 0, then there exists δ ∈
(0,min{x∗i , x∗j , xi − x∗i , xj − x∗j}) such that pii(x∗) < pii(x∗ + sgn(wij)δ{i,j}) and
pij(x
∗) < pij(x∗ + sgn(wij)δ{i,j}).
2. If w ≥ 0 or w ≤ 0 and, for some i, j ∈ I with i 6= j, it holds that wij 6= 0,
then there exists δ ∈ (0,min{x∗i , x∗j , xi− x∗i , xj − x∗j}) such that the action profile
x∗ + sgn(wij)δ{i,j} is a Pareto improvement over x∗.
The proof of Proposition 2.3.6 can be found in the Appendix.
Proposition 2.3.6 implies that interior Nash equilibria are not strong Nash equilibria
since there are profitable deviations by coalitions of two linked players. Moreover,
interior Nash equilibria are not Pareto efficient provided that the interaction weights
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are either all non-negative or all non-positive. See Elliott and Golub (2019) for a
characterization of efficient Nash equilibria in the non-negative case.
2.4 Cycling of learning processes
Within the framework of weighted network games, we consider learning processes where
players update their strategies sequentially. That is, given some initial action profile,
one player changes his action, while that of every other player remains the same. Then,
another player makes a change under similar circumstances, and so on. We improve
upon existing results (Kukushkin, 2004; Dubey et al., 2006), which show acyclicity
of best-response dynamics by identifying the conditions under which a general class of
learning processes (particularly, the better-response dynamics) may cycle. We find that
learning processes may cycle if and only if players move away from or radically overshoot
the best response. Since the non-existence of best-response cycles is a necessary but not
sufficient condition of the convergence of best-response dynamics (Kukushkin, 2015),
this is a crucial step towards our convergence results.
Let N denote the set of positive integers and let K = {{1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}, . . .} ∪N be a
collection of index sets. For K ∈ K, we denote by K− the set that results from K by
leaving out its highest element. Notice that K− is equal to K if K = N.
Definition 2.4.1. Let some G ∈ G and K ∈ K be given. A sequence of action profiles
(xk)k∈K is a path in the game G if:
1. For each k ∈ K− there exists a player ik such that xk+1−ik = xk−ik ,
2. There is at least one k ∈ K− such that xk+1 6= xk.
If xk+1−ik = x
k
−ik , and x
k+1
ik
6= xkik , then we call ik the updating player at period k.
As per Definition 2.4.1, a path is a sequence where at most one player has changed
his contribution between any two successive action profiles, while there are at least two
different action profiles in the sequence.
Definition 2.4.2. Let some G ∈ G and K ∈ K be given. A path (xk)k∈K is best-
response compatible in the game G if for every k ∈ K− it holds that:
1. If xk+1 = xk, then there exists ik ∈ I such that xk+1
ik
= xkik = bik(x
k).
2. If xk+1
ik
6= xkik , then xk+1ik = bik(xk).
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Definition 2.4.3. Let some G ∈ G and K ∈ K be given. A path (xk)k∈K is better-
response compatible in game G if for every k ∈ K− it holds that:
1. If xk+1 = xk, then there exists ik ∈ I such that xk+1
ik
= xkik = bik(x
k).
2. If xk+1
ik
6= xkik , then piik(xk+1) > piik(xk).
Definitions 2.4.2 and 2.4.3 capture two of the simplest and best-known learning pro-
cesses. In case of a best-response compatible path, each updating player moves to his
best available option. In case of a better-response compatible path, updating players
are only required to strictly improve their payoffs. Clearly, a best-response compatible
path is also a better-response compatible path.
Definition 2.4.4. Let some G ∈ G and K = {1, . . . ,m} ∈ K be given. A finite path
(xk)k∈K in the game G is a cycle if x1 = xm.
It is well known that best-response dynamics do not produce cycles in best-response
potential games (Voorneveld, 2000), which includes weighted network games by Propo-
sition 2.3.1. Better-response dynamics do not generate cycles in ordinal potential games
(Monderer and Shapley, 1996). The following example shows that better-response cy-
cles can occur within weighted network games.
Example 2.4.5. Let I = {1, 2}, X1 = X2 = [0, 4], and t1 = t2 = 1. Moreover, let the
payoff functions be given by
pi1(x1, x2) = 2
√
x1 + 0.6x2 − x1
and
pi2(x1, x2) = 2
√
x2 + 0.6x1 − x2.
It is easy to check that pi1 and pi2 satisfy the properties laid down in Definition 2.2.1
and Assumption 2.2.2 with w12 = 0.6, f1(z) = f2(z) = 2
√
z, and c1 = c2 = 1.
Table 2.1 presents a sequence of action profiles that constitutes a better-response
cycle for this example.
Note that the changes in player 1’s choice of actions between periods 1 and 2 and
between periods 3 and 4, as well as those for player 2 between periods 4 and 5 and
between periods 6 and 7 are quite large, given the action space. Columns 5 and 6 of
Table 2.2 present for each period the distance between the current action and both the
best response and the action chosen by the player updating his action. Notice that in
periods 1 and 4, the actions chosen are more than twice as far away from the current
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k xk1 x
k
2 pi1(x
k) pi2(x
k)
1 0 0.1 0.49 0.53
2 3 0.1 0.50 2.66
3 3 0 0.46 2.68
4 0.1 0 0.53 0.49
5 0.1 3 2.66 0.50
6 0 3 2.68 0.46
7 0 0.1 0.49 0.53
Table 2.1: Actions played and payoffs in the better-response cycle in Example 2.4.5.
action than the best response is, meaning that the updating player, despite the increase
in payoffs, has moved farther from his optimal decision than he originally was. We refer
to this as extreme overshooting beyond the best response. This chapter’s main result
is showing that a lack of extreme overshooting is a sufficient and necessary condition
of convergence in the class of learning processes centered in the best responses.
k xk1 x
k
2 bik(x
k) |bik(xk)− xkik | |xk+1ik − xkik | αk
1 0 0.1 0.94 0.94 3 −2.19
2 3 0.1 0 0.1 0.1 0
3 3 0 1 2 2.9 −0.45
4 0.1 0 0.94 0.94 3 −2.19
5 0.1 3 0 0.1 0.1 0
6 0 3 1 2 2.9 −0.45
7 0 0.1
Table 2.2: The size of action changes in the better-response cycle of Table 2.1.
As before, for a path (xk)k∈K , let (ik)k∈K− denote the updating player in period
k if there was a change in the action profile and let it denote any other player if there
was not. Furthermore, for k ∈ K−, let the overshooting coefficient αk ∈ R∪ {−∞,∞}
be defined as
αk =
xk+1
ik
− bik(xk)
xk
ik
− bik(xk)
,
where we take the convention that in case the denominator is 0, αk = −∞ if the
numerator is negative, αk = 0 if the numerator is 0, and αk = +∞ if the numerator is
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positive. Column 7 of Table 2.2 shows the values of αk in the better-response cycle of
Example 2.4.5.
The coefficient αk determines the extent of overshooting of the updating player
beyond the best response. If there is overshooting, then αk is negative. There is no
overshooting if αk is positive. If αk = 0 then the updating player moved to the best
response. If αk ∈ {−∞,∞} then xk+1ik 6= xkik = bik(xk), so the player moved away from
a best response. If αk < −1, then the new action is farther from the best response
relative to the action before the update.
Values of αk in (0, 1) correspond to a better response, while in case αk > 1 the
payoff of the updating player is lower than before. For negative values of αk, the
threshold between better and worse replies depends on the payoff function. Naturally,
the possible values that αk may take depend on x.
As suggested by Example 2.4.5, sequences of action profiles that feature extreme
overshooting beyond the best response may cycle. We therefore characterize sequences
by their extent of overshooting.
Definition 2.4.6. A path (xk)k∈K in a game G ∈ G is α-centered for some α > 0 if
for every k ∈ K− it holds that |αk| < α.
A best-response compatible path is α-centered for every α > 0. Furthermore, for
every α > 0 there exist paths that are better-response compatible and α-centered, but
are not best-response compatible. For instance, it is easy to see that every sequence
(αk)k∈K− such that for every k ∈ K−, αk ∈ [0,min{α2 , 12}], is both α-centered and
better-response compatible.
The restriction of being α-centered on a better-response dynamic captures a form
of cautiousness by the players, as they do not engage in updates that take them very
far from their optimal choice. For finite values of α, players do not change their action
in an α-centered path if they are at their best response, as that would imply |αk| =∞.
Alternatively, α can be thought of as a measure of inaccuracy of best-responding players
who are unable to execute their intended strategies.
For the remainder of this chapter we mainly consider α-centered paths with α ∈
(0, 1). In these paths, every updating player moves closer to his current best response.
We define the overshooting coefficient α̂k similar to αk, replacing the best-response
function b with the unconstrained best-response function b̂. For a path of action profiles
(xk)k∈K , we define
α̂k =
xk+1
ik
− b̂ik(xk)
xk
ik
− b̂ik(xk)
, k ∈ K−.
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The relationship between αk and α̂k is summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.4.7. Let (xk)k∈K be a path of action profiles in a game G ∈ G. The following
statements hold for every k ∈ K−:
(i) αk 6= α̂k implies bik(xk) ∈ {0, xik}.
(ii) αk ∈ (0, 1) implies α̂k ∈ (0, 1).
(iii) αk ∈ (−1, 0) implies αk = α̂k.
(iv) αk = 0 implies 0 ≤ α̂k ≤ 1.
(v) α̂k = 1 implies x
k+1 = xk.
Proof. (i). If bik(x
k) ∈ (0, xik), then it holds that bik(xk) = b̂ik(xk) and thus αk = α̂k.
(ii). We only need to consider the case αk 6= α̂k. By (i) we have bik(xk) ∈ {0, xik}.
Take the case bik(x
k) = 0. Then it holds that b̂ik(x
k) < 0, so xk+1
ik
< xkik due to
0 < αk < 1, and thus
0 < αk =
xk+1
ik
xk
ik
<
xk+1
ik
− b̂ik(xk)
xk
ik
− b̂ik(xk)
= α̂k < 1.
The case bik(x
k) = xik follows from similar arguments.
(iii). Since αk ∈ (−1, 0), we have
sgn(xkik − bik(xk)) = − sgn(xk+1ik − bik(xk)) 6= 0.
Therefore, it must hold that bik(x
k) ∈ (0, xi), otherwise xk+1ik would not be in Xik . It
follows that bik(x
k) = b̂ik(x
k).
(iv). Once again, we only need to discuss the case αk 6= α̂k, so bik(xk) ∈ {0, xik}.
Consider the case bik(x
k) = 0. We have that b̂ik(x
k) < 0 and xk+1
ik
= 0 since αk = 0.
It holds that
0 = αk ≤ −b̂ik(x
k)
xk
ik
− b̂ik(xk)
= α̂k ≤ 1.
The case bik(x
k) = xik follows from similar arguments.
(v). In case α̂k = 1, we have
xk+1
ik
− b̂ik(xk) = xkik − b̂ik(xk),
so xk+1
ik
= xkik . 
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In the following proposition we show the relation between the value of α̂k and changes
in the value of the potential as defined in Proposition 2.3.1. This relationship will
prove crucial in our convergence analysis.
Proposition 2.4.8. Let a game G ∈ G be given.
1. Let (xk)k∈K be a path of action profiles such that for every k ∈ K−, α̂k ∈ R.
Then it holds that
φ(xk+1)− φ(xk) = 12 (1− α̂k)(1 + α̂k)(̂bik(xk)− xkik)2, k ∈ K−.
2. The game has no 1-centered cycles.
Proof. 1. Using the definition of φ gives
φ(xk+1)− φ(xk) =
∑
i∈I
(xk+1i − xki )ti − 12
∑
i∈I
xk+1i (
∑
j∈I
wijx
k+1
j ) +
1
2
∑
i∈I
xki (
∑
j∈I
wijx
k
j ).
Using the symmetry of the interaction matrix W and taking advantage of the fact that
xk+1 is the successor of xk in a path, we substitute xk−ik = x
k+1
−ik to get
φ(xk+1)− φ(xk) = (xk+1
ik
− xkik)ti − 12 ((xk+1ik )2 − (xkik)2)− (xk+1ik − xkik)
∑
j 6=ik
wikjx
k
j .
Factoring out xk+1
ik
− xkik yields
φ(xk+1)− φ(xk) = (xk+1
ik
− xkik)[(tik − 12 (xk+1ik + xkik)−
∑
j 6=ik
wikjx
k
j ].
Substituting b̂ik(x
k) = tik −
∑
j 6=ik wikjx
k
j gives
φ(xk+1)− φ(xk) = (xk+1
ik
− xkik)(bˆik(xk)− 12 (xk+1ik + xkik))
= 12 (x
k+1
ik
− xkik)[̂bik(xk)− xk+1ik + b̂ik(xk)− xkik ].
Finally, substituting xk+1
ik
= (1− α̂k )̂bik(xk)+ α̂kxkik and b̂ik(xk)−xk+1ik = α̂k (̂bik(xk)−
xkik) gives
φ(xk+1)− φ(xk) = 12 (1− α̂k)(1 + α̂k)(̂bik(xk)− xkik)2.
Suppose that (xk)k∈K is a 1-centered cycle. For every k ∈ K− it holds by Lemma 2.4.7
that α̂k ∈ (−1, 1] and therefore by the first statement we have φ(xk+1)− φ(xk) ≥ 0.
By Definition 2.4.1, each path has at least one pair of successive action profiles
that are different. Let k′ ∈ K− be such that xk′+1 6= xk′ . Since the path (xk)k∈K
is 1-centered, Lemma 2.4.7 implies |α̂k′ | < 1, and therefore by the first statement we
have φ(xk
′+1)−φ(xk′) > 0. Together with the fact that φ(xk+1)−φ(xk) ≥ 0 for every
k ∈ K−, we obtain a contradiction to (xk)k∈K being a 1-centered cycle. 
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Proposition 2.4.8 says that in a path of action profiles, the change of the potential is
only determined by the magnitude of α̂k. Each time the updating player gets closer
to his unconstrained best response by his update, the value of the potential increases,
and each time he gets further from the unconstrained best response, the value of the
potential decreases. By this property we show that if every update moves the updating
player closer to his best response, then better-response cycles cannot exist. This also
implies the non-existence of best-response cycles. Notice that the cycle in Example
2.4.5 is not 1-centered, hence Proposition 2.4.8 is not applicable. Furthermore, notice
that for α > 1, cycling is possible in an α-centered path. For example, if we have
i1 = i2 and α1 = α2 = −1, then (x1, x2, x3) constitutes a cycle. This means that α ≤ 1
is a necessary and sufficient condition for the non-existence of α-centered cycles.
2.5 Convergence results
With the cycling behavior of the learning processes established we present the main
results of this chapter, the convergence of a general class of learning processes.
Clearly, processes that are not 1-centered will not converge in general, although
there are examples of processes and networks where this is possible, e.g. the better-
response dynamic in case of the empty network.
Intuition suggests that for 1-centered processes, where each player moves closer
to his best response, convergence is guaranteed. However, a player may get farther
away from his best response through the updates of the other players, meaning that
subsequent updates for any given player are not necessarily smaller in magnitude than
previous ones. As a first step to establish convergence, we show that the distance
between consecutive elements of any α-centered path with α < 1 converges to zero and
that the distance between the current action and the best response to it approaches
zero for an updating player.
Proposition 2.5.1. Let (xk)k∈N be an α-centered path in a game G ∈ G such that
α < 1. It holds that:
1. limk→∞ ‖xk+1 − xk‖2 = 0.
2. limk→∞ |bik(xk)− xkik | = 0.
Proof. 1. We use the fact that xk+1
ik
= (1− α̂k )̂bik(xk) + α̂kxkik to obtain
‖xk+1 − xk‖22 = (xk+1ik − xkik)2 = (1− α̂k)2(̂bik(xk)− xkik)2.
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Applying Proposition 2.4.8 gives
‖xk+1 − xk‖22 = 2
1− α̂k
1 + α̂k
(φ(xk+1)− φ(xk)).
Since the path is α-centered with α < 1, by Lemma 2.4.7 we have −α < α̂k ≤ 1. It
follows that
‖xk+1 − xk‖22 ≤ 2
1 + α
1− α (φ(x
k+1)− φ(xk)). (2.4)
By the first part of Proposition 2.4.8 we have that the sequence (φ(xk))k∈N is mono-
tonically increasing. Furthermore, since φ is continuous and the set X is compact, the
sequence (φ(xk))k∈N is also bounded, and hence it is convergent, so φ(xk+1)−φ(xk)→
0 as k → ∞. Since the right-hand side of (2.4) converges to zero, it follows that
‖xk+1 − xk‖22 → 0 as k →∞. This implies the statement.
2. Suppose it does not hold that limk→∞ |bik(xk) − xkik | = 0. Then the sequence
(ik, xk)k∈N has a converging subsequence (ik
`
, xk
`
) with limit (i, x) such that |bi(x)−
xi| = ε > 0. We distinguish three cases: (a) b̂i(x) ∈ (0, xi), (b) b̂i(x) ≤ 0, and (c)
b̂i(x) ≥ xi.
Case (a). b̂i(x) ∈ (0, xi).
There is `′ ∈ N such that, for every ` ≥ `′, ik` = i, bi(xk`) ∈ (0, xi), and |bi(xk`)−xk`i | ≥
ε/2. It follows that α̂k` = αk` , so by Proposition 2.4.8,
φ(xk
`+1)− φ(xk`) ≥ 12 (1− αk`)(1 + αk`) 14ε2 > 12 (1− α)(1 + α) 14ε2, ` ≥ `′. (2.5)
By Proposition 2.4.8, we have that the sequence (φ(xk))k∈N is monotonically increasing,
so the subsequence (φ(xk
`
))`∈N is monotonically increasing, and by (2.5) it tends to
infinity. This contradicts the fact that the continuous function φ has a maximum on
the compact set X.
Case (b). b̂i(x) ≤ 0.
We have that bi(x) = 0 and xi = ε. There is `
′ ∈ N such that, for every ` ≥ `′, ik` = i,
bi(x
k`) ≤ xk`i , and |bi(xk
`
)− xk`i | ≥ ε/2. If b̂i(xk
`
) ≥ 0, then α̂k` = αk` . Otherwise, we
have b̂i(x
k`) < 0, so bi(x
k`) = 0, and
0 ≤ α̂k` =
xk
`+1
i − b̂i(xk
`
)
xk
`
i − b̂i(xk`)
≤ x
k`+1
i − bi
xk
`
i − bi
=
αk`x
k`
i − bi
xk
`
i − bi
≤
1
2αk`ε− bi
1
2ε− bi
<
1
2αε− bi
1
2ε− bi
.
(2.6)
The right-hand side of (2.6), denoted by β, belongs to (α, 1), so it holds that
−α < α̂k` ≤ β, ` ≥ `′.
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By Proposition 2.4.8, we have that
φ(xk
`+1)− φ(xk`) ≥ 12 (1− αk`)(1 + αk`) 14ε2 > 12 (1− β)(1 + β) 14ε2, ` ≥ `′. (2.7)
By Proposition 2.4.8, we have that the sequence (φ(xk))k∈N is monotonically increasing,
so the subsequence (φ(xk
`
))`∈N is monotonically increasing, and by (2.7) it tends to
infinity. This contradicts the fact that the continuous function φ has a maximum on
the compact set X.
Case (c). b̂i(x) ≥ xi.
We can derive a contradiction along similar lines as in Case (b).
Since all three cases lead to a contradiction, we conclude that limk→∞ |bik(xk) −
xkik | = 0. 
The first statement of Proposition 2.5.1 follows from the monotonicity and therefore
the convergence of the values of the potential along an α-centered path, by applying
Proposition 2.4.8 to translate differences in the value of the potential to distances
between action profiles. The second statement shows convergence to the best response
for all updating players. In order to achieve convergence to a Nash equilibrium, we
need convergence to the best response for all players. This can only be achieved if all
players update regularly, otherwise nothing guarantees convergence for a player who,
for instance, never updates. We therefore define the notion of updating in every `
periods, which is going to be the final condition for our main result.
Definition 2.5.2. Player i ∈ I updates in every ` periods in a path of action profiles
(xk)k∈N in a game G ∈ G if for every k ∈ N there exists k′ ∈ {k, . . . , k + ` − 1} such
that either [xk
′
i 6= xk
′+1
i ] or [x
k′ = xk
′+1 and xk
′
i = x
k′+1
i = bi(x
k′)].
A player satisfies Definition 2.5.2 if in every length ` segment of the path there is an
action profile at which he updated or there exists a pair of successive action profiles
that are identical and the player is at his best response. This condition is quite general,
e.g. if ` > n, then it includes the possibility of fixing the order of updates across the
players – provided that each player gets a turn.
We are ready to present our main results.
Theorem 2.5.3. Let (x,w, t) ∈ P and let (xk)k∈N be an α-centered path in a game
G ∈ G(x,w, t). If α < 1 and every player updates in every ` periods for some ` ∈ N,
then every cluster point of (xk)k∈N belongs to X∗(x,w, t). If, in addition, we have that
|X∗(x,w, t)| <∞, then there exists x∗ ∈ X∗(x,w, t) such that limk→∞ xk = x∗.
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Proof. We first show the first statement. Since every linear function is Lipschitz con-
tinuous, the function bi : X → Xi is Lipschitz continuous for every i ∈ I. Denote the
Lipschitz constant of bi by Li.
Let x be a cluster point of (xk)k∈N. We prove the result by showing that, for every
i ∈ I, for every ε > 0, |bi(x)− xi| < ε. We need a technical lemma.
Lemma 2.5.4. Let (xk)k∈N be a path of action profiles in a game G ∈ G such that
limk→∞ ‖xk+1 − xk‖2 = 0. For every ε > 0, for every ` ∈ N, there exists M ∈ N such
that, for every m > M, for every k ∈ {m, . . . ,m+ `− 1}, we have ‖xk − xm‖2 < ε.
The proof of this lemma can be found in the Appendix. Let i ∈ I and ε > 0 be
given.
Let M1 ∈ N be such that, for every m > M1, for every k ∈ {m, . . . ,m+ `− 1}, we
have ‖xk − xm‖2 < ε/(3 + 2Li). Lemma 2.5.4 guarantees the existence of such an M1.
Let M2 ∈ N be such that for every m > M2 it holds that |bim(xm) − xmim | <
ε/(3 + 2Li). The second statement of Proposition 2.5.1 guarantees the existence of
such an M2.
Let m > max{M1,M2} be such that ‖xm − x‖2 < ε/(3 + 2Li). Such an m must
exist, since x is a cluster point of the sequence (xk)k∈N.
If player i updates in every ` periods, then there exists k′ ∈ {m, . . . ,m + ` − 1}
such that |bi(xk′) − xk′i | < ε/(3 + 2Li), where we use that m > M2. Since m > M1
as well, it holds that ‖xk′ − xm‖2 < ε/(3 + 2Li), and by the choice of m we have
‖x − xm‖2 < ε/(3 + 2Li). In particular, it follows that |xk′i − xmi | < ε/(3 + 2Li) and
|xmi − xi| < ε/(3 + 2Li). By the triangle inequality we get
|bi(xk′)− xi| ≤ |bi(xk′)− xk′i |+ |xk
′
i − xmi |+ |xmi − xi| <
3ε
3 + 2Li
.
Also, ‖x−xm‖2 < ε/(3 + 2Li) and ‖xm−xk′‖2 < ε/(3 + 2Li) imply that ‖x−xk′‖2 <
2ε/(3 + 2Li). Using the Lipschitz continuity of bi, we get
|bi(x)− bi(xk′)| < 2Liε
3 + 2Li
.
Summing up, we have
|bi(x)− xi| ≤ |bi(x)− bi(xk′)|+ |bi(xk′)− xi| < 2Liε
3 + 2Li
+
3ε
3 + 2Li
= ε.
This concludes the first part of the proof.
For the second part let Y denote the non-empty set of cluster points of (xk)k∈N. The
first statement implies that every element of Y is a Nash equilibrium. We therefore
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only have to show that Y is a singleton. We know that the set Y is finite, since
Y ⊆ X∗(x,w, t) and the set X∗(x,w, t) is finite by assumption.
Let some y ∈ Y be given. Since the set Y is finite, there exists ε > 0 such that
for every x ∈ X \ {y} with ‖x − y‖2 ≤ ε it holds that φ(x) − φ(y) < 0. Take ε > 0
sufficiently small such that the set
D(y) = {x ∈ X : ε2 ≤ ‖x− y‖2 ≤ ε}
is non-empty. Since D(y) is also compact, the number φ = maxx∈D(y) φ(x) is well-
defined. Note that φ(y) > φ.
Since φ is continuous and y ∈ Y, we have that limk→∞ φ(xk) = φ(y). So there
exists M1 ∈ N such that for every k > M1 it holds that φ(xk) > φ. Furthermore, since
limk→∞ ‖xk+1 − xk‖2 = 0 by Proposition 2.5.1, it holds that there exists M2 ∈ N such
that for every k > M2 we have ‖xk+1 − xk‖2 < ε/2.
Let m > max{M1,M2} be such that ‖xm − y‖2 < ε/2. Such an m must exist due
to the fact that y ∈ Y. We argue that for every k > m we have ‖xk − y‖2 < ε/2.
Suppose to the contrary that there exists k > m with ‖xk− y‖2 ≥ ε/2 and let k be the
smallest such number. Since k > M2 and ‖xk−1 − y‖2 < ε/2, we have ‖xk − y‖2 < ε,
hence xk ∈ D(y) and φ(xk) ≤ φ < φ(xm), contradicting the fact that the sequence
(φ(xk))k∈N is non-decreasing.
We have shown that for every ε > 0 sufficiently small, there exists m ∈ N such that
for every k > m it holds that ‖xk − y‖2 < ε/2. It follows that y is the only cluster
point of (xk)k∈N. 
Theorem 2.5.3 combines the results in Propositions 2.4.8 and 2.5.1. It identifies suf-
ficient conditions for one-sided learning processes to converge. The conditions are as
follows: first, every update must take the updating player closer to his current best
response and, second, players must update regularly. Theorem 2.5.3 and Proposition
2.5.1 together imply that any such process will spend an arbitrarily long time in any
ε-range of any cluster point of the process. Finally, if we have that the set of Nash
equilibria is finite, we get convergence to a single Nash equilibrium point. The latter
condition holds generically as stated in Corollary 2.3.4.
We conclude this section by an example illustrating the tightness of these sufficient
conditions.
Example 2.5.5. Consider the case with no strategic interaction, w = 0, and interior
target values, for every i ∈ I, 0 < ti < xi. Then a game G ∈ G(x,w, t) has a single Nash
equilibrium, x∗ = t. Since the Nash equilibrium set is finite, Theorem 2.5.3 applies. It
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is easy to see that to achieve convergence to the Nash equilibrium, the α < 1 condition
cannot be weakened even in this simple case.
Letting α = 1 allows for limk→∞ αk = 1, which means that the conditions of
Proposition 2.5.1 are no longer satisfied. In this case, the distance to the best reply,
which is equal to the target value ti, is no longer converging to zero. We have no
convergence to the Nash equilibrium.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we consider weighted network games, a class of games with a very
wide range of applications, where direct, pairwise player interactions are described by
a matrix of weights. We show that these games are best-response potential games and,
generically, have a finite set of Nash equilibria.
Pairs of linked players can always benefit from jointly deviating in an interior equi-
librium. Two players whose contributions are strategic substitutes of each other can
jointly increase their actions to increase their payoffs, while players whose contributions
are strategic complements can jointly decrease their actions to improve their payoffs.
In case all players’ actions are strategic substitutes or all players’ actions are strate-
gic complements, such deviations lead to Pareto improvements. Therefore, in general,
equilibria are neither strong nor efficient.
We study a large class of better-response learning processes. The convergence prop-
erties of these processes are determined by their centering parameter, which indicates
to what extent players can overshoot their best responses. If players move closer to
the best response at each update, as is the case for best-response dynamics and better-
response dynamics with a centering parameter of one, then the players get arbitrarily
close to the set of Nash equilibria and converge to a single Nash equilibrium whenever
the set of Nash equilibria is finite, which is generically the case. This is due to the fact
that the best-response potential is symmetric around the best response of the players,
hence moving closer to the best response increases the value of the potential. In the
case of better-response dynamics with unrestricted overshooting, it is shown that cycles
may arise.
The restrictions on overshooting that guarantee convergence to a Nash equilibrium
in the general case are the same as in a trivial game with no strategic interaction. The
reason for this is that the best-response potential can be shown to increase whenever
an updating player moves closer to his best response, irrespective of the values of the
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interaction weights. Our results hence identify a rich class of learning processes that
produce Nash equilibria, including cautious better-reply dynamics.
Topics that are left unexplored in this chapter include asymmetric interaction
weights, which is the topic of Chapter 4. Another interesting topic is the issue of
inefficiency of equilibria. These inefficiencies may disappear in different – possibly
more centralized – classes of learning processes. Finally, the beliefs that shape the up-
dates themselves are left unmodeled and unexplored. These topics are open for future
research.
2.A Appendix: Proofs
The Appendix contains some of the more straightforward proofs, or proofs with close
analogues in already existing literature.
Proposition 2.3.1. For every (x,w, t) ∈ P, it holds that:
1. Every game G ∈ G(x,w, t) is a best-response potential game with the potential
φ : X → R defined by
φ(x) = x>t− 12x>Wx, x ∈ X.
2. X∗(x,w, t) 6= ∅.
3. x∗ ∈ X∗(x,w, t) if and only if x∗ satisfies the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) con-
ditions, i.e. for every i ∈ I, there exist λi, µi ∈ R+ such that
ti −
∑
j∈I wijx
∗
j + λi − µi = 0,
x∗i ≥ 0, xi ≥ x∗i ,
λix
∗
i = 0, µi(xi − x∗i ) = 0.
Proof. We show that for every x ∈ X and every i ∈ I it holds that
argmax
xi∈Xi
pii(xi, x−i) = argmax
xi∈Xi
φ(xi, x−i).
1. The left-hand side of the equality above equals bi(x). For the right-hand side,
notice that x>W is the row vector of consumption levels of each player, x>W =
(
∑
j∈I w1jxj , . . . ,
∑
j∈I wnjxj), using the fact that W is symmetric. Multiplication by
x gives
x>Wx = x1
∑
j∈I
w1jxj + · · ·+ xn
∑
j∈I
wnjxj .
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Differentiating φ(xi, x−i) by xi leads to
∂φ(xi, x−i)
∂xi
= ti − 12
(
2xi +
∑
j 6=i
wijxj +
∑
j 6=i
wjixj
)
= ti −
∑
i∈I
wijxj ,
where the last equality uses the symmetry of W .
Setting the derivative of φ with respect to xi equal to zero gives the extreme point
xi = ti−
∑
j 6=i wijxj , and as long as ti−
∑
j 6=i wijxj ∈ [0, xi], it is the unique maximum,
since the second derivative is −wii = −1.
If ti−
∑
j 6=i wijxj < 0, then, since xi ≥ 0, the first derivative of φ with respect to xi
is uniformly negative on [0, xi] hence the unique maximum is achieved for the minimal
contribution, xi = 0.
Similarly, if ti −
∑
j 6=i wijxj > xi, then the first derivative is uniformly positive,
meaning that, in [0, xi], the unique maximum is achieved for the maximal contribution,
xi = xi.
2. Let b : X → X be the function such that its component i ∈ I is equal to bi, the
best-response function of player i. Since X is non-empty, compact, and convex, and b
is continuous, the existence of an x∗ such that b(x∗) = x∗ is guaranteed by Brouwer’s
fixed-point theorem.
3. Since every game in G(x,w, t) is a best-response potential game with potential φ,
every Nash equilibrium satisfies the stated KKT conditions.
Since, for every i ∈ I, for every x ∈ X, it holds that
∂2φ(x)
∂x2i
= −1 < 0,
every point satisfying the KKT conditions yields a Nash equilibrium. 
Proposition 2.3.6. Let (x,w, t) ∈ P be given. Let x∗ ∈ X∗(x,w, t) be a Nash
equilibrium of a game G = (I,X, pi) ∈ G(x,w, t) such that x∗i ∈ (0, xi) and x∗j ∈ (0, xj).
It holds that:
1. If for some i, j ∈ I with i 6= j it holds that wij 6= 0, then there exists δ ∈
(0,min{x∗i , x∗j , xi − x∗i , xj − x∗j}) such that pii(x∗) < pii(x∗ + sgn(wij)δ{i,j}) and
pij(x
∗) < pij(x∗ + sgn(wij)δ{i,j}).
2. If w ≥ 0 or w ≤ 0 and, for some i, j ∈ I with i 6= j, it holds that wij 6= 0,
then there exists δ ∈ (0,min{x∗i , x∗j , xi− x∗i , xj − x∗j}) such that the action profile
x∗ + sgn(wij)δ{i,j} is a Pareto improvement over x∗.
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Proof. 1. We first discuss the case wij > 0.
Since x∗i ∈ (0, xi) and x∗j ∈ (0, xj), it holds that
∑
k∈I wikxk = ti and
∑
k∈I wjkxk =
tj . Hence, for δ > 0 such that x
∗
i + δ ≤ xi and x∗j + δ ≤ xj , we have
pii(x
∗ + δ{i,j})− pii(x∗)
δ
=
fi(ti + δ(1 + wij))− fi(ti)
δ
− ci.
Since fi is concave, we have
fi(ti + δ) ≤ fi(ti + δ(1 + wij))− δwijf ′i(ti + δ(1 + wij)).
Therefore, we can write
pii(x
∗ + δ{i,j})− pii(x∗)
δ
≥ fi(ti + δ)− fi(ti)
δ
− ci + wijf ′i(ti + δ(1 + wij)).
Let εi = minx∈X f ′i(
∑
k∈I wikx
k). Since f ′i is a continuous function, its minimum
over the compact set X is well-defined. Notice that Assumption 2.2.2 guarantees that
εi > 0. Thus,
pii(x
∗ + δ{i,j})− pii(x∗)
δ
≥ fi(ti + δ)− fi(ti)
δ
− ci + wijεi.
Also due to the continuity of f ′i , the term (fi(ti+δ)−fi(ti))/δ−ci converges to zero as δ
goes to zero. Hence, for sufficiently small positive δ, we have pii(x
∗+δ{i,j})−pii(x∗) > 0.
The same argument applies to agent j.
The case wij < 0 follows from very similar arguments.
2. We first consider the case where wij > 0. As per Proposition 2.3.6, there exists
δ ∈ (0,min{x∗i , x∗j , xi − x∗i , xj − x∗j}) such that pii(x∗ + δ{i,j}) > pii(x∗) and pij(x∗ +
δ{i,j}) > pij(x∗). Since w ≥ 0 it follows that for every other player h ∈ I \ {i, j} we
have fh(
∑
k∈I whkx
∗
k+δ
{i,j}) ≥ fh(
∑
k∈I whkx
∗
k), while his own action did not change,
and therefore pih(x
∗ + δ{i,j}) ≥ pih(x∗), meaning that players i and j increasing their
action by δ yields a Pareto improvement.
The case w ≤ 0 follows from similar arguments. 
Lemma 2.5.4. Let (xk)k∈N be a path of action profiles in a game G ∈ G such that
limk→∞ ‖xk+1 − xk‖2 = 0. For every ε > 0, for every ` ∈ N, there exists M ∈ N such
that, for every m > M, for every k ∈ {m, . . . ,m+ `− 1}, we have ‖xk − xm‖2 < ε.
Proof. Let some ε > 0 and some ` ∈ N be given. The statement obviously holds for
` = 1, so consider the case ` > 1.
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For every δ > 0 there exists Mδ ∈ N such that for every m > Mδ we have ‖xm+1 −
xm‖2 < δ, since limk→∞ ‖xk+1 − xk‖2 = 0. We take δ = ε/(` − 1) and consider an
arbitrary m > Mδ.
Then, by the triangle inequality, for every k ∈ {m, . . . ,m+ `− 1} we can write
‖xk − xm‖2 ≤ ‖xk − xk−1‖2 + · · ·+ ‖xm+1 − xm‖2 < k−m`−1 ε ≤ ε.
Therefore, Mδ is a suitable candidate for M . 
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Chapter 3
Myopic and farsighted players
in the local public goods game
“Forethought we may have, undoubtedly, but not foresight.”
Napoleon Bonaparte
This chapter1 studies the exploitation of a myopic population by a single farsighted player in a
network game. Our model contributes to the growing literature of local public goods games by
considering multiple levels of player sophistication. By framing the game as a Markov Decision
Process we show the existence and payoff-uniqueness of optimal strategies in every network
structure. Every stationary equilibrium strategy profile of this game has a set of rest points
called absorbing effort profiles. Myopic players have a propensity for a rising inequality in
production, creating rich free-riders and poor producers. This property of the game results in
the convergence of equilibrium play to an absorbing effort profile for every network structure
and every initial state. The farsighted player benefits from new links that connect him to
more myopic neighbors or the breaking of a link running between two of his neighbors.
1This chapter is based upon Bayer, Herings, and Peeters (2019). A part of this chapter was written
during my visit at Aix-Marseille School of Economics between March 1 and June 1, 2018 sponsored
by the Graduate School of Business and Economics of Maastricht University. I would like to thank
Pe´ter Cso´ka, and La´szlo´ Ko´czy, for comments on previous versions of this chapter, as well as Yann
Bramoulle´ for feedback and suggestions.
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3.1 Introduction
Economic agents interacting on the same market have vast differences in their so-
phistication. The sources of these differences are many, they include asymmetries in
technology (an innovator against followers), goals (a speculator against investors), or
experience (a new entrant against incumbents), or various other cognitive and physi-
cal limitations. When an agent with a higher level of sophistication is pitted against
a population of naive agents, the former type may use its advantages to exploit the
latter, if by such actions it can achieve higher gains. Depending upon the market in
question and on the situation, exploitation may manifest as free-riding, breaking so-
cial contracts, manipulation, and obstructing or destroying the coordination of other
players. Many models focus on homogeneous player sophistication and employ tools
such as the Nash equilibrium. These tool are efficient, but conceptually valid only if
every agent is sufficiently naive. Therefore, the predictions of these models are often
not robust to the inclusion of a sophisticated agent. As the induced behavior, exploita-
tion, tends to be destructive to social norms as well, its analysis is motivated by pure
theoretical, behavioral, and sociological factors.
In addition to sophistication, agents also differ in their spatial properties. These
properties – which may refer to physical space such as geographical position, or an
abstract space such as online connectivity – define the ways by which each agent
interacts with the rest of the population. Simple graphs provide a very rich but at
the same time a highly efficient tool to model spatial asymmetries. In this chapter we
combine tools of game theory in order to capture the strategic nature of exploitation
with tools of network theory to examine the ways exploitative behavior is dependent
upon the position of the sophisticated player.
The specific model in which our analysis is framed is the private provision of public
goods game, also known as the local public goods game, introduced by Bramoulle´ and
Kranton (2007). The direct predecessor of this model is Ballester et al. (2006)’s model
of externalities. The class of local public goods games has an established theoretical
literature as well as a wide range of applicability. The latter includes applications
in industrial organization, by a model of distribution of R&D costs by interlinked
firms (Ko¨nig et al., 2014), sociology, by a paper on crime and social networks (Calvo´-
Armengol and Zenou, 2004) as well as a spatial model of peer effects (Blume et al.,
2010), and political economy, by a model on the distribution of defense expenditures
within allied nations (Sandler and Hartley, 1995) and its follow-up, on the distribution
of counter-terrorism expenditures between allies (Sandler and Hartley, 2007). Goyal
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(2012) and Jackson and Zenou (2014) offer comprehensive overviews of related models.
The case of homogeneous player rationality and ability in this gameclass is well-
understood. Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2007) shows existence of Nash equilibria and
that equilibria with free riders are present in any non-trivial network. The follow-up
paper, Bramoulle´ et al. (2014) shows existence conditions of stable Nash equilibria
with respect to continuous best-response dynamics. Subsequent literature focuses on
the asymptotic behavior of basic learning processes. It has been shown that best-
response dynamics always converge to a single Nash equilibrium (Bervoets and Faure,
2019) and that convergence may be achieved by a learning process with very little
requirements on player sophistication (Bervoets et al., 2016).
In this chapter we study the effects of heterogeneous player sophistication in the
above gameclass. Through this effort we provide an insight into the behavior of eco-
nomic agents who are differentiated both by their abilities and their spatial properties.
To our knowledge the paper on which this chapter is based is the first to do so. In the
spirit of Ellison (1997) we discuss the inclusion of a single player of increased sophis-
tication into a population of naive agents. In games of strategic complements such as
coordination games, the addition of the more sophisticated player improves efficiency,
as coordination shifts towards a better Nash equilibrium via strategic teaching by the
sophisticated player (Camerer et al., 2002). In contrasts, our game, a game of (local)
strategic substitutes, induces a manipulative behavior by the sophisticated player with
no clear gains in efficiency. By modeling sophistication as a form of farsightedness, i.e.
the ability to discount future gains rather than optimizing for a single period, we create
a player whose interest lies in the maximization of his neighbors’ efforts into creating
the local public good, while minimizing his own efforts.
The main component of local public goods games is the underlying network, de-
scribing the nature of interactions between the players, with one player designated
as the farsighted player. All players, regardless of type, may decide on the amount
of effort they exert into creating a specialized good. Every player consumes the to-
tal amount of goods created in their neighborhood and pays the costs of own effort.
To keep our analysis focused on the players’ spatial properties and on the farsighted
player’s attempts at exploitation, we assume that players are symmetric in their target
level of consumption.
As we are interested in the process of exploitation, we examine the game described
above in a dynamic setting which takes place in discrete time. In every period a
randomly selected player has a chance to revise his exerted effort. Once he does,
period payoffs are awarded, and a new random player receives a revision opportunity.
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Period payoffs are discounted by the farsighted player but not by the myopic players
who therefore maximize their instantaneous payoffs. By applying classic results of
the theory of Markov Decision Processes, we show the existence of optimal stationary
strategies of the farsighted player for every network structure, given the myopic players’
equilibrium behavior. Therefore, the existence of stationary subgame perfect equilibria
of the implied stochastic game is guaranteed. Moreover, by the theory of best-response
potential games (Voorneveld, 2000), we get that the above game played by a population
of myopic best-responders converges to a rest point, a Nash equilibrium of the static
game.
In this chapter we show the existence of such rest points, called absorbing effort
profiles, for every stationary subgame perfect equilibrium. The addition of the far-
sighted player means that the rest points will not necessarily coincide with static Nash
equilibria, as they would do for a homogeneously myopic population. The stability
of the absorbing profiles requires that each myopic player’s exerted efforts be a best
response to the other players’, and that the farsighted player has no profitable way
of advancing the game into a state that is better for him. Furthermore, in our main
convergence result we show that for every network, every starting state, and every
equilibrium play the process converges to such an absorbing profile with probability 1.
Our results allow for a straightforward description of the ways in which the inclusion
of a farsighted player alters key aspects of equilibrium play. The presence of the
farsighted player does not weaken the convergence properties of the game, but changes
the set of rest points. There are two mechanisms working to this effect: (1), Nash
equilibria which are easy to improve upon by the farsighted player will not be stable
against farsighted deviations, and (2), some effort profiles that are stable for the myopic
players may be desirable for the farsighted player even if he is not at his static best
response. As a result the set of absorbing effort profiles is neither a subset nor a
superset of the Nash equilibria of the static game.
A further key effect of including the farsighted player is that, unlike a game played
by myopic players, equilibrium play may produce cycles between action profiles, as
the farsighted player may try to revisit a previous action profile hoping for a more
favorable random draw in the order of revising players. However, the probability of
the game being locked in an infinite cycle is zero. This, as well as the convergence of
the game, is guaranteed by a crucial property of the gameclass, a tendency towards
increased free-riding behavior. This effect is propagated by the local substitutability of
efforts between neighboring players. An increase in one player’s efforts will decrease his
neighbor’s myopic best-response efforts. Similarly, a neighbor’s decrease will increase
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a player’s myopic best-response efforts. As we will show in this chapter, the result
of these mutually reinforcing effects is strong enough to break any cycles that the
farsighted player might try to implement, and thus leads to convergence.
Throughout most of this chapter we keep the underlying network structure fixed,
but in applications the spatial properties of the players are liable to change, either by
the players’ own choice, or by external factors. For this reason we consider comparative
statics of different networks. Evaluating networks can inform the farsighted player’s
choice on which links to form and which to sever to increase his utility in a network
formation setting or advise a social planner who aims to minimize the possibilities of
exploitation in a game by restructuring the network. We find that adding a link to
connect the farsighted player to an additional neighbor, or removing a link between
two of his neighbors leads to an increase in the farsighted player’s evaluations.
The combination of these two results confirms the intuition that being the center of
a star network is optimal for the farsighted player since it allows for the full exploitation
of the entire myopic population. Moreover, it shows that there is a sequence of single
changes (the addition or removal of one link) that lead to the star network and each
step improves on the farsighted player’s evaluation of the network. However, we also
show that not every sequence of changes that leads to the star network is profitable
in every step, meaning that networks may contain stumbling blocks that hinder the
farsighted player’s attempts of reaching the optimal network structure.
To sum up, this chapter contributes to the network literature and to the game
theory literature by building a dynamic model of exploitation of a myopic population
by a single farsighted player on a network. We show existence of equilibrium play,
existence of stable effort profiles with respect to equilibrium play, and convergence to
these stable effort profiles. Finally, we consider how changes in the network affect the
farsighted player’s long-run utility.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 introduces local public goods games
and introduces the dynamic and stochastic components of the model. Section 3.3 shows
the existence of absorbing profiles of efforts. Section 3.4 contains our results regarding
the propensity of rising inequality between players under equilibrium play. Section 3.5
contains our main convergence result, showing that equilibrium play progresses the
game to an absorbing profile of actions. In Section 3.6 we examine how the farsighted
player’s evaluations of a network are affected by adding or severing a link. Section 3.7
concludes.
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3.2 The model
We now introduce the static version of local public goods game with the set of prim-
itives, (n,G, (fi)i∈I , (ci)i∈I , d). We then go on to extend this model into a recurrent
setting taking place in discrete time with additional primitive δ.
Let I = {1, . . . , n} denote the set of players with n ≥ 2. Player 1 is called the
farsighted player. All players other than 1 are called myopic. Let the set I \ {1} be
denoted by I−1.
A network structure, characterized by the n × n binary matrix G, will represent
local interaction. For i, j ∈ I, gij = 1 means that players i and j are connected, while
gij = 0 means that they are not. We assume gii = 1, and we assume that connections
run both ways, i.e. for every i, j ∈ I we have gij = gji. For a player i ∈ I, the set
Ni(G) = {j ∈ I \ {i} : gij = 1} is called the set of i’s neighbors, or i’s neighborhood.
For J ⊆ I let NJ(G) = {i ∈ I \ J : gij = 1 for some j ∈ J} denote the neighborhood
of a set of players J . Finally, for i ∈ I let N i(G) = Ni(G) ∪ {i}, and for J ⊆ I
let NJ(G) = NJ(G) ∪ J . Throughout Sections 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5, we assume a
fixed network structure and hence shorten these notations to Ni, NJ , N i, and NJ ,
respectively.
The set of possible efforts of player i is Xi = {0, 1/d, 2/d, . . .}, with positive integer
d. Let X =
∏
i∈I Xi denote the set of effort profiles, and let X−i =
∏
j∈I\{i}Xj . For
i ∈ I and x ∈ X, the ith component of the effort profile, xi is called the effort exerted
by player i. For an effort profile x ∈ X and a set of players J ⊆ I we denote by
x(J) =
∑
i∈J xi the sum of the players’ efforts. The value x(N i) is called player i’s
consumption.
The players are engaged in a local public goods game with payoff functions pii : X →
R that are given by
pii(x) = fi(x(N i))− cixi,
where ci ∈ R+, and the functions fi : {0, 1/d, 2/d, . . .} → R+ satisfy the following
properties:
1. fi(0) = 0,
2. fi is monotonically increasing,
3. fi(y)− fi(y − 1/d) ≥ fi(y + 1/d)− fi(y) for all y ∈ {1/d, 2/d, . . .},
4. fi(1)− fi(1− 1/d) > ci/d, and fi(1 + 1/d)− fi(1) < ci/d.
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5. fi is bounded.
For i ∈ I and x ∈ X, the value fi(x(N i)) is called the benefits enjoyed by player i. The
function fi is called the benefit function of player i, while the parameter ci is the cost of
one unit of effort for player i. Let pi(x) denote the vector of payoffs (pi1(x), . . . , pin(x))
in effort profile x.
The interpretation of the game characterized by Γ = (I,X, (pii)i∈I) is the following.
Similarly to the game in Chapter 2, each player decides how much to contribute to the
local public good. After choosing their efforts, the players reap the benefits from their
own efforts, as well as from the efforts of their immediate neighbors, and the value of
the benefits is given by the benefit functions fi. In addition, all players incur linear
costs for their own efforts, exerting unit level of efforts comes with a cost of ci for
player i. The five properties of the benefit function respectively mean (1) the benefits
of consuming zero units of the good are zero, (2) monotonicity, (3) concavity, (4) the
existence of an optimal effort level, above which the cost of producing any additional
amount of the public good is larger than the benefits of its consumption for each player,
and (5) boundedness. These properties are standard in the discussion of local public
good games. The optimal effort levels are the same for all players and, by (4), their
value is normalized to unity.
We are interested in the dynamic behavior of a farsighted player acting against a set
of myopic players in a recurrent version of Γ, denoted by Γ′. The dynamics take place
in discrete time, indexed by t = 1, 2, . . .. The game starts with an arbitrary profile
of efforts, x0. In every period t, an active player it is chosen via a fixed probability
distribution from all players. Similarly to Chapter 2’s updating process, if player it
holds a revision opportunity, then the profile xt is given as a concatanation of his
choice, denoted by zt, and every other player’s effort in period t − 1. Instantaneous
payoffs, pii(x
t) are awarded in period t. In period t+ 1 a new active player is selected,
and so on. A state is therefore characterized by a vector of efforts, and the active
player. The set of states is denoted by Ω = X × I. For a player i ∈ I, an effort level
xi ∈ Xi, and an effort profile x′ ∈ X the effort profile (xi, x′−i) is the one that differs
from x′ in only the ith coordinate, with player i playing xi.
Fix T ≥ 1. For time periods 1 ≤ t ≤ T , states ωt = (xt−1, it) ∈ Ω, and choices
zt ∈ Xit , a sequence hT = (ω1, z1, ω2, z2, . . . , ωT−1, zT−1, ωT ) such that for every
1 ≤ t ≤ T it holds that
xt−it = x
t−1
−it and x
t
it = z
t (3.1)
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is called a T -long history. Let HT denote the set of T -long histories, and H =
⋃
t∈NH
t
denote the set of finite histories. For a player i, an effort profile x, and a state ω, let
HTi , H
T
x , and H
T
ω denote the set of T -long histories for which the last active player, i
T
is i, the last effort profile, xT−1 is x, and the last state, ωT is ω, respectively. Define
Hi =
⋃
t∈NH
t
i , Hx =
⋃
t∈NH
t
x, and Hω =
⋃
t∈NH
t
ω.
The function representing a player’s decisions in all possible situations is called a
strategy. A strategy si of a player i ∈ I, is a function si : Hi → Xi. For a history
hTi ∈ HTi , the value si(hTi ) is the effort chosen by player i after observing history hTi .
Denote the set of strategies of player i by Si and let S =
∏
i∈I Si.
The transitions between the states are governed by a probability distribution Q : Ω×
{0, 1/d, . . .} → ∆(Ω). The probability that state ω′ follows ω if choice z is made equals
Q(ω′|ω, z). The marginal distributions of Q with respect to X and I are denoted by
QX and QI , respectively, i.e. for every ω ∈ Ω and z ∈ {0, 1/d, . . .} it holds that
QX(x|ω, z) =
∑
i∈I Q(x, i|ω, z), and QI(i|ω, z) =
∑
x∈X Q(x, i|ω, z). Due to the con-
sistency condition (3.1), for every x, x′ ∈ X, i ∈ I and z ∈ Xi we have
QX(x
′|(x, i), z) =
1, if x′ = (z, x−i)0, otherwise.
Hence, any assumption made on QI pins down Q itself. For now we assume that the
next active player is selected uniformly from the set of all players at all times.
Assumption 3.2.1. For every i ∈ I, every ω ∈ Ω, and every z ∈ {0, 1/d, . . .} we
assume that QI(i|ω, z) = 1/n.
Assumption 3.2.1 provides simplicity for our framework. It constitutes a deviation
from Chapter 2’s model, where no explicit assumptions were made on the assignment
of revision opportunities. As it will be apparent later on, the results in this chapter
hold for a more general class of probability distributions, requiring only that for each
period, every player should have at least some ε > 0 probability of becoming the active
player.
All players receive instantaneous payoffs in all periods, regardless of activity and
history. In period t ≥ 1, player i ∈ I receives instantaneous payoff pii(xt). For strat-
egy profile s and a T -long history h ∈ HT , let ut1(h, s) denote the expected instan-
taneous payoff that player 1 receives in period T + t − 1. For example, u11(h, s) =
pi1(siT (h), x
T−1
−iT ) = pi1(x
T ). Player 1’s utility is given as the discounted expected in-
stantaneous payoffs, with discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1) as follows:
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U1(h, s) =
∞∑
t=1
δt−1ut1(h, s)
as player 1’s utility function.
A myopic player i ∈ I−1 cares only about his instantaneous payoffs, so for x ∈ X
and h ∈ HT , his utility function is defined by
Ui(h, s) = pii(siT (h), x−iT ).
The main equilibrium concept of dynamic games is the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
(SPE), which is defined as follows:
Definition 3.2.2 (SPE). Strategy profile s∗ is an SPE of Γ′ if for every player i ∈ I,
every history h ∈ H, and every strategy si ∈ Si it holds that
Ui(h, s
∗) ≥ Ui(h, (si, s∗−i)).
In an SPE in every period the farsighted player maximizes his discounted expected
payoffs of the future, while the myopic players maximize instantaneous payoffs.
The strategy bi ∈ Si for which bi(ht) = max{0, 1 − xt−1(Ni)} is called the best-
responder strategy of player i. Clearly, if s∗ is an SPE, then s∗i = bi for every i ∈ I−1.
Note that the best-responder strategy depends only on the last state observed.
Strategies that satisfy this criterion are called stationary strategies. More formally, a
strategy si ∈ Si is called stationary if there is a function s′i : X → Xi such that for
every x ∈ X, and every h ∈ H(x,i) it holds that si(h) = s′i(x) (note that the set X
is isomorphic with H0(·,i)). The value s
′
i(x) is player i’s choice at effort profile x. We
identify the set of stationary strategies of player i with the set of maps S˜i = {s′i : X →
Xi}, and the set of stationary strategy profiles with S˜ =
∏
i∈I S˜i. The main equilibrium
concept used in this chapter is the Stationary Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SSPE),
defined as follows:
Definition 3.2.3 (SSPE). A strategy profile s∗ is an SSPE of Γ′ if it is an SPE and
for every i ∈ I, the strategy s∗i is stationary.
Again, if s∗ is an SSPE of Γ′, then for every i ∈ I−1 we have s∗i = bi. In Proposition
3.2.4 we show that an SSPE exists in this game. Denote by (s1, b−1) ∈ S the profile of
strategies where player 1 plays s1 and every other player is a best-responder.
Proposition 3.2.4. The game Γ′ has an SSPE.
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Proof. Consider a Markov Decision Process (MDP) with set of states Ω. We assume
that in every state (x, i) for which i 6= 1, nature chooses bi(x). With that assumption
in place, player 1 is left as the only strategic player. A policy of his is a function
p : H1 → X1, whereas a stationary policy is a function p′ : X → X1. The process that
drives the transition to a new state from ω to ω′, given choice z is Q(ω′|ω, z).
Since Q is Markovian, this is indeed an MDP. Let the reward after history h given
policy p be given as
Vp(h) = U1(h, (p, b−1)).
Denote this MDP by Γ′1 and let p
∗ be an optimal stationary policy of Γ′1. Then, it
holds that for every h ∈ H we have
p∗ ∈ argmax
p
Vp(h).
Hence, for every h we have p∗ ∈ argmax s1∈S1 U1(h, (s1, b−1)), and therefore (p∗, b−1) ∈
S˜ is an SSPE. 
Let the set of SSPEs be denoted by S∗. Proposition 3.2.4 makes use of the fact that
the myopic players’ equilibrium behavior is independent of that of their opponents.
Therefore, we can model the farsighted player’s decision problem as an MDP with the
myopic players treated as parts of nature. An optimal stationary policy in this MDP is
a best response by the farsighted player to the myopic players’ equilibrium strategies in
game Γ′. Together, an optimal stationary policy and the myopic best-responses form
an SSPE of Γ′. Note that if δ is small, we have a unique SPE/SSPE, in which every
player is a best-responder. Furthermore, it can be shown that for a general δ every
SPE yields the same expected utility for player 1:
Proposition 3.2.5. For any two SPE strategy profiles r, s ∈ S of game Γ′ it holds
that for every h ∈ H we have
U1(h, r) = U1(h, s).
Proof. If s, r are both SPE strategy profiles, then s1 and r1 are both optimal (poten-
tially non-stationary) policies of Γ′1. Therefore, it holds for every h that
Vs1(h) = Vr1(h).

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Propositions 3.2.4 and 3.2.5 establish the existence and the payoff-uniqueness of the
farsighted player’s best strategy for any network structure. Note, however, that the
myopic players’ payoffs may not be the same in each SSPE.
In the remaining of this chapter we restrict our attention to stationary strategies
and will use SSPE as our equilibrium concept, since no player can realize gains in
utility by choosing a non-stationary strategy.
Furthermore, we will pay special attention to the case where player 1 is patient, i.e.
δ is close to 1, as in this case player 1 is most prompted to play more sophisticated
strategies than his opponents. A close examination of this case reveals in which situa-
tions a farsighted agent is able to manipulate the game in order to end up in a position
where he can free-ride on his neighbors’ efforts.
3.3 Existence of absorbing effort profiles
This section contains the definition of an equilibrium concept of effort profiles, called
absorbing effort profiles. We then go on to show existence.
Definition 3.3.1 (Absorbing effort profile). An effort profile x ∈ X is absorbing for
stationary strategy profile s ∈ S˜ if for every player i ∈ I it holds that
si(x) = xi.
In other words, if x is an absorbing effort profile of s, then if the game reaches x, it will
never move out of it. Let the set of absorbing effort profiles of s be denoted by A(s).
We define two standard concepts of graph theory, cliques and independent sets.
Definition 3.3.2 (Cliques). A non-empty set of players M ⊆ I is called a clique, if
for every i, j ∈M we have gij = 1.
Notice that every single player constitutes a clique, as does every pair of neighbors.
Definition 3.3.3 (Independent sets). Let J ⊆ I. The set of players M ⊆ J is called
an independent set of J if for every i, j ∈ M with i 6= j it holds that gij = 0. The set
M is called a maximal independent set of J if it is independent and J ⊆ NM . The set
M is called a maximum independent set of J if it is independent and there is no other
independent set M ′ of J for which |M ′| > |M |.
Notice that for every J ⊆ I, every maximum independent set of J is also a maximal
independent set of J .
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We now present the main result of this section, the existence of absorbing effort
profiles for SSPE strategies. Even stronger, we identify a profile, x∗, that is absorbing
for every SSPE.
Let M1 be a maximum independent set of N1. Let M be a maximal independent set
of I such that for every i ∈ M1 we have i ∈ M . Such an M can be easily constructed
for a given M1, by adding a player who is not in NM1 , then adding a player outside
the neighborhood of M1 and the new player, and so on, until we run out of players.
Let x∗ ∈ X be defined as x∗i = 1 if i ∈ M and x∗i = 0 if i /∈ M . Notice that N1 6= ∅
implies 1 /∈M and N1 = ∅ implies 1 ∈M .
Proposition 3.3.4. For every SSPE s∗, and any x∗ as defined above, it holds that
x∗ ∈ A(s∗).
The proof of Proposition 3.3.4 requires a number of technical steps. We first introduce
the notion of reachability between effort profiles.
Definition 3.3.5 (Reachability). Let x, x′ ∈ X and s ∈ S˜. We say that x′ is reachable
from x in s if either x = x′, or there exists a sequence of effort profiles satisfying
equation (3.1) in which x precedes x′ (not necessarily as an immediate predecessor)
and the updates are made in accordance with strategy profile s, i.e. zt = sit(x
t−1).
If x′ is reachable from x in s then we write x -s x′. We write x ∼s x′ if x -s x′
and x′ -s x both hold. We write x ≺s x′ if x -s x′ and x′ 6-s x. Clearly, ∼s is an
equivalence relation. An equivalence class of ∼s containing x is called a recurring set
in s if there exists no x′ ∈ X for which x ≺ x′. The recurring set in s that contains
the effort profile x ∈ X is denoted by [x]s. If y ∈ [x]s for some x then we say that y is
recurring. Finally, let Rs(x) = {x′ ∈ X : x -s x′} denote the set of effort profiles that
are reachable from x in s.
We now introduce the notion of pillar sets as an upper bound of the total contribu-
tion of a subset of myopic players. The idea is the following: We pick a myopic player
with positive effort, called a pillar, whose neighborhood without the farsighted player
has a total effort of at most one. We remove the player and his myopic neighbors from
the network. We find another such player and repeat until we run out of players with
positive effort. The pillar set contains the players selected by this process. The name
pillar is chosen for the players’ property of supporting at most 1 unit of effort.
Let I+−1(x) = {i ∈ I−1 : xi > 0}, and I0−1(x) = {i ∈ I−1 : xi = 0}, denote the myopic
contributors and free-riders in effort profile x, respectively.
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Definition 3.3.6 (Pillar set). Let J ⊆ I−1 and x ∈ X be given. The set M ⊆ J is
called a pillar set of J in x if there exists some enumeration of the elements of M ,
(ik)
|M |
k=1, such that
• M is a maximal independent set within J ∩ I+−1(x).
• for every k ∈ {1, . . . , |M |} we have x((J ∩N ik) \
⋃k−1
k′=1N ik′ ) ≤ 1.
We denote the collection of pillar sets of J in effort profile x byMx(J). In the special
case J ∩ I+−1 = ∅, M = ∅ is a pillar set.
A pillar set of a subset of players for a given effort profile provides an upper bound
on the total effort levels of all players in that set. Clearly, if a pillar set M exists for an
effort profile x ∈ X and a subset of players J ⊆ I−1, then the properties of Definition
3.3.6 guarantee that x(J) ≤ |M | holds. Note that this upper bound is usually not
tight. The notion of pillars is demonstrated by an example.
Example 3.3.7. Let I = {1, . . . , 7}, and consider the network structure in which every
myopic player is a neighbor of the farsighted one, and the myopic players are located
on a circle. Consider the effort profile x = (0.1, 0.4, 0.4, 0.3, 0.4, 0.4, 0.1) (see Figure
3.1). Then, {2, 4, 6} is a pillar set of I−1 in x, as all myopic players exert positive effort
in x, M is a maximal independent set of I−1, and, if we take the sequence (2, 4, 6), it
holds that x({2, 3, 7}) = 0.9 ≤ 1, x({4, 5}) = 0.7 ≤ 1, and x({6}) = 0.4 ≤ 1. This set
is of cardinality 3, and hence we should have x(I−1) ≤ 3, which is of course true, as
x(I−1) = 2. Notice that {2, 5} is not a pillar set of I−1, since x({4, 5, 6}) = 1.1 > 1.
0.1
1
0.4
2
0.4
3
0.3
4
0.4
5
0.4
6
0.1
7
Figure 3.1: The links between the myopic players of Example 3.3.7.
By Definition 3.3.6, two properties immediately follow.
1. Inclusion. For x ∈ X and sets J, J ′ ⊆ I−1 with J ⊆ J ′, if M ∈ Mx(J ′) with
M ⊆ J , then M ∈Mx(J).
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2. Addition. For x ∈ X and sets J, J ′ ⊆ I−1, if M ∈ Mx(J) and M ′ ∈ Mx(J ′),
and if M ∪M ′ is an independent set, then M ∪M ′ ∈Mx(J ∪ J ′).
Let X ′−1 ⊂ X−1 denote the set of effort profiles of myopic players that accommodate
a pillar set for every J ⊆ I−1. Let X ′ = X1 × X ′−1. Notice that X ′−1 is a finite set.
The existence of a pillar set of I−1 in an effort profile does not necessarily imply the
existence of a pillar set in a J ⊆ I−1. We now show that if every myopic player is a
best-responder, as they are in equilibrium, the game will enter the set X ′ with positive
probability, and once there, it cannot leave it.
Lemma 3.3.8. Let s ∈ S˜ be given such that s−1 = b−1.
1. Reachability: For every x ∈ X \X ′ it holds that Rs(x) ∩X ′ 6= ∅.
2. No exit: For every x ∈ X ′ it holds that Rs(x) ⊆ X ′.
Proof. 1. We show that once every myopic player has been active at least once, the
resulting effort profile must be in X ′. Let ((x0, 2), . . . , (xn−2, n), xn−1) ∈ Ωn−1×X be
a sequence satisfying (3.1) such that x0 ∈ X \X ′. The proof constructs a pillar set of
xn−1 for an arbitrary J .
Fix J ⊆ I−1 and consider the player in J with the highest index number with
positive efforts in xn−1. If no myopic player in J has positive efforts, the empty set
is a pillar set of J in xn−1. Otherwise let this player be denoted by j1. Then, we
have xj1−1(N j1) = 1. By the choice of j1 we have 1 = x
j1−1(N j1) ≥ xn−1(J ∩ N j1).
Remove the myopic players in N j1 from the game, and let j2 denote the myopic player
in J \N j1 with the highest index number of the remaining players with positive efforts
in xn−1. If there is no such player, then M = {j1} is a suitable pillar set of J in xn−1.
Otherwise, by the choice of j2, it holds that 1 = x
j2−1(N j2) ≥ xn−1((J ∩N j2) \N j1).
Remove the myopic players belonging to N2 and repeat. If there are no more myopic
players with positive efforts in J \(N j1 ∪N j2), then M = {j1, j2} is a suitable pillar set
of J in xn−1. Otherwise we go on as before with a j3. Since there are only finitely many
myopic players, this construction will terminate after at most n− 1 steps, resulting in
pillar set of J in xn−1. Since such a construction can be performed for any choice of
J , it holds that xn−1 ∈ X ′.
2. Suppose that the statement is false. Then, there exists a sequence of states,
((x0, i1), . . . , (xT , iT+1)) ∈ ΩT+1, that satisfies (3.1) such that x0 ∈ X ′ and xT ∈ X\X ′.
Then, there must exist J ⊆ I−1 such that there is no pillar set of J in xT . We show
that, no matter the choice of J , a pillar set can always be constructed.
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We use an induction argument. First, consider the case |J | = 1, i.e. J = {j}.
If xTj = 0, then the empty set is a pillar set. If 0 < x
T
j ≤ 1, then {j} is a pillar
set. The case xTj > 1 is impossible, since j ∈ {i1, . . . , iT } implies xTj = [0, 1], while
j /∈ {i1, . . . , iT } means xTj = x0j , hence the pillar set of {j} in x0 is also a pillar set in
xT .
Suppose |J | = k for k > 1 and for every 1 ≤ k′ < k it holds that every subset of
I+−1(x
T ) with a cardinality of k′ has a pillar set in xT . If there exists j ∈ J with xTj = 0,
then take the set J ′ = J \ {j}. Since a pillar set only includes contributing players, by
the induction hypothesis there exists a pillar set of J ′ in xT , which is clearly a pillar
set of J in xT as well.
If J ⊆ I+−1(xT ) and if J ∩ {i1, . . . , iT } = ∅, then for every j ∈ J we have x0j = xTj ,
hence the existence of a pillar set of J in x0 implies the existence of a pillar set of J in
xT .
If J ⊆ I+−1(xT ) and if J ∩ {i1, . . . , iT } 6= ∅, then let j1 ∈ J denote the last player
in the sequence (it)Tt=1 who is also a member of J . By this choice, we must have
xT (N j1 ∩ J) ≤ 1. Consider the set of players, J ′ = J \ N j1 . By the induction
hypothesis, there exists an M ′ ⊆ J ′ which is a pillar set of J ′ in xT . Then, since
M ′ ∩Nj1 = ∅, by the Addition property, M = {j1} ∪M ′ is a pillar set of J ′ in xT . 
Remark 3.3.9. By the proof of Lemma 3.3.8, two statements follow.
1. Notice that not only is the set X ′ reachable from any effort profile, it is reachable
via at most n− 1 updates, hence it will be reached almost surely for any starting
state.
2. For a fixed x1 ∈ X1 it also holds that once the game reaches {x1} × X ′−1, it
cannot leave this set unless player 1 updates. The proof is identical to that of
the ’No exit’ part of Lemma 3.3.8.
As a consequence of Lemma 3.3.8, for any strategy profile s such that s−1 = b−1, and
any recurrent set [x]s we must have [x]s ⊆ X ′.
Let X∗ = {x ∈ X : ∀i ∈ I−1 xi = bi(x)} and X∗+ = {x ∈ X : ∀i ∈
I+−1(x) xi = bi(x)} denote the sets of effort profiles where every myopic player is
at his best response, and every contributing myopic player is at best response, respec-
tively. Notice that for every s1 ∈ S˜1 we have A(s1, b−1) ⊆ X∗ ⊆ X∗+.
We now prove Proposition 3.3.4.
Proof of Proposition 3.3.4. Since every myopic player is a best-responder in equilibrium,
for every SSPE strategy profile s∗, every x ∈ X∗, and every i ∈ I−1 we have that
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s∗i (x) = xi. Let X
1 = argmax x′∈X′ pi1(x
′). Due to the second point of Lemma 3.3.8, for
every s∗ and x ∈ X1∩X∗ we have s∗1(x) = x1, as pi1(x) is the maximum instantaneous
payoff that can be reached in X ′. Recall the definitions of x∗ and M1. Clearly, x∗ ∈ X∗.
We now show that x∗ is an element of X1 as well.
If N1 6= ∅, then, since the cardinality of every pillar set of N1 is an upper bound of
the total effort in N1, and no pillar set of N1 can have a bigger cardinality than M1,
by the fact that x∗(N1) = |M1| we have that x∗ ∈ argmax x′∈X′ x′(N1). By the fact
that x∗1 = 0, and by the assumptions made on pi1, it follows that x
∗ ∈ X1 as well. This
means that x∗ ∈ A(s∗) for any SSPE s∗.
If N1 = ∅, then for any effort profile x ∈ X it holds that x(N1) = 0, and the
payoff of player 1 depends only on x1. By the assumptions placed on pi1, it follows that
s∗1(x) = 1 for every x ∈ X, hence x∗ ∈ A(s∗) for any SSPE s∗.

Proposition 3.3.4 identifies an effort profile which is both acceptable for the myopic
players, as they are playing best responses, and for the farsighted player, who gets the
maximum instantaneous payoff attainable from this position. By this construction we
show not only that the set of absorbing effort profiles is non-empty for every SSPE,
but also that it has a non-empty intersection with the set of static Nash equilibria of
the game. However, it is not true that the set of absorbing effort profiles would equal
the set of Nash equilibria, as shown by the following example.
Example 3.3.10. Let I = {1, 2, 3}, d = 2, ci = 1 for i ∈ I. Let the network G be
given by g12 = g23 = 1, and g13 = 0. Consider the effort profile x
0 = (0, 0.5, 0.5) (see
figure 3.2).
0
1
0.5
2
0.5
3
Figure 3.2: The network and initial effort profile of Example 3.3.10. Player 1 can choose be-
tween remaining under his target consumption, or disturbing the equilibrium between players
2 and 3 and prompting a response.
Clearly, for a strategy s1 ∈ S˜1 such that s1(x0) = 0, it holds that x0 ∈ A(s1, b−1),
whereas we clearly have x0 /∈ X∗. We show next that by choosing δ and f1 appropri-
ately, s1(x
0) = 0 is the equilibrium play of player 1. By playing 0 at x0, player 1 will
receive the payoff stream f1(0.5) indefinitely.
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Figure 3.3: If player 1 increases his effort in Example 3.3.10, then he faces a permanent
decrease in efforts from player 2. Player 3 provides for both 2 and 3, and player 1 cannot
change that.
For s1 ∈ S˜1 with s1(x0) > 0, the only effort profiles we can reach from x0 are the
ones where players 2 and 3 play 0.5 and 0.5, or 0 and 1, respectively. Moreover, with
probability 1, we will reach a profile where the latter is the case, since at any point when
player 1 has a positive effort level, if players 2 and 3 receive revision opportunities in
this order, they will set their efforts to 0 and 1 respectively. From this point onwards,
by the assumptions on f1, every period’s instantaneous payoff that player 1 receives
is at most f1(1) − 1. Hence, if f1(1) − 1 > f1(0.5) and if δ is high enough, player 1’s
equilibrium choice in profile x0 is s1(x
0) = 0. In this case, the set of absorbing effort
profiles of the equilibrium strategy will include an effort profile that is not a Nash
equilibrium of the static game.
Notably, Example 3.3.10 also illustrates that the best profile for the farsighted
player, x∗ = (0, 1, 0), is not attainable from the (0, 0.5, 0.5) starting effort profile. Even
so, an absorbing profile has been reached, which, as shown in Section 3.5, is generally
true for all games and all initial profiles.
3.4 Rising inequality between myopic players
In this section we concentrate on the myopic players. In particular, we focus on the
progression of the game when it is played by a set of best-responding players revising
in sequence. We show that such dynamics allow for a rise of inequality in the efforts
exerted towards the local public good.
Since the farsighted player can gain utility by exploiting as many of his myopic
neighbors as possible, the results of this section provide insight to his opportunities
and limitations. Therefore, we will find it particularly useful to set up our convergence
theorem. First we show that an effort profile where all myopic players are at their best
replies is reachable from any effort profile.
Lemma 3.4.1. Let s ∈ S˜ be such that s−1 = b−1. For every x ∈ X there exists an
x′ ∈ Rs(x) such that x′ ∈ X∗ and x′1 = x1.
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Lemma 3.4.1 follows by the fact that local public goods games are best-response
potential games (Voorneveld, 2000). As shown in Chapter 2, the function
φ(x) =
∑
i∈I
xi − 1
2
x>Gx
is a best-response potential of a static local public goods game with continuous action
sets. Notice that for every (x, i) ∈ Ω it holds that argmax xi∈R+ φ(xi, x−i) ∈ Xi, since
x(Ni) ∈ {0, 1/d, . . . , }, and hence we have
argmax
xi∈Xi
pii(xi, x−i) = argmax
xi∈Xi
φ(xi, x−i)
by the same arguments as in Chapter 2, meaning that φ is a best-response potential
of Γ.
By Remark 3.3.9, if player 1 is never selected to become active, the game can reach
the finite set {x1} ×X ′−1 by at most n− 1 updates, with every update increasing the
value of φ. Furthermore, as the game cannot leave {x1} × X ′−1 and the value of φ
cannot decrease, an effort profile will be reached, where φ cannot increase any further
by unilateral deviations. At that point, every myopic player will be at his best response.
Lemma 3.4.1 means that should the farsighted player refrain from changing his own
effort – whether by his own choice or by the fact that he is not selected to become
active for a time – the myopic players will reach a partial equilibrium.
We now present a lemma on rising inequality between a linked pair of myopic play-
ers. Given an effort profile such that one member of the pair has a higher consumption
than the other, the effort profile where the former player exerts no effort while the
latter one provides for the former is always reachable.
Lemma 3.4.2 (Rising inequality between pairs). Let s ∈ S˜ be such that s−1 = b−1.
Let x ∈ X and i, j ∈ I−1 be given such that gij = 1 and x(N j) > x(N i). Then there
exists y ∈ Rs(x) that can be reached via updates only by players i and j such that
yj = 0, yi = max{0, 1− x(Ni) + xj}.
Proof. If xj = 0, let player i revise and denote the resulting profile y, which satisfies
the statement. If xj > 0, then let players j and i revise once in sequence and denote
the resulting profile by x′. Clearly, x′(N j) > x′(N i) holds, as only i and j updated.
Furthermore, we have x′i = bi(x
′). If x′i = 0, then we have x
′(Ni) ≥ 1, and hence
x′(Nj) > 1, meaning that x′j = bj(x
′) = 0, and the statement holds for y = x′.
If x′i > 0, then we must have x
′(N j) > x′(N i) = 1. Consider a sequence of states
((x0, i1), (x1, i2), . . . , (x2d−1, i2d)) ∈ Ω2d such that x0 = x′, it = j if t is odd and it = i
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if t is even, and for every t ≥ 1 we have xt = (bit(xt−1), xt−1−it ). Since x′(N j) > 1 we
have x1j < x
0
j , and x
1(N i) = 1− x0j + x1j , hence player i will increase his effort by the
same amount as player j’s decrease, i.e., x2i −x1i = x0j−x1j . Since x2(N j) > x2(N i) = 1,
the same argument can be repeated. After at most 2d steps, player j will reach 0 and
player i will have taken over all of player j’s efforts. 
Lemma 3.4.2 is illustrated in the following example.
Example 3.4.3. Consider again the the network structure and effort profile of Ex-
ample 3.3.7 (see Figure 3.1). Since x(N2) = 1 < x(N3) = 1.2, the conditions of
Lemma 3.4.2 apply. It is easy to see that letting players 3 and 2 best-respond to
x in sequence leads to the profile x2 = (0.1, 0.6, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.4, 0.1), with x2(N2) =
1 < x2(N3) = 1.2. Doing so again gives x
4 = (0.1, 0.8, 0, 0.3, 0.4, 0.4, 0.1), satisfying
x42 = 1− x0(N2) + x03 = 0.8 and x43 = b3(x4) = 0.
Repeated application of Lemma 3.4.2 allows it to be generalized in Lemma 3.4.4 to one
player and several neighbors with higher consumption.
Lemma 3.4.4 (Rising inequality in neighborhoods). Let s ∈ S˜ be such that s−1 = b−1.
Let x ∈ X, i ∈ I−1, and J ⊆ I−1 ∩Ni be given such that for every j ∈ J it holds that
x(N j) > x(N i). Then there exists y ∈ Rs∗(x) that can be reached via updates only by
players in {i} ∪ J such that y(J) = 0 and yi = max{0, 1− x(Ni) + x(J)}.
Proof. Fix j ∈ J . As shown in the proof of Lemma 3.4.2, a sequence of alternating
best-response updates by players i and j allows the game to reach an action profile x′
for which we have x′j = 0. We now show that for every j
′ ∈ J \ {j} it still holds that
x′(N j′) > x′(N i). We have
x′(N j′) = x′(N j′ \ {i, j}) + x′i + gjj′x′j = x(N j′) + (x′i − xi) + gjj′(x′j − xj),
and
x′(N i) = x′(N i \ {i, j}) + x′i + x′j = x(N i) + (x′i − xi) + (x′j − xj).
Since x′j − xj ≤ 0 and by gjj′ ∈ {0, 1} we have (gjj′ − 1)(x′j − xj) ≥ 0, hence we have
x′(N j′)− x′(N i) ≥ x(N j′)− x(N i) > 0.
Therefore, the same method used in the proof of Lemma 3.4.2 can be repeated
until every player in J exerts an effort of 0, and player i takes over the efforts of every
j ∈ J . 
Lemma 3.4.4 is a direct consequence of Lemma 3.4.2, as differences in consumptions
between two neighboring players are either preserved or magnified when the player with
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lower consumption takes over the efforts of another of his neighbors. The two lemmas
together describe a progression towards increasing inequality in efforts between myopic
players, given an inequality in consumption.
We now introduce two notions to describe sets of contributing myopic players.
Definition 3.4.5 (Islands, factions, partnerships). Let x ∈ X. A connected, non-
empty set of myopic players L ⊆ I−1 is called an island in x if
• for every j ∈ L it holds that xj > 0,
• for every i ∈ NL \ {1} it holds that xi = 0.
A possibly disconnected L satisfying the same properties is called an archipelago, con-
sisting of unions of islands. Furthermore, a connected F ⊆ I−1 is called a faction in x
if F is an island and for every j ∈ F it holds that xj = bj(x). Similarly, an archipelago
that satisfies the same properties is called a partnership.
Let the collection of islands in x be denoted by L(x), the collection of factions by F(x),
and the collection of partnerships by B(x).
An island is a set of contributing myopic players and whose myopic neighbors
outside the set are free riders. A faction is an island where every player is at his best
response, and therefore has a consumption of exactly 1. Archipelagos are unions of
islands, while partnerships are unions of factions. Clearly, every myopic player in every
effort profile is either a member of an island or a free rider. For any s1 ∈ S˜1, in every
effort profile in either of the three sets, X∗, X∗+, A(s1, b−1), every myopic player is
either a member of a faction or a free rider.
Notice that given a profile x ∈ X, for every partnership B ∈ B(x) it holds that
M ∈Mx(B) if and only if M is a maximal independent set of B.
The following lemma shows an important property, that every island can give rise
to a partnership through a series of best-responses.
Lemma 3.4.6 (From islands to partnerships). Let x ∈ X and let s be given such that
s−1 = b−1. Let L ∈ L(x) be such that there is a player i ∈ L for which x(Ni∩{1}) < 1.
Then, there exists an x′ ∈ Rs(x) with updates only by players belonging to L, and a
partnership B ∈ B(x′) such that B ⊆ L and for every j ∈ L we have that x′j = bj(x′)
Proof. Similarly to the proof of Lemma 3.4.1 suppose that only the players in L are
allowed to move. As before, by the fact that this is a best-response potential game,
together with the results of Voorneveld (2000) guarantee that the players will reach an
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action profile x′ ∈ X where for every j ∈ L it holds that x′j = bj(x′). The condition
x(Ni ∩ {1}) < 1 for at least one i ∈ L guarantees that at least one member of L will
have a positive effort level. It follows that there must be a B ⊆ L that is a partnership
in x′. 
The main result of this section shows that in recurring effort profiles no member of a
partnership and its neighborhood will change his efforts if the partnership lies outside
player 1’s neighborhood.
Proposition 3.4.7 (Members of distant partnerships never change their efforts). Let
s ∈ S˜ be such that s−1 = b−1, let x ∈ X, and let x be a recurrent profile in s. Then,
for every B ∈ B(x) such that B ∩ N1 = ∅, for every j ∈ NB and every x′ ∈ [x]s it
holds that xj = x
′
j.
Proof. Suppose that |B| = 1, i.e. B is a one-player faction, {j}. It must hold that
xj = 1. Then, no neighbor of j can increase his efforts before j decreases his own.
However, j cannot decrease his own efforts before a neighbor of his increases. Hence,
no effort profile can be reached from x where any player in NB = N j has a different
effort level.
Now let m > 1 and suppose that the statement holds for every partnership with
fewer than m members. Let |B| = m and suppose that we have an x′ ∈ [x]s and a
j ∈ NB such that x′j 6= xj . Since the members of B are playing their best-responses in
x, every history through which x′ can be reached from x must include an effort profile
y and a player i ∈ NB such that yi = bi(y) > 0 but yj = xj for every j ∈ NB \ {i}.
It must hold that y(N i) = 1, as yi = bi(y) > 0. Furthermore, it must be true that
B \ Ni 6= ∅, otherwise y(Ni) ≥ 1 and bi(y) = 0, a contradiction. Moreover, for every
j ∈ Ni ∩ B we have y(N j) = x(N j) + yi > 1. Hence, by Lemma 3.4.4 there exists
y′ ∈ Rs(y) such that y′(Ni∩B) = 0. Notice that i is not in the neighborhood of B \Ni.
Hence, the remainder of the original partnership is an archipelago in y′.
By Lemma 3.4.6 there exists y′′ ∈ Rs(y′) and a partnership B′ ⊆ B \ Ni in y′′.
However, since y′′ ∈ [x]s, and since |B′| ≤ |B \ Ni| < m we must have xj = y′′j for
every j ∈ NB′ . This contradicts the assumption that B is a partnership of m players
in x and that x is recurrent. 
The intuition behind Proposition 3.4.7 is as follows: Any one-player faction outside
player 1’s neighborhood will remain one indefinitely, as it is simply an expert with an
effort of 1, surrounded by free riders. Neither will change their effort levels before the
other does so. A two-player faction, if it breaks can lead to a one-player partnership,
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and therefore it either cannot break in a recurrent set of effort profiles, or a profile
with a two-player faction cannot be recurrent. By induction the same argument can
be extended to partnerships of more players.
3.5 Reaching a single effort profile
The main result of this section is the following:
Theorem 3.5.1. There exists a δ < 1 such that for every δ ∈ (δ, 1) and every SSPE
strategy profile s∗ it holds that every recurring set is a singleton, and for any given
starting state, ω, one of the recurring sets is reached with probability 1.
Naturally, Theorem 3.5.1 implies that every recurrent effort profile belongs to X∗,
furthermore some element of X∗ is reached almost surely from any starting state.
The proof of Theorem 3.5.1 needs a number of steps. We introduce a binary relation
on effort profiles regarding their pillar sets.
Definition 3.5.2 (Pillar-dominance). Let x, y ∈ X ′, and J ⊆ I−1 be given. We say
that y pillar-dominates x in J , denoted by x /J y, if
min
Mx∈Mx(J)
|Mx| ≤ min
My∈My(J)
|My|.
Notice that x /J y holds automatically if J ∩ I+−1(x) = ∅.
The idea behind the notion of pillar-dominance is to introduce an upper bound on
the effort levels in x with information regarding y. For example, if we have x/N1 y, and
y is an experts and free riders Nash equilibrium with ` experts in N1, then we know
that x(N1) ≤ `. The whole proof idea of Theorem 3.5.1 makes use of this relation.
Crucially, notice that /J is a transitive relation.
We now turn to the first in what will be a series of statements that set up the
proof of Theorem 3.5.1. The proof strategy is as follows: Starting from a non-singleton
recurring set under an SSPE we construct an effort profile where all myopic players are
at best response, while at the same time it is no worse for the farsighted player than
any other in the recurring set, and we also provide a corresponding strategy for player
1 by which he is guaranteed to reach it, which leads to contradiction.
To achieve this, given an SSPE s∗, and a non-singleton recurring set [x]s∗ we need
a profile y ∈ [x]s∗ with four properties:
1. y ∈ X∗,
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2. xmax /N1 y,
3. every faction in y is either completely inside or completely outside of N1,
4. every faction in y inside N1 is a clique,
where xmax ∈ argmax x′∈[x]s∗ pi1(x′) denote one of the best profiles for player 1 of the
recurring set.
Properties 1, 3, and 4 together describe an effort profile where, for some y1 ∈ [0, 1],
the total contribution of the farsighted player’s neighbors is y(N1) = m(1 − y1), with
m denoting the number of contributing cliques in player 1’s neighborhood. Property 2
ensures that m ≥ xmax(N1). The proof strategy is to construct a strategy for player 1
which leads him to an effort profile where his consumption is m while his efforts are 0
with probability 1. If such a strategy exists, then s∗1 cannot be part of an SSPE.
In what follows we first present a technical lemma, then prove that such a y can
indeed be reached, always adding one property at a time. Finally, we prove Theorem
3.5.1. For i ∈ I−1, let L(i, x) denote the island that i belongs to, if any.
For x ∈ X let L(x) = {i ∈ I+−1(x) : L(i, x) is not a clique} denote the set of con-
tributors for whom the islands they belong to are not cliques.
Lemma 3.5.3. Fix s ∈ S˜ such that s−1 = b−1. Let x ∈ X be a recurrent effort profile
in s such that x1 < 1. Let i ∈ I−1 be such that x(N i) < 1. There exists y ∈ X∗+∩Rs(x)
that can be reached by updates only by myopic players such that
1. yi = bi(y),
2. x /N1 y, and
3. |L(x)| ≥ |L(y)|.
The proof can be found in the Appendix.
The next lemma states that from any recurring effort profile the game reaches a
state where every myopic player is at best response, the ensuing effort profile pillar-
dominates the original one, and the number of myopic contributors who are not in
cliques does not increase. This establishes properties 1 and 2 that we will use for the
proof of Theorem 3.5.1, and builds towards property 4.
Lemma 3.5.4. Fix s ∈ S˜ such that s−1 = b−1. If there exists an x ∈ X with |[x]s| > 1,
and x1 < 1, then there exists an action profile y ∈ X∗ ∩Rs(x), that can be reached via
updates only by myopic players, such that x /N1 y and |L(x)| ≥ |L(y)|.
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The proof can be found in the Appendix. Lemma 3.5.4 relies on the repeated use of
Lemma 3.5.3 to advance the game into further effort profiles that both pillar-dominate
the original, ensure that all myopic contributors are at best response, and that the
number of contributors not in cliques does not increase. The fact that the game is a
best-response potential game guarantees that the myopic players will eventually stop
revising and they all reach their best responses. We demonstrate the meaning of Lemma
3.5.4 with an example.
Example 3.5.5. Consider again the network of Example 3.3.7. Suppose that the
profile x = (0.1, 0.4, 0.4, 0.3, 0.4, 0.4, 0.1) (see Figure 3.1) is recurring. Then, the effort
profile we get by allowing player 2 to usurp players 3 and 7 in succession is also recurring
(shown in Figures 3.4 and 3.5). Notice that in the new profile, player 4 can also usurp
player 5 which would leave player 4 with an effort of 0.9. Subsequently, player 6 can
move to his best response, also exerting 0.9 effort, creating three one-player factions
(Figure 3.6). Every player is at best response, every contributor is part of a one-player
faction that is also a clique, and the only pillar set is {2, 4, 6}. Hence, the resulting
profile pillar-dominates x.
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Figure 3.4: The links between the myopic players and the effort profile of Example 3.5.5 after
player 2 usurps player 3’s efforts. Now rising inequality applies for players 2 and 7.
Notice that in Example 3.5.5 property 3 is vacuous and we got property 4 for
free, neither of which is guaranteed to happen in the general case. Further examples
(Examples 3.5.7 and 3.5.9) will be used to illustrate such cases. By its construction,
Example 3.5.5 also demonstrates why showing that recurring sets include an effort
profile with all four properties is a crucial step for proving Theorem 3.5.1. Once the
farsighted player becomes active, it is clear that his best strategy is to move to zero,
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Figure 3.5: The links between the myopic players and the effort profile of Example 3.5.5 after
player 2 usurps player 3 and 7’s efforts in succession.
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Figure 3.6: The links between the myopic players and the effort profile of Example 3.5.5. Rising
inequality allows the formation of an effort profile where the farsighted player’s problem is
greatly simplified.
which will be followed by players 2, 4, and 6 moving to 1, hence the best profile for
player 1 is reached, and x could not have been recurring under an SSPE.
As mentioned, generally properties 1 and 2 do not imply properties 3 and 4. As a
next step we show that once we reached a profile that satisfies 1 and 2, then we can
reach a profile that satisfies 1, 2, and 3.
Lemma 3.5.6. Fix s ∈ S˜ such that s−1 = b−1. If there exists an x ∈ X with |[x]s| > 1
and x1 < 1, then there exists an action profile y ∈ [x]s ∩X∗, such that x /N1 y and for
every F ∈ F(y) it holds that either F ⊆ N1 or F ∩N1 = ∅, and |L(x)| ≥ |L(y)|.
The proof can be found in the Appendix. The idea behind Lemma 3.5.6 is to start
with an effort profile where all myopic players are at best response, which is possible
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due to Lemma 3.5.4. If there is a faction with members both inside and outside of N1,
then we check how the farsighted player reacts. If he does not revise his efforts, the
recurrent set must be a singleton. If he decreases, we apply Lemma 3.5.4 to get back
to a state with all myopic players at their best responses, with the farsighted player
now having a lower contribution. If he increases, then a faction with members both
inside and outside his neighborhood will splinter into smaller ones, with one splinter left
completely outside his neighborhood. Thus, a contradiction is reached by Proposition
3.4.7, as the original profile could not have been recurrent. This idea is demonstrated
by a simple example.
Example 3.5.7. Consider the line network, and the initial effort profile, x0 of Example
3.3.10 (shown in Figure 3.2). If this profile is recurring, then the recurring set is
a singleton: If the farsighted player would not deviate, i.e. s1(x
0) = 0, we have
[x0]s = {x0}, a singleton. If the farsighted player would deviate, i.e. s1(x0) > 0, then
by the rising inequality between pairs lemma (Lemma 3.4.2) we can reach a profile
where player 3 is an expert and player 2 is a free rider. There is no way back to x.
Therefore, it can be easily seen that any candidate non-singleton recurring set in the
line network must contain at least one profile in which player 3 is a free rider, meaning
that the only partnership is completely inside N1.
Finally, we add property 4. We show that a profile can be reached such that every
faction inside the farsighted player’s neighborhood is a clique while also satisfying
properties 1, 2, and 3. For x ∈ X let F1(x) = {F ∈ F(x) : F ⊆ N1} denote the
collection of factions that are entirely inside player 1’s neighborhood.
Lemma 3.5.8. Fix s ∈ S˜ such that s−1 = b−1 and for every x ∈ X it holds that
s1(x) ≤ 1. If there exists an x ∈ X with |[x]s| > 1 and x1 < 1, then there exists an
action profile y ∈ [x]s ∩ X∗, such that x /N1 y, for every F ∈ F(y) we either have
F ⊆ N1 or F ∩N1 = ∅, and for every F ∈ F1(y) it holds that F is a clique.
The proof can be found in the Appendix. The idea behind Lemma 3.5.8 is to start
from a profile that satisfies the first three properties, and then, similarly to Lemma
3.5.6 we check what the farsighted player’s choice would be. If he does not revise, then
again, we are in a singleton recurring set. If he does, then we break up an original
faction into smaller ones. Once the factions are small enough, i.e. they have one, two,
or three players, they are guaranteed to be cliques. We demonstrate the idea with an
example.
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Example 3.5.9. Consider once more the network of Example 3.3.7 with the following
effort profile: x = (0.1, 0.4, 0.4, 0.1, 0.4, 0.4, 0.1) (Figure 3.7). Since x ∈ X∗, we have
no inequality to exploit with the rising inequality lemmas.
0.1
1
0.4
2
0.4
3
0.1
4
0.4
5
0.4
6
0.1
7
Figure 3.7: The links between the myopic players and the effort profile of Example 3.5.9. All
players are at best response but the only faction is not a clique. There is no inequality, none
of the myopic players can usurp any other.
The only way for the game to escape x is by the farsighted player’s deviation. If he
does not deviate, the recurring set containing x must be a singleton. If he does, then,
depending on the order of players revising, inequalities can appear that we can exploit
to fragment the faction {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} into smaller ones.
Suppose that player 1 increases his effort by 0.2 to exert 0.3, and that this change
is followed player 3’s revision (a decrease to 0.2), then player 7’s (a decrease to 0, since
he cannot go below that). Figure 3.8 shows the resulting effort profile which we call
x′.
Notice that x′(N2) = 0.9 < x′(N3) = 1 < x′(N7) = 1.1, and hence the rising
inequality in neighborhoods lemma is now applicable for player 2 and his only con-
tributing myopic neighbor, 7. Hence, from x′ we can reach an effort profile in which
player 2 is a one-player faction with an effort of 0.7, and players 3 and 7 are both free
riders. Following this, it is easy to see that the profile y = (0.3, 0.7, 0, 0.7, 0, 0.7, 0)
is also reachable by player 4 usurping player 5 followed by player 6 moving to his
best reply. Note that any increase of player 1 allows the emergence of the same three
one-player factions via similar methods.
If player 1 decreases instead of increasing, we can also reach the same outcome.
Suppose that player 1 decreases his effort to 0, and his revision is followed by player
2’s (an increase to 0.5) and then by player 4’s (an increase to 0.2). Figure 3.9 shows
this effort profile which we call x′′.
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Figure 3.8: The links between the myopic players and the effort profile of Example 3.5.9, after
an increase by player 1, and two subsequent decreases by players 3 and 7. Rising inequality
applies for player 2 and 3.
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Figure 3.9: The links between the myopic players and the effort profile of Example 3.5.9, after
a decrease by player 1, and two subsequent increases by players 2 and 4. Rising inequality
applies for player 2 and 3.
Since x′′(N2) = 1 < x′′(N3) = 1.1, the rising inequality between pairs lemma
applies for players 2 and 3. Moreover, player 2 can usurp player 7 as well, again
forming a one-player faction. This can be followed by player 4 usurping 5, and then
6 moving to his best response to reach another effort profile with three one-player
factions, (0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0)
In the following proof we assume that an SSPE strategy profile can permit non-
singleton recurrent sets, which makes the four lemmas applicable, then arrive at a
contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 3.5.1. Assume that we have an x ∈ X and an s∗ ∈ S∗ for which
|[x]s∗ | > 1. Let xmax ∈ argmax x′∈[x]s∗ pi1(x′) denote one of the best effort profiles for
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player 1. Note that since |[x]s∗ | > 1, player 1 has to move at least once. Since N1 = ∅
leads to a trivial contradiction, we assume N1 6= ∅.
If I+−1(x
max) = ∅, then we must have xmax(N1) = 0, and for every i ∈ N1 we have
xmax(Ni) ≥ 1, otherwise any neighbor revising would improve player 1’s instantaneous
payoff. Clearly, by allowing all myopic players outside N1 to reach their best responses
as well we can reach x∗ ∈ X∗ with x∗1 = xmax1 , x∗(N1) = 0, and pi1(x∗) = pi1(xmax).
If this is the best that player 1 can achieve, then in an SSPE we must have s∗1(x
∗) =
xmax1 = x
∗
1 = 1, since, in absence of any efforts from his neighbors, any change in
his own effort would decrease his own instantaneous payoffs. This means that the
absorbing set is a singleton, a contradiction.
If I+−1(x
max) 6= ∅, then let M ∈Mxmax(N1). Then, for every x′ ∈ [x]s∗ we have
pi1(x
′) ≤ f1(|M |).
Furthermore, since the farsighted player changes his efforts at least once, changing his
instantaneous payoff, we must have a x′ ∈ [x]s∗ with pi1(x′) < f1(|M |). We will show
that there exists y ∈ [x]s∗ for which pi1(y) ≥ f1(|M |) and y ∈ X∗, with y1 = 0. This
leads to contradiction, as under these circumstances, playing s∗1(y) > 0 would not be
an SSPE strategy, and we have [y]s∗ = {y}.
Let y0 ∈ [x]s∗ denote the effort profile such that y0 ∈ X∗, for every F ∈ F(y0)
with F ∩ N1 6= ∅ it holds that F ⊆ N1 and F is a clique, and there does not exist a
y′ ∈ [x]s∗ with the same properties for which |F1(y′)| > |F1(y0)|. Let |F1(y0)| = m0.
By Lemma 3.5.8, such a y0 must exist, and m0 ≥ |M |. In other words, y0 is a profile
where m0 cliques of myopic players contribute in player 1’s neighborhood with each
clique’s total effort equaling 1− y01 .
Consider the following strategy s1 ∈ S˜1 for x′ ∈ X:
s1(x
′) =
max{x′1 − 1/d, 0} if x′ ∈ X∗,x′1 otherwise.
We now show that if, instead of s∗1, player 1 adopts s1 as soon as the game reaches
the effort profile y0, the game will reach an effort profile where player 1’s instantaneous
payoff is at least f1(m
0), and all myopic players are at best response. If y01 = 0, this
is already achieved, hence pi1(y
0) = f1(m
0) ≥ f1(|M |), meaning that in any SSPE, s∗,
we must have s∗1(y
0) = 0, contradicting |[x]s∗ | > 1.
Let y′ = (s1(y0), y0−1). What we show next is that for every i ∈ N1 such that y′i = 0
and bi(y
′) > y′i, N i contains the entirety of one clique of myopic players of positive
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effort and no other myopic players of positive effort. If N i includes no contributing
myopic players, then letting exactly one player in every faction F ∈ F1(y0) move to his
best response after y′, and finally letting i do the same would produce m0 + 1 factions
in N1, contradicting the choice of y
0.
If for some F ∈ F1(y0) we have N i∩F 6= ∅, but F 6⊆ N i, then take j ∈ F \N i. Since
j ∈ F we have y′(N j) = 1−1/d, and since i is not at his best response, but was before
player 1 decreased, we have y′(N i) = 1 − 1/d as well. Now, let y′′ denote the profile
we get from y′ by letting players i and j move successively to best response. Then, for
every j′ ∈ F ∩ N i we have y′′(N j′) = 1 + 1/d, while y′′(N i) = y′′(N j) = 1. Hence,
by Lemma 3.4.4, there exists a profile ŷ ∈ Rs(y0), with ŷ(F ∩Ni) = 0. From here, by
letting players i, j, and one player from every other clique F ′ ∈ F1(y0), F ′ 6= F move
to best response we get a profile with m0 + 1 cliques of myopic players contributing,
contradicting the choice of y0.
Hence, if i ∈ N1 with bi(y′) > y′i, then N i contains the entirety of one clique. It
cannot contain any other myopic contributors, since for every F ∈ F1(y0) we have
y′(F ) = 1 − y01 , meaning that y′((N i ∩ F ) ∪ {1}) = 1 − 1/d. If i had any other
contributing myopic neighbors, he would have a consumption of at least one.
Therefore, once player 1 adopts the strategy s1, every time a myopic player updates,
a faction is created that is also a clique. If y01 > 0, then let s = (s1, b−1), and let
y1 ∈ Rs(y0)∩X∗ be such that y11 = y01 − 1/d. Notice that y0 /∈ Rs(y1), because player
1 never increases his efforts while playing s1. As factions cannot split, nor can they
merge, y1 will have m0 cliques of myopic players contributing with every clique’s effort
totaling 1− y11 = 1− y0 + 1/d. The same arguments can be repeated for y2, and so on,
until we have yk1 = 0 for some k ≤ d. By continuing along this strategy, player 1 slowly
decreases his efforts, while the cliques of myopic players in his neighborhood increase.
If we let y denote any profile where player 1’s effort is 0, and the neighboring cliques’
efforts are 1, then clearly we have pi1(y) = f1(m
0) ≥ f1(|M |). Hence, the instantaneous
payoff f1(m
0) is reached with certainty.
With that we achieve contradiction, as a player with a high enough δ will choose
s1 instead of s
∗
1, meaning that s
∗ is not an SSPE.

We conclude this section by a technical result regarding the limit of expected utilities
for a given starting state.
Proposition 3.5.10. There exists a δ such that for every δ ∈ (δ, 1), every ω ∈ Ω, and
every SSPE profile s∗, limt→∞ ut1(ω, s
∗) exists.
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Proof. Let ω ∈ Ω and an SSPE s∗ be given. Let Qt(x) denote the probability that the
game is in effort profile x in period t if the game starts in state ω and players follow
strategy profile s∗. By Theorem 3.5.1 it follows that with probability 1, the game
proceeds to an absorbing effort profile. By the fact that no absorbing profile can be
reached from any other, for every x ∈ X the limit limt→∞Qt(x) exists and can only
be positive for x ∈ A(s∗).
Hence
lim
t→∞u
t
1(ω, s
∗) = lim
t→∞
∑
x∈X
Qt(x)pi1(x) =
lim
t→∞
∑
x∈A(s∗)
Qt(x)pi1(x) =
∑
x∈A(s∗)
lim
t→∞Q
t(x)pi1(x)
also exists. 
3.6 Lower and upper bounds on long-run payoffs
In this section we compare networks based on the opportunities they offer. Given a
network, the objective is to identify which connections are valuable for the farsighted
player, and which connections are harmful. The most direct application of this analysis
is in models where network formation is an option, i.e. the farsighted player or a planner
can form and sever links for a cost. Such is the case in most social networks, computer
networks, and many biological networks.
In Section 3.5 we have shown that equilibrium strategies lead to convergence to
an absorbing effort profile in case the farsighted player is patient. The utility, i.e. the
discounted sum of expected instantaneous payoffs, of these players is almost completely
decided by the instantaneous payoffs they receive in the absorbing effort profiles they
can reach by their chosen SSPE strategy. However, since the set of SSPE strategies
depends on the network structure and on the initial effort profile of the players in a
convoluted way, we conduct comparative statics of networks based on lower and upper
bounds of the long-run payoffs that the farsighted player can achieve.
The formal definitions are as follows. For a network G let δ(G) denote threshold
value of δ for which Theorem 3.5.1 holds.
Definition 3.6.1. Let δ > δ(G) and let
• u(G) = infω∈Ω,s∗∈S∗ limt→∞ ut1(ω, s∗).
• u(G) = supω∈Ω,s∗∈S∗ limt→∞ ut1(ω, s∗).
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Notice that both values exist as for every SSPE strategy profile Theorem 3.5.1 ensures
that some absorbing effort profile is reached in the long run. The values u(G) and
u(G) are lower and upper bounds on the long-run expected payoff of the farsighted
player who knows only the network G, his position in it, but not the initial state,
and thus has not yet chosen an equilibrium strategy. Clearly, u(G) ≤ u(G) for every
G ∈ G. For a patient farsighted player as assumed by Theorem 3.5.1 and Definition
3.6.1, the long-run expected payoff almost completely determines the utility of the
farsighted player and hence u(G) and u(G) are close estimates on the infimum and
supremum of U1(ω, s
∗), respectively. More precisely, for every ε there exists a δ such
that for every δ > δ we have |u(G) − (1 − δ) infω∈Ω,s∗∈S∗ U1(ω, s∗)| < ε and |u(G) −
(1− δ) supω∈Ω,s∗∈S∗ U1(ω, s∗)| < ε.
By using the two bounds we can make qualitative comparisons between networks
from the perspective of the farsighted player. Without further information on the initial
state of the game, every farsighted player should place his evaluation of a network
within an ε-range of the interval between the two bounds.
Let G = {G ∈ Rn×n : ∀i, j ∈ I gij = gji, gii = 1}. The main results of this section
concern the comparative statics of the bounds as links are added to the network. We
first show that the two bounds coincide in networks where the farsighted player is
linked to every myopic opponent. Let G1 = {G ∈ G : ∀i ∈ I−1 g1i = 1} denote the set
of such networks with n players.
LetMind1 (G) denote the set of independent sets of myopic players in the farsighted
player’s neighborhood in network G.
Proposition 3.6.2. There exists δ such that for every G ∈ G1 and every δ > δ it holds
that
u(G) = u(G) = f1( max
M∈Mind1 (G)
|M |).
The proof of Proposition 3.6.2 can be found in the Appendix. It constructs a strategy
that achieves a long-run payoff equal to the network’s upper bound for every initial
state. If the farsighted player is sufficiently patient, then his SSPE strategy must
also achieve this long-run payoff. This strategy consists of two simple stages: (1)
establishing dependence by providing for the myopic neighbors, i.e. exerting an effort
of 1 until every neighbor decreases to 0, and (2) withdrawal of efforts and forcing an
increase, i.e. moving to 0 effort. The steps (1) and (2) may be repeated if not enough
players increase after the withdrawal stage.
The complexity of this strategy is rather low. As an immediate implication of the
simplicity of this strategy, the values of the upper and lower bounds may be reached
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even without the ability to compute SSPE strategies. We will generalize this point to
the entire class of networks towards the end of this section. Note however, that the
above strategy is not necessarily an SSPE itself, as there may be better strategies that
guarantee the same outcome, e.g. by reaching the optimum sooner.
For now we turn to our comparison results. We first introduce the measures of
networks by which we will characterize the values of the upper and lower bounds,
respectively. We start with the upper bound.
Definition 3.6.3. Let e : G → N be given by
e(G) = max
M∈Mind1 (G)
|M |.
The value e(G) is the cardinality of a maximum independent set of the farsighted
player’s neighborhood in network G. It is the maximum number of players that the
farsighted player can fully exploit simultaneously without any of the myopic players
preferring to deviate. We now show a strictly monotone relationship between e(G) and
u(G)
Proposition 3.6.4. For every G ∈ G it holds that
u(G) =
f1(e(G)) if e(G) > 0,f1(1)− c1 if e(G) = 0. .
Proof. Recall the effort x∗ from Proposition 3.3.4. It is a Nash equilibrium of the static
game Γ such that players in a maximum independent set M ∈Mind1 exert an effort of
1 and players in N1 \M exert 0. Hence, it maximizes player 1’s instantaneous payoffs
over the set of effort profiles X ′, meaning that u(G) = f1(|M |) = f1(e(G)), if N1 6= ∅,
while u(G) = f1(1)− c1 if N1 = ∅. 
Proposition 3.6.4 shows that the value of the upper bound is very easily calculated as
the cardinality of a maximum independent set of the farsighted player’s neighborhood.
Hence, it can be done so even without knowledge of the entire network.
We now provide a similar characterization of u(G). We need a technical definition.
Definition 3.6.5 (Closed partnership). For x ∈ X, a partnership B ∈ B(x) is closed
if for every i ∈ NB \ {1} it holds that x(N i ∩B) ≥ 1.
A closed partnership is a partnership whose members provide at least 1 unit of effort
for each of their free-riding neighbors. Note that a closed partnership may be a union
of other, potentially not closed, factions or partnerships. Let the collection of closed
partnerships in effort profile x be denoted by B˜(x).
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Definition 3.6.6 (Blocking profile). The set X˜ = {x ∈ X∗ : x1 = 1, and ∀j ∈ I−1 \
N1 ∃B ∈ B˜(x) with j ∈ NB} is called the set of blocking profiles.
The action profiles included in X˜ are the ones for which no player in I−1 \N1 reacts
to player 1’s changes, as all are either inside of or are neighbors of a closed partnership.
Notice that X˜ is always non-empty: setting a maximal independent set of I \N1 and
the farsighted player’s exerted efforts to 1 and every other player’s to 0 satisfies the
definition. Furthermore, note that x ∈ X∗ with x1 = 1 alone does not guarantee that
every myopic player outside N1 will be in a closed partnership or in the neighborhood
of a closed partnership.
For x˜ ∈ X˜ let I(x˜) = {i ∈ I : there is no B ∈ B˜(x˜) such that i ∈ NB} denote
the players who are not blocked by a closed partnership. Note that I(x˜) ⊆ N1 as all
other players are blocked by a closed partnership by Definition 3.6.6, but I(x˜) is not
generally equal to N1.
Definition 3.6.7. Let the function e : G → N be given by
e(G) = min
x˜∈X˜
max
M∈Mind1 (G|I(x˜))
|M |.
The value e(G) in Definition 3.6.7 gives the minimum number of players that the
farsighted player can exploit no matter what the initial state is. The reason for this
is the following. Since in a blocking effort profile x˜ all players outside of I(x˜) are
getting more than 1 unit of effort from some members of a closed partnership, we
consider the subgraphs of G where these players are removed. From such a subgraph
we take the cardinality of the maximum independent set, maxM∈Mind1 (G|I(x˜)) |M |, since,
as seen previously in Propositions 3.3.4 and 3.6.4, getting 1 effort from the maximum
independent set of his neighborhood is the best instantaneous payoff the farsighted
player can hope for. In addition, this payoff is attainable, as we will show in the next
proposition. By taking a minimum over effort profiles in X˜ the value e(G) gives the
exact number of units of the public good that is attainable for even the worst choice
of x˜.
Similarly to Proposition 3.6.4 we characterize u(G) by e(G) and show that they are
strictly monotonous transformations of each other.
Proposition 3.6.8. For every G ∈ G it holds that
u(G) =
f1(e(G)) if e(G) > 0,f1(1)− c1 if e(G) = 0.
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The proof of Proposition 3.6.8 can be found in the Appendix.
By Proposition 3.6.8, the value of the lower bound hinges on the number of inde-
pendent myopic neighbors in player 1’s neighborhood that cannot be fully supported
by closed partnerships outside player 1’s neighborhood. Every such player is liable
to exploitation by the farsighted player. As all players outside the farsighted player’s
neighborhood are in closed partnerships, Proposition 3.6.2 can be applied to ensure that
even an unsophisticated farsighted player takes full advantage of a maximum indepen-
dent set of unblocked myopic neighbors. Taking the minimum over all effort profiles
with closed partnerships gives a lower bound of the farsighted player’s possibilities.
Similarly to Proposition 3.6.2, the strategy to reach a long-run payoff that equals the
lower bound is very simple. To guarantee this value, a patient farsighted player must
switch between the dependence stage and the withdrawal stage, alternating between
playing 1 and 0.
We now present the main comparison results. For a network G with gij = 0, let
Gij = G+ {i, j}. Gij is the network we get by adding the link {i, j} to G.
Theorem 3.6.9. If we add the link {i, j} to the network G with gij = 0, the following
comparisons hold:
1. If i = 1, we have u(G) ≤ u(Gij) and u(G) ≤ u(Gij). In addition, if j /∈ NN1 we
have u(G) < u(Gij).
2. If i, j ∈ N1, we have u(G) ≥ u(Gij) and u(G) ≥ u(Gij).
3. Otherwise, u(G) = u(Gij).
Proof. By Propositions 3.6.4 and 3.6.8, and by the strict monotonicity of f1, it is
sufficient to show the analogue of Theorem 3.6.9 after replacing u with e and u with e
in all three statements. The substitution also makes use of f1(1) > f1(1) − c1 for the
cases e(G) = 0 and e(G) = 0. Let X˜ij be defined in the same manner as X˜ for the
network Gij .
1. The first inequality follows due to the fact that the cardinality of the maximum
independent set of the farsighted player’s neighborhood cannot decrease by the arrival
of a new neighbor. For the second inequality notice that 1 ∈ {i, j} implies that X˜ ⊇
X˜ij , since every closed partnership in I−1 \ N1(Gij) is a closed partnership in I−1 \
N1(G). On the other hand, for a fixed x˜ ∈ X˜ij we have M1(G|I(x˜)) ⊆ M1(Gij |I(x˜)).
Both of these facts imply e(G) ≤ e(Gij). The final inequality is due to the fact that the
maximum independent set of the farsighted player’s neighborhood necessarily increases
if we add a node without any links to the others.
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2. As before, the first inequality follows very simply by the fact that the cardinality
of a maximum independent set in a network cannot increase by the addition of a new
link. For the second inequality, i, j ∈ N1 implies X˜ = X˜i,j , since for every x˜ ∈ X˜ we
have x˜(N1) = 0 and x˜1 = 1. Therefore we only need to consider what happens to the
maximum independent set of N1∩I(x˜) for a fixed x˜, whose cardinality cannot increase
by the addition of another link.
3. Naturally, any link that does not change G|N1(G) does not affect its maximum
independent set and hence, does not change e(G). 
Theorem 3.6.9 fully characterizes the qualitative effects of an additional link on the
upper bound. A new link is either beneficial or neutral to the farsighted player if it
connects him to a new neighbor, harmful or neutral if it connects two of his neighbors,
and neutral in all other cases. The first two statements are upheld very similarly for
the lower bound. In all other cases the effect of a new link on the lower bound is
ambiguous. This will be demonstrated by Examples 3.6.10 and 3.6.11.
The comparison results concerning the upper bound are achieved as straightforward
consequences of its characterization as the cardinality of a maximum independent set of
the farsighted player’s neighborhood. Adding a player into the neighborhood increases
the number of players whose efforts are enjoyed by the farsighted player, although
depending on the connections the upper bound may not change. In case the new
neighbor shares no connection with any of the old ones, the upper bound is guaranteed
to increase. This has the implication that farsighted players prefer to link to distant
players in the network rather than neighbors of his neighbors. Another way to improve
his position is by weakening the connectedness of his existing neighborhood, as any
severed link has a chance to increase the upper bound. All other single changes in the
network are inconsequential on the upper bound, although this does not apply to a
series of single changes.
Changes in the network affecting the neighborhood of the farsighted player have
the same effect on the lower bound. Connecting two neighbors of the farsighted player
has no effects on the set of effort profiles with closed partnership outside the farsighted
player’s neighborhood but it can increase the cardinality of maximum independent sets
of the remaining players, increasing the lower bound. Adding a new neighbor reduces
the possibilities to create closed partnerships while potentially increasing the cardinal-
ity of maximum independent sets, both effects work to increase the lower bound. In
all other cases the new link changes the set blocking profiles in a way that can lead to
an increase or to a decrease in the lower bound. This is demonstrated by the following
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two examples which make up the remainder of this section.
Example 3.6.10. Consider a network of five players {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} with the following
links: {{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {1, 4}, {4, 5}}. In this network, the value of the minimum ex-
ploitation function is 0, and hence the lower bound is f1(1)− c1. Figure 3.10 shows the
network and an effort profile with two closed partnerships which block both myopic
players from exerting positive effort.
1
1
0
2
1
3
0
4
1
5
Figure 3.10: The network blocking effort profile of Example 3.6.10. Players 2 is blocked by
player 3’s effort while player 4 is blocked by player 5. Player 1’s best option is to exert an
effort of 1.
Adding the link {3, 5} eliminates this blocking effort profile as players 3 and 5 both
exerting an effort of 1 is no longer stable for myopic deviation. Hence, at least one of
players 2 and 4 will always be free to provide for player 1, hence the value of the lower
bound increases to f1(1). The resulting network with a new blocking profile is shown
in Figure 3.11
0
1
1
2
0
3
0
4
1
5
Figure 3.11: The network blocking effort profile of Example 3.6.10 after connecting the two
non-neighbors of player 1. Players 2 and 4 cannot be blocked at the same time.
Now consider connecting a player in the neighborhood of the farsighted player with
one outside, e.g. adding the link {2, 5}. Then, the profile in which player 5 plays 1
and all other myopic players play 0 once again blocks both neighbors of the farsighted
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player. Hence, adding a link between two non-neighbors can benefit the farsighted
player, while adding a link between a neighbor and a non-neighbor may harm him.
Example 3.6.10 shows two simple cases through which the lower bound can be influ-
enced. Linking the farsighted player’s neighbors to non-neighbors can make it easier
to achieve blocking effort profiles due to more links, while linking two non-neighbors
to each other can make it harder, as closed partnerships will be harder to find.
While the above reasoning holds for many networks, there are examples where
connecting a neighbor to a non-neighbor, or deleting a link between two non-neighbors
both have the potential to increase the lower bound if the original blocking profile is
sensitive for any changes in the network. This is shown in the following example.
Example 3.6.11. Consider a game with 17 players. The farsighted player is linked to
10 myopic players, none of which have links between them. The remaining 6 myopic
players are grouped into two cliques of three players, but there are no links between
the cliques. One of the farsighted player’s neighbors has no other connections. The 9
other neighbors are connected to three other players each: one player from one clique
and two players of the other. No two of these 9 players have the same set of neighbors.
In this network, the profile where the 6 clique members are playing 1/3 each blocks
the 9 neighbors, and this is the only blocking profile that will block all of them, while
the 10th cannot be blocked in any way, hence the value of the lower bound is f1(1).
Figure 3.12 shows this network and blocking profile.
Suppose that we remove a link one of the three cliques, the one with which each
of the 9 neighbors has one connection. We thereby form a line of three players. As a
result, the blocking profile of Figure 3.12 will no longer be admissible, since the clique
will not be a partnership. The new worst blocking profile is one in which the center
player of the line is a free rider, the other two contribute 1, while the other clique has
two free riders and one player contributing 1. The value of the lower bound therefore
increases to f1(2). The new blocking profile is shown on Figure 3.13.
Finally, suppose that we take the original network and add a link between the 10th
neighbor to a member of the clique with which the 9 neighbors have one connection.
Then, the original blocking profile of Figure 3.12 will again be inadmissible as the equal
1/3-1/3-1/3 distribution only gives the 10th neighbor 1/3 of effort, hence the clique
is not a closed partnership. The worst blocking profile is the one where each clique
has a single player with 1 effort, including the one to whom the 10th neighbor is now
connected to. In this profile the farsighted player is no longer able to exploit the 10th
player, but gains two players from his 9 other neighbors, who are now connected to
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Figure 3.12: The network and the worst blocking effort profile of Example 3.6.11. The dotted
ellipsis and lines indicates the neighborhood of the farsighted player.
trios of zeros. Hence the value of the lower bound increases to f1(2) again. This profile
is shown on the right side of Figure 3.10.
As a consequence of Theorem 3.6.9, the star network with the farsighted player in the
middle maximizes both the lower and the upper bound, and they are equal to f1(n−1)
by Proposition 3.6.2. However, as shown by Example 3.6.10, deleting a link between
two myopic players who are not neighbors of the farsighted player may decrease the
lower bound. Furthermore, Example 3.6.11 shows that adding a link between two
myopic players can dramatically increase the value of the lower bound. These two
facts serve as potential stumbling blocks for a farsighted player who is trying to reach
the star network. However, if linking to new players is a costless option, then the first
statement of Theorem 3.6.9 guarantees that the farsighted player will link to all myopic
players. Additionally, if the farsighted player can sever links running between myopic
players, then the second statement implies that the star network will be reached by
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Figure 3.13: The network and a worst effort profile of Example 3.6.11 with one link from one
of the cliques removed. The number of neighbors that can be exploited increases to 2.
severing all links between his neighbors.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we consider the private provision of local public goods game, a gameclass
with a wide array of applicability and a strong body of theoretical contributions. We
build a model of exploitation of a myopic population by a single farsighted player
with the goal of analyzing exploitative behavior based on the spatial properties of the
population. Our chapter is the first to consider a theoretical model combining the
spatial asymmetries with various levels of player ability.
We consider a dynamic and stochastic setting such that in every time period a
randomly selected player is given a chance to revise his exerted effort into the local
public good. With this dynamic, the game is known to converge to a Nash effort profile.
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Figure 3.14: The network and a worst effort profile of Example 3.6.11 with one link added.
The number of neighbors that can be exploited increases to 2.
The farsighted player’s optimal strategies correspond to optimal policies of a Markov
Decision Process, and hence, stationary subgame perfect equilibria of this game exist
for every network structure.
Our next question was the issue of convergence. We find that every network and
every SSPE permits the existence of absorbing effort profiles that are stable for devi-
ations given the strategies of the players. Moreover, we show that the game dynamics
between myopic players propagate a rising inequality in the exerted efforts of the pop-
ulation. Unless stable partnerships are able to form, then myopic players with lower
total efforts in their neighborhood will increase their efforts, while players with high
total efforts in their neighborhood will lower theirs. As these two effects are mutually
reinforcing each other, we observe a tendency towards a rising inequality of production
of the local public good within the myopic population. This benefits the farsighted
player if the high-effort players end up in his neighborhood and harms him otherwise.
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As a result of the rising inequality, self-sustaining partnerships may form with high-
effort players in the center and free-riders around them. These autarchic partnerships
may become closed as the surrounding free-riders may dampen any ripple effect in the
network (including the ones caused by the farsighted player) from reaching the central
players with high efforts. In this chapter we show that no matter the network struc-
ture or the starting effort profile, due to the rise of inequality, an optimally playing
farsighted player will cause the game to eventually settle in an absorbing state.
Finally, we analyze the farsighted player’s minimum and maximum available long-
run payoff in a given network as a way of evaluating and comparing different network
structures. We provide characterizations for both bounds by the use of maximum
independent sets of (some subset of) the farsighted player’s neighborhood, and show
that the value of the lower bound is reachable from any starting state by a very simple
farsighted strategy. We show that adding a link that connects the farsighted player to a
new neighbor or removing a link that runs between two of his neighbors improves both
his minimum and maximum evaluation of the network. From this we conclude that
the star network is the best structure for the farsighted player for a fixed set of players,
but there are cases when adding a link between two myopic players, particularly, two
myopic players outside the farsighted player’s neighborhood, can increase his minimum
and maximum evaluation.
3.A Toolkit: Buffers
This section introduces necessary concepts for the proofs of the statements in Section
3.5. Notice that the proof of Proposition 3.4.7 is achieved mostly via the application
of Lemmas 3.4.2 and 3.4.4. In this section we extend Lemma 3.4.4 along the lines of
the following example:
Example 3.A.1. Consider the game and the initial effort profile of Example 3.3.7. We
have x(N2) = x(N7) = 1 < x(N3) = 1.2 (see Figure 3.1). Rising inequality between
pairs applies for players 2 and 3 but not for players 2 and 7. However, after player 2
usurps player 3 (figure 3.15), player 7 becomes richer than player 2.
This is due to the fact that players 3 and 7 are not neighbors, hence player 7 gains
from player 2’s increase but does not lose from player 3’s decrease. Hence, player 2 can
usurp player 7 as well (figure 3.16).
Once player 2 usurps both of his neighbors, he becomes a one-player island (and
faction). The set of free-riding players {3, 7} acts as a buffer between the two islands,
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Figure 3.15: The links between the myopic players and the effort profile of Example 3.A.1
after player 2 usurps player 3’s efforts. Now rising inequality applies for players 2 and 7.
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Figure 3.16: The links between the myopic players and the effort profile of Example 3.A.1
after player 2 usurps player 7’s efforts as well. Player 2 becomes a one-player faction, and is
separated from the island {4, 5, 6} by a buffer of players, {3, 7}.
{2} and {4, 5, 6}: as long as the farsighted player does not move away from his effort
of 0.1, no matter how the efforts change in the latter, the former is not affected.
Naturally, once a second player has been usurped, the same argument can be re-
peated on higher levels, allowing for additional players with equal consumption to be
taken over. We now introduce the idea formally.
Definition 3.A.2 (Buffer set). Let x0 ∈ X and i ∈ I−1 be given. Let D0i (x0) = {j ∈
Ni ∩ I+−1(x0) : x0(N j) > x0(N i)}. For k ≥ 1 let xk ∈ X and Dki (x0) ⊆ Ni be defined
recursively as follows:
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xkj =

0 if j ∈ Dk−1i (x0),
max{0, 1− xk−1(Ni \Dk−1i (x0))} if j = i,
xk−1j otherwise.
.
Dki (x
0) = Dk−1i (x
0) ∪ {j ∈ Ni ∩ I+−1(xk) : xk(N j) > xk(N i)} = Dk−1i (x0) ∪D0i (xk).
Once Dki (x
0) = Dk−1i (x
0) for some k ≥ 1, the set Di(x0) = Dki (x0) is called the buffer
set of player i in effort profile x0.
The set Dki (x
0) denotes the set of players whose efforts can be usurped by player i
starting from effort profile x0, as per the conditions of Lemma 3.4.4. The effort profile
xk+1, is the one we get once the efforts of players in Dki (x
0) have been usurped. By
Lemma 3.4.4, for every s ∈ S˜ with s−1 = b−1 we have xk+1 ∈ Rs(xk) with updates
only from player i and elements of Dki (x
0). Hence, Di(x
0) is the set of all players whose
efforts can be usurped iteratively by player i, starting from effort profile x0. Notice
that Di(x
0) may contain neighbors of i who do not have a higher consumption than
i in the effort profile x0. Such is the case in Example 3.A.1, with player 7, who is a
member of D2(x), but not of D
0
2(x).
Lemma 3.A.3. Let x0 ∈ X and J ⊆ I+−1(x0) be such that for every i′ ∈ NJ ∩ I+−1(x0)
it holds that x0(N i′) > minj′∈J x0(N j′). For any k ≥ 0, i ∈ argmin j′∈J x0(N j′), and
j ∈ Ni ∩ I+−1(x0) \Dki (x0) it holds that
j ∈ Dk+1i (x0) \Dki (x0)⇔ Dki (x0) 6⊆ Nj .
Typically we take J to be an island, in which case the condition for all contributing
myopic neighbors to consume more than the player with the lowest consumption is
vacuous.
Proof. By Definition 3.A.2, j ∈ (Ni ∩ I+−1(x0)) \ Dki (x0) means xk(N j) ≤ xk(N i).
By i ∈ argmin j′∈J x0(N j′) together with the assumptions in Lemma 3.A.3 we have
xk(N j) ≥ xk(N i), hence xk(N i) = xk(N j). Furthermore, also by Definition 3.A.2, it
holds that
xk+1(N i)− xk(N i) = xk+1i − xki − xk(Dki (x0)).
⇒: Consider the contrapositive. If we had Dki (x0) ⊆ Nj , then by j ∈ Ni we have
xk+1(N j)− xk(N j) = xk+1i − xki − xk(Dki (x0)),
meaning that xk(N j) = x
k(N i) leads to x
k+1(N j) = x
k+1(N i), hence j /∈ Dk+1i (x0).
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⇐: Dki (x0) 6⊆ Nj means that
xk+1(N j)− xk(N j) = xk+1i − xki − xk(Dki (x0) ∩Nj) > xk+1i − xki − xk(Dki (x0)),
meaning that xk(N j) = x
k(N i) implies x
k+1(N j) > x
k+1(N i), hence j ∈ Dk+1i (x0).

Lemma 3.A.4. Let x ∈ X and a J ⊆ I+−1(x) be given such that for every i′ ∈
NJ ∩ I+−1(x) it holds that x(N i′) > minj′∈J x(N j′). Let i, j ∈ argmin j′∈J x(N j′) such
that gij = 1. We have two statements:
1. if j /∈ Di(x) and i /∈ Dj(x), then Di(x) = Dj(x).
2. if j /∈ Di(x) and i ∈ Dj(x), then Di(x) ⊂ Dj(x).
Proof. We show that if j /∈ Di(x), then Di(x) ⊆ Dj(x), which directly implies state-
ment 2, and, by applying symmetry, we get statement 1.
By Lemma 3.A.3, if j /∈ Di(x), then for every k ≥ 0, Dki (x) ⊆ Nj , otherwise we
would have j ∈ Dk+1i (x). Furthermore, it is also true that D0i (x) ⊆ D0j (x) since for
every i′ ∈ D0i (x) we have x(N j) = x(N i) < x(N i′), hence i′ ∈ D0j (x).
We show that, for any k ≥ 0, Dki (x) ⊆ Dkj (x) implies Dk+1i (x) ⊆ Dk+1j (x). Suppose
the contrary, i.e. we have Dki (x) ⊆ Dkj (x) but Dk+1i (x) 6⊆ Dk+1j (x). Then there exists
j′ ∈ Dk+1i (x) such that j′ /∈ Dk+1j (x). Since j′ /∈ Dki (x), we have j′ /∈ D0i (x), hence it
holds that x(N j′) = x(N i). By i ∈ J and by the assumption made on J we have j′ ∈ J
and j′ ∈ argmin i′∈J x(N i′). Since Dk+1i (x) ⊆ Nj we have j′ ∈ Nj as well. Hence,
by Lemma 3.A.3, j′ ∈ Dk+1i (x) implies Dki (x) 6⊆ Nj′ , while j′ /∈ Dk+1j (x) implies
Dkj (x) ⊆ Nj′ , contradicting Dki (x) ⊆ Dkj (x). 
Lemma 3.A.5. Let x ∈ X and a J ⊆ I+−1(x) be given such that for every i′ ∈
NJ ∩ I+−1(x) it holds that x(N i′) > minj′∈J x(N j′). For every i0 ∈ argmin j′∈J x(N j′)
there exists a non-empty connected C ⊆ argmin j′∈J x(N j′) such that
1. for every i ∈ C it holds that D = Di(x) = NC ∩ I+−1(x),
2. Di0(x) ⊆ D.
Furthermore, if there exists a j ∈ Ni0 ∩ I+−1(x) with x(N i0) < x(N j), then the
resulting buffer, D = NC ∩ I+−1(x) is non-empty.
Proof. The proof is constructive. Let C0 = {i0} and let D0 = Di0(x). For k ≥ 0 we
construct a Ck and a Dk such that for every i, i′ ∈ Ck it holds that Di(x) = Di′(x) =
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Dk, x(N i) = x(N i′) = minj′∈J x(N j′) and Di0(x) ⊆ Dk. Consider the following
construction for Ck+1 and Dk+1.
If we have NCk ∩ I+−1(x) = Dk, then we terminate. If not, then there must exist a
j ∈ (NCk ∩I+−1(x))\Dk. Notice that j /∈ Dk implies x(N j) = minj′∈J x(N j′), meaning
that j ∈ J and j ∈ argmin j′∈J x(N j′).
Take an arbitrary j ∈ (NCk ∩ I+−1(x)) \ Dk and an ik ∈ Ck ∩ Nj . If ik /∈ Dj(x),
then we take Ck+1 = Ck ∪ {j}. Then, by the first part of Lemma 3.A.4 we have
Dj(x) = Dik(x). Hence, if we take D
k+1 = Dk, then if point 2 is satisfied for Ck and
Dk, they are also satisfied for Ck+1 and Dk+1. If ik ∈ Dj(x), then we take Ck+1 = {j}.
By the second part of Lemma 3.A.4 we have Dj(x) ⊃ Dik(x). For Dk+1 = Dik(x), if
point 2 is satisfied for Ck and Dk, it will also be satisfied for Ck+1 and Dk+1.
In both cases, either Ck grows, or Dk does, while Dk can never decrease. Property 2
trivially holds for C0, and is preserved by the construction. The process will ultimately
terminate with a κ ≤ n such that we have D = NCκ ∩I+−1(x) = Dκ, satisfying property
1 as well.
Clearly, if there exists a j ∈ Ni0 ∩ I+−1(x) such that x(N i0) < x(N j), then j ∈ D0i0 ,
meaning that D is non-empty. 
The idea behind Lemma 3.A.5 is to take a player with a minimum consumption, find
his neighbors, then take one of those players, and so on. Lemma 3.A.4 guarantees that
we will arrive at a maximal set of players that can be usurped, and that this maximal
set covers the entire non-free riding neighborhood.
Definition 3.A.6 (Partnership with buffer). Let x ∈ X be given. The trio of sets
(B,C,D), with B,C,D ⊆ I−1 is called a partnership with a buffer in x if the following
properties are all satisfied:
• B ∈ B(x),
• B ⊆ C and for every i ∈ C it holds that xi = bi(x),
• C is connected,
• D = NC ∩ I+−1(x),
• for every (i, j) ∈ C ×D it holds that gij = 1,
• x(C \B) = x(D) = 0.
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Note that Definition 3.A.6 only requires B and C to be non-empty. A partnership with
a buffer consists of a partnership, B nested in a connected subset of myopic players, C
which may contain free riders, and a buffer of free-riders, D separating the partnership
from the remainder of the myopic player set.
In the following lemma we extend both Lemma 3.4.4 and Lemma 3.4.6.
Lemma 3.A.7. Let s ∈ S˜ such that s−1 = b−1. Let x ∈ X be a recurrent effort profile
such that x1 < 1. Let J ⊆ I+−1(x) be such that for every i′ ∈ NJ ∩ I+−1(x) it holds
that x(N i′) > minj′∈J x(N j′). For every i0 ∈ argmin j′∈J x(N j′) there exists an effort
profile y ∈ Rs(x) and a partnership with a buffer (B,C,D) in y such that
1. C ⊆ argmin i∈J x(N i), Di0(x) ⊆ D,
2. y can be reached from x via updates only by the players in C ∪D.
3. x /(C∪D)∩N1 y.
Proof. By Lemma 3.A.5 there exists a connected C ⊆ argmin i∈J x(N i) such that for
every i ∈ C we have NC ∩ I+−1(x) = Di(x) and Di0(x) ⊆ Di(x), satisfying properties 1
and 2.
Recall the definition of xk from Definition 3.A.2. For every k it is true that xk ∈
Rs(x) with updates only by player i and the elements of D
k
i (x). Let κ ≥ 0 be given
such that xκ = xκ−1, and let y′ = xκ. Thus, we get y′(D) = 0. Since D = NC ∩ I+−1(x)
and y′(D) = 0, C is an archipelago in y′. By applying Lemma 3.4.6 to each of its
islands we reach a profile y with updates only by players belonging to C, such that for
every i ∈ C we have yi = bi(y). Let B = C ∩ I+−1(y). Then, it is true that B ∈ B(y)
and y(C \B) = 0, satisfying all required properties of partnerships with buffers.
Now we show property 3. If B ∩N1 = ∅, then x = y, otherwise B is a partnership
in x but not in y, contradicting the recurrence of x by Proposition 3.4.7. If x = y, then
property 3 is satisfied. Assume B ∩ N1 6= ∅. Notice that since y(C \ B) = y(D) = 0,
M ∈My((C ∪D) ∩N1) if and only if M ∈My(B ∩N1). Since x is recurrent, the set
NJ ∩I+−1(x) has a pillar set in x, meaning that minj∈NJ∩I+−1(x) x(N j \{1}) ≤ 1. By the
assumptions on J we must have argmin j∈NJ∩I+−1(x) x(N j \ {1}) = argmin j∈J x(N j \
{1}). Since for every i ∈ B ∩ N1 it holds that i ∈ argmin j∈J x(N j), we also have
i ∈ argmin j∈J x(N j \ {1}). Hence, for every i ∈ B ∩ N1 we have x(N i \ {1}) ≤ 1,
meaning that for every M ∈ My((C ∪ D) ∩ N1) we have M ∈ Mx((C ∪ D) ∩ N1),
implying property 3. 
Note that by Lemma 3.A.7, if there exists j ∈ Ni0 ∩ I+−1(x) such that x(N i0) <
x(N j), then it also holds that Di0(x) ⊆ D = NC ∩ I+−1(x) 6= ∅.
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This section’s final lemma sets up the proofs of the lemmas in Section 3.5.
Lemma 3.A.8. Fix s ∈ S˜ such that s−1 = b−1. Let x ∈ X be a recurrent effort profile
in s such that x1 < 1. There exists a y ∈ X∗+ ∩ Rs(x) that can be reached by updates
only by myopic players such that x /N1 y and |L(x)| ≥ |L(y)|.
Proof. First, let I = {1, 2} with g12 = 1. For any initial profile x such that x1 < 1,
letting player 2 move to a best response will satisfy the statement for y = (x1, 1− x1),
since 1 − x1 > 0, and M = {2} is a pillar set of I−1 = {2} in every profile. Clearly,
|L(x)| = |L(y)| = 0.
We proceed by induction for the number of players, n. Assume that the statement
is satisfied for every network of fewer than n players. If there exists i ∈ I0−1(x), then,
since myopic players behave identically in the presence of the free-rider i as they would
in a game played by the set I \{i} on the network G|I\{i}, we can invoke the induction
hypothesis for a game of n− 1 players which guarantees the statement. Hence we can
assume that I0−1(x) = ∅. This means that the property |L(x)| ≥ |L(y)| is vacuous,
since the number of contributors who are not in cliques cannot increase.
By Lemma 3.A.7 there exists profile x′ ∈ Rs(x) and a partnership with a buffer,
B,C,D in x′ such that C ⊆ argmin i∈I−1 x(N i) and x/(C∪D)∩N1x′. Since D = NC\{1},
we can remove C∪D and apply the induction condition on the set of players I\(C∪D).
Hence, there exists a profile y ∈ X∗+∩Rs(x′) for which x′/(I−1\(C∪D))∩N1y and for every
i ∈ C∪D it holds that yi = x′i. Any pillar sets of (C∪D)∩N1 and of (I−1\(C∪D))∩N1
in y are disjoint due to D = NC \ {1} and y(D) = 0, hence x /N1 y is implied by the
Addition property of pillar sets. 
3.B Proofs of the lemmas of Section 3.5
The proofs found in this section make extensive use of the concepts outlined in the
previous one.
Lemma 3.5.3. Fix s ∈ S˜ such that s−1 = b−1. Let x ∈ X be a recurrent effort profile
in s such that x1 < 1. Let i ∈ I−1 be such that x(N i) < 1. There exists y ∈ X∗+∩Rs(x)
that can be reached by updates only by myopic players such that
1. yi = bi(y),
2. x /N1 y, and
3. |L(x)| ≥ |L(y)|.
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Proof. By Lemma 3.A.8 and by the transitivity of /N1 , we can take x ∈ X∗+. If
x(N i) ≥ 1, then we are done. Otherwise, since x ∈ X∗+, we must have xi = 0. If
I+−1(x)∩Ni = ∅, then by letting player i move to his best response we get a profile that
satisfies all properties. If not, then we must have i ∈ N1, otherwise, by applying Lemma
3.4.4 on player i and the set Ni ∩ I+−1(x) we would get a partnership outside player 1’s
neighborhood, a contradiction by Proposition 3.4.7. Since, for every F ∈ F(x) it holds
that x(F ) ≥ 1 − x1, for any F ∈ F(x) it holds that F 6⊆ Ni, otherwise x(N i) ≥ 1.
Hence, there must exist a player i0 ∈ I+−1(x) \N i such that (Ni ∩Ni0) ∩ I+−1(x) 6= ∅.
Let x′ be the profile we get by letting player i move to his best response. Then, for
every j ∈ Ni ∩ I+−1(x) it holds that x′(N j) > 1, and hence, every myopic contributor
in the neighborhood of I+−1(x) \N i has a higher consumption than the minimum con-
sumption in I+−1(x) \N i. Furthermore, since i0 ∈ argmin i′∈I+−1(x)Ni(N i′), by Lemma
3.A.7 we have a profile x1 ∈ Rs(x′) and a partnership with a buffer, B0, C0, D0, in x1
such that C0 ⊆ argmin i′∈I+−1(x)\Ni x(N i′), Di0(x
′) ⊆ D0, and x′ /(C0∪D0)∩N1 x1. No-
tice that x1i = x
′
i > 0, since i’s move had to be an increase. Furthermore, i /∈ C0 ∪D0
due to the fact that C0 ⊆ I+−1(x′) \N i and D0 ⊆ NC0 , meaning that x′ /(C0∪D0)∩N1 x1
implies x /(C0∪D0)∩N1 x
1. Finally we have x1(N i) < 1, since D
0
i0(x
′) includes some of
player i’s neighbors due to (Ni ∩Ni0) ∩ I+−1(x) 6= ∅, Di0 ⊆ D0, and x1(D0) = 0.
Let I1 = (I+−1(x)∪{i}) \ (C0 ∪D0) = I+−1(x1) \B0. For k ≥ 1 we will construct the
profile xk+1 ∈ Rs(xk) and a partnership with a buffer Bk, Ck, Dk in xk+1, such that
a number of properties are satisfied. Let Ik+1 = Ik \ (Ck ∪ Dk). The properties we
expect from xk+1 and Bk, Ck, Dk are as follows:
• Bk, Ck, Dk ⊆ Ik and Dk = NCk ∩ I+−1(xk) = NCk ∩ Ik.
• Only the players in Ck ∪Dk update between xk and xk+1.
• If i ∈ Ik+1, then xk+1i ≥ xki and xk+1(N i) < 1.
• x /(Ck∪Dk)∩N1 xk+1.
Let κ = min{k ≥ 1: Ik = ∅} and let y = xκ. We will show that such a y satisfies all
desired properties. For the construction of xk+1 we differentiate two cases.
Case 1: There exists a non-empty J ⊆ Ik \ {i} such that for every j ∈ Ik ∩ NJ it
holds that xk(N j) > minj′∈J xk(N j′). Then, by Lemma 3.A.7 there exists a profile
xk+1 ∈ Rs(xk) and a partnership with a buffer, Bk, Ck, Dk ⊆ Ik in xk+1 such that
Ck ⊆ argmin j∈J xk(N j), Dk = NCk ∩ I+−1(xk) = NCk ∩ Ik, and xk /(Ck∪Dk)∩N1 xk+1.
Since i /∈ J , it holds that i /∈ Ck. If i /∈ Dk as well, then we have xk+1i = xki , while
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xk(N i) < 1 implies x
k+1(N i) < 1 as, by the fact that only the players in C
k ∪Dk have
updated and xk+1(Dk) = 0, no player in i’s neighborhood has a higher effort in xk+1
than in xk. If i ∈ Dk then xk+1i = 0 and i /∈ Ik+1. Since for every i′ ∈ Ck ∪ Dk we
have xi′ = x
k
i′ , x
k /(Ck∪Dk)∩N1 x
k+1 implies x /(Ck∪Dk)∩N1 x
k+1.
Case 2: For every J ⊆ Ik \ {i} there exists a j ∈ NJ ∩ Ik such that xk(N j) ≤
minj′∈J xk(N j′). This property implies that Ik is connected, as any component of
Ik that does not include i would satisfy the previous property. It also means that
i ∈ argmin j∈Ik xk(N j), otherwise we have a contradiction for J = Ik \ {i}.
If Ik = {i}, then let i move to his best response and let xk+1 denote the resulting
effort profile. Since xk(N i) < 1, we have x
k+1
i > x
k
i . Furthermore, {i} ∈ B(xk+1). Let
Ck = {i} and Dk = ∅. We clearly have x /(Ck∪Dk)∩N1 xk+1.
If Ik ⊆ N i, but Ik 6= {i}, then Ik must be a clique due to i ∈ argmin j∈Ik xk(N j).
Therefore, for every j ∈ Ik we have xk(N j) = xk(N i) < 1. Let any player from Ik move
to best response and let xk+1 denote the resulting effort profile. Let Bk = Ck = Ik
and Dk = ∅. Then, every pillar set of Ck ∪ Dk in xk+1 is a singleton, containing
one player of Ik. Since i ∈ N1 we have minM∈M
xk+1
((Ck∪Dk)∩N1) |M | = 1, while
minM∈Mx((Ck∪Dk)∩N1) ≤ 1, we also have x /(Ck∪Dk)∩N1 xk+1.
If Ik has members outside of N i, then we first show that (argmin j∈Ik\Ni x
k(N j))∩
NNi 6= ∅. Suppose the contrary. Then, minj∈Ik\Ni xk(N j) < minj′∈Ik∩NNi x
k(N j′).
This means that Ik \ NNi 6= ∅. Let J = Ik \ NNi . Then, NJ ∩ Ik = NNi ∩ Ik, and
therefore, for every j ∈ NJ ∩ Ik it holds that xk(N j) > minj′∈J xk(N j′), contradicting
the condition of reaching Case 2.
Case 2a: There exists an i′ ∈ (argmin j∈Ik\Ni xk(N j))∩NNi and a j′ ∈ (Ni∩Ni′)∩Ik
such that xk(N i) = x
k(N j′) < x
k(N i′). Then j
′ ∈ argmin j∈Ik xk(N j). By Lemma
3.A.7 there exists a profile xk+1 ∈ Rs(xk) and a partnership with a buffer Bk, Ck, Dk
such that Ck ⊆ argmin j∈J xk(N j), Dk = NCk ∩ Ik = NCk ∩ I+−1(xk), Dj′(xk) ⊆ Dk,
and xk /(Bk∪Dk)∩N1 x
k+1. From this point, the arguments follow Case 1, except in this
case we have i ∈ Dk. This is due to the fact that i′ ∈ Dk by i′ ∈ D0j′(xk). By i′ /∈ Ni,
Lemma 3.A.3 gives i ∈ D1j′(xk), implying i ∈ Dk.
Case 2b: The condition of reaching Case 2a does not hold, however, there exists a
player i′ ∈ (argmin j∈Ik\Ni xk(N j))∩NNi and a j′ ∈ Ik∩(Ni∩Ni′) such that xk(N i) =
xk(N j′) = x
k(N i′). Then, i
′ ∈ argmin j∈Ik xk(N j). Let player i move to his best
response from xk and call the resulting effort profile xˆk. Due to xk(N i) < 1 this is an
increase, hence xˆki > x
k
i . We get xˆ
k(N i) = xˆ
k(N j′) = 1, and i
′ ∈ argmin j∈Ik xˆk(N j).
By Lemma 3.A.7 there exists xk+1 ∈ Rs(xˆk) and a partnership with a buffer Bk, Ck, Dk
in xk+1 such that Ck ⊆ argmin j∈Ik xˆk(N j), Dk = NCk∩Ik = NCk∩I+−1(xk), Di′(xˆk) ⊆
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Dk, and xk/(Ck∪Dk)∩N1 . Clearly, i /∈ Ck, hence we either have i ∈ Dk and i /∈ Ik+1,
or xk+1i = xˆ
k
i > x
k
i . Furthermore, notice that j
′ ∈ Di′(xˆk), hence j′ ∈ Dk. Therefore,
if i ∈ Ik+1, then we get xk+1(N i) < 1 as Dk ∩Ni 6= ∅.
Case 2c: The conditions of reaching Cases 2a and 2b do not hold. If we had a
player i′ ∈ argmin j∈Ik\Ni xk(N j)∩NNi and a j′ ∈ Ik ∩ (Ni ∩Ni′) such that xk(N i) =
xk(N j′) > x
k(N i′), it would contradict i ∈ argmin j∈Ik xk(N j). Hence, if we select
an arbitrary i′ ∈ (argmin j∈Ik\Ni xk(N j)) ∩ NNi and a j′ ∈ Ik ∩ (Ni ∩ Ni′), we must
have xk(N i) < x
k(N j′). As in Case 2b, let xˆ
k denote the profile we get by letting
player i move to his best response. Since xk(N i) < 1, we have xˆ
k
i > x
k
i , and due to
i ∈ argmin j∈Ik x(N j), for every j ∈ Ni ∩ Ik we have 1 = xˆk(N i) ≤ xˆk(N j). Since x ∈
X∗+, and since no player in the neighborhood of i
′ has increased, we have xk(N i′) ≤ 1.
Hence, i′ ∈ argmin j∈Ik xˆk(N j). Therefore, by Lemma 3.A.7 we have a profile xk+1 ∈
Rs(x
k) and a partnership with a buffer Bk, Ck, Dk such that Ck ⊆ argmin j∈Ik xˆk(N j),
Di′(xˆ
k) ⊆ Dk, and x /(Ck∪Dk)∩N1 xk+1. We now show that i /∈ Ck. Suppose the
contrary. If we had i ∈ Ck, then minj∈Ik xˆk(N j) = 1. By the connectedness of Ck
this would mean that there is a pair i0 ∈ Ik \ N i and j0 ∈ Ik ∩ Ni with gi0j0 = 1
and xˆk(N j0) = xˆ
k(N i0) = 1. However, this must mean x
k(N i) = x
k(N j0) < x
k(N i0),
contradicting the fact that Case 2b’s conditions are not satisfied. Hence, i /∈ Ck. The
fact that xk+1i > x
k
i if i ∈ Ik+1 and xk+1i = bi(xk) = 0 otherwise follows similarly to
Case 1.
We now show that each of the three properties are satisfied for y, starting with
property 2. Notice that since Ck is never empty when Ik is non-empty, the process
described above will terminate in xκ with κ < n. Consider the sets Ck∪Dk. Clearly, we
have I+−1(x)∪{i} =
⋃κ
k=0(C
k∪Dk). Since for every k ≥ 0 we have x/(Ck∪Dk)∩N1 xk+1,
Bk, Ck, Dk are partnerships with buffers in y, covering the entirety of I+−1(x)∪{i}, and
since the players in Ck ∪Dk do not change their efforts after reaching the profile xk+1,
the Addition property of pillar sets implies x /N1 y for y = x
κ, satisfying property
2. Since every myopic contributor in y is at best response due to the properties of
partnerships and buffers, we have y ∈ X∗+.
Now we show yi = bi(y). Clearly, i ∈ Ck ∪Dk for some k ≤ κ. If i ∈ Ck for some
k ≤ κ, then xk+1i = bi(xk+1) by property 2 of Definition 3.A.6. Since Dk = NCk ∩ Ik,
and since xk+1((NCk \Dk) ∩ I−1) = 0 by construction, we have xk+1(NCk \ {1}) = 0.
The construction of y guarantees y(NCk \ {1}) = 0 as well, meaning that xk+1i =
bi(x
k+1) implies yi = bi(y). If i ∈ Dk for some k ≤ κ, then yi = 0. Furthermore, since
Bk ⊆ Ni, and since y(Bk) ≥ 1− x1, by i ∈ N1, we must also have y(N i) ≥ 1, meaning
that yi = bi(y).
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Finally, we show |L(y)| ≤ |L(x)|. If xi > 0, then by the construction of y it holds
that I+−1(y) ⊆ I+−1(x). Therefore, no island that was not a clique could become larger,
and no island that was a clique could become a non-clique, implying |L(y)| ≤ |L(x)|.
The same holds if xi = 0 and yi = 0, as, once again, no free rider in x is a contributor
in y. If xi = 0 but yi > 0, then we must have had a k ≤ κ with i ∈ Bk. As shown
in Case 2, this can only happen if i itself is a member of a clique, hence y satisfies
property 3 as well. 
Lemma 3.5.4. Fix s ∈ S˜ such that s−1 = b−1. If there exists an x ∈ X with |[x]s| > 1,
and x1 < 1, then there exists an action profile y ∈ X∗∩Rs(x), that can be reached via
updates only by myopic players, such that x /N1 y and |L(x)| ≥ |L(y)|.
Proof. First, let I = {1, 2} with g12 = 1. For any initial profile x such that x1 < 1,
letting player 2 move to a best response will satisfy the statement for y = (x1, 1− x1),
since 1 − x1 > 0, and M = {2} is a pillar set of I−1 = {2} in every profile. Clearly,
|L(x)| = |L(y)| = 0.
We proceed by induction for the number of players, n. Assume that the statement
is satisfied for every network of fewer than n players.
Let x1 = x. For k ≥ 1 we will construct the profile xk+1 ∈ Rs(xk) such that the
following properties are satisfied:
1. Only myopic players update between xk and xk+1.
2. xk+1 ∈ X∗+, and if xk /∈ X∗, then xk+1 6= xk.
3. xk /N1 x
k+1.
4. |L(xk)| ≥ |L(xk+1)|.
Let κ = min{k ≥ 1: xk = xk+1}. Such a κ must exist due to the fact that X1 ×X ′−1
is finite, we cannot leave it by Lemma 3.3.8 and Remark 3.3.9, and that for every
1 ≤ k ≤ κ it holds that φ(xk) < φ(xk+1). Clearly, by the transitivity of /N1 , the
profile y = xκ satisfies all of the desired properties. The construction of xk+1, given
xk proceeds as follows. We distinguish four cases.
Case 1: There exists i ∈ I−1 with xk(N i) < 1. In this case Lemma 3.5.3 guarantees
the existence of xk+1 which satisfies properties 1, 3, and 4. Furthermore, xk+1 is such
that xk+1 ∈ X∗+ and xk+1i = bi(xk+1), meaning that xk+1 6= xk, satisfying property 2
as well.
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Case 2: For every i ∈ I−1 we have xk(N i) ≥ 1, and I0−1(xk) 6= ∅. In this case
we have an i ∈ I−1 such that xki = 0. Since myopic players behave identically in
the presence of the free-rider i as they would in a game played by the set I \ {i} on
the network G|I\{i}, we can invoke the induction hypothesis for a network with n− 1
players. Therefore, there exists xk+1 ∈ Rs(xk) which satisfies property 1, as well as
xk+1 ∈ X∗+, because all myopic players other than i are at their best response. We have
xk /N1\{i} x
k+1 by the induction hypothesis, which, due to xki = 0 implies property
3. Since xki = x
k+1
i , we have |L(xk)| ≥ |L(xk+1)| as well, satisfying property 4. If
for every j ∈ I−1 \ {i} we have xk+1j = xkj , then we must have had xk ∈ X∗ due to
xk(N i) ≥ 1, satisfying property 2 as well.
Case 3: For every i ∈ I−1 we have xk(N i) ≥ 1, I0−1(xk) = ∅, and we have two
players, i, j ∈ I−1 with gij = 1 and xk(N i) 6= xk(N j). In this case, property 4 is
vacuous, as |L(xk)| cannot increase. By Lemma 3.A.7, there exists a profile xˆk and a
partnership with buffer B,C,D in xˆk with C ⊆ argmin i∈I−1 xk(N i), D = NC \ {1},
and xk /(C∪D)∩N1 xˆ.
Since every element of I−1 \ (C ∪D) is separated from B by the buffer of free-riders
D in the profile xˆk, by s−1 = b−1, every myopic player will behave identically as they
would in a network without C ∪D, G|I\(C∪D). Therefore, we can apply the induction
hypothesis on the set of players I \(C∪D). Hence, there exists a profile xk+1 such that
for every j ∈ C∪D it holds that xk+1j = xˆkj , every member of I−1\(C∪D) is at his best
response in xk+1, and xˆk /N1\(C∪D) x
k+1. Clearly, xk+1 satisfies properties 1, 2, and 4.
Since xˆk /N1\(C∪D) x
k+1 implies xk /N1\(C∪D) x
k+1, and since xk /(C∪D)∩N1 xˆ
k implies
xk /(C∪D)∩N1 x
k+1, the Addition property of pillar sets gives xk /N1 x
k+1, satisfying
property 3.
Case 4: For every i ∈ I−1 we have xk(N i) ≥ 1, I0−1(xk) = ∅, and we for every
pair of players i, j ∈ I−1 with gij = 1 it holds that xk(N i) = xk(N j). If G is a
disconnected network, we apply the induction hypothesis to each of its components. If
G is connected, then for every i ∈ I−1 it holds that xk(N i) = α ≥ 1. If α = 1, then
xk ∈ X∗ and we are done. If α > 1 and I−1 is a clique, then by letting every myopic
player move to his best response in any order we reach a suitable xk+1.
If α > 1 and I−1 is not a clique, then there must exist i, j, j′ ∈ I−1 such that
gij = gij′ = 1 but gjj′ = 0. Let the players j and j
′ move to their best responses from
xk and call the resulting effort profile x′. Since α > 1, both players must decrease,
meaning that we have x′(N j) = x′(N j′) > x′(N i), and i ∈ argmin i′∈I−1 x′(N i′). By
Lemma 3.A.7 there exists an effort profile xˆk and a partnership with bufferB,C,D in xˆk
such that C ⊆ argmin i′∈I−1 x′(N i′), D = NC \ {1}, Di(x′) ⊆ D, and xk /(C∪D)∩N1 xˆk.
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Notice that j, j′ ∈ D, since j, j′ ∈ D0i (x′). From here the analysis of this case follows
that of Case 3. 
Lemma 3.5.6. Fix s ∈ S˜ such that s−1 = b−1. If there exists an x ∈ X with |[x]s| > 1
and x1 < 1, then there exists an action profile y ∈ [x]s ∩X∗, such that x /N1 y and for
every F ∈ F(y) it holds that either F ⊆ N1 or F ∩N1 = ∅, and |L(x)| ≥ |L(y)|.
Proof. By Lemma 3.5.4 and by the transitivity of /N1 , we can take a x
′ ∈ Rs(x) ∩X∗
and show that a y ∈ Rs(x′) exists that satisfies the desired properties. If the statement
does not hold for x′, then we must have F ∈ F(x′) with an i ∈ F ∩N1 and a j ∈ F \N1
such that gij = 1.
Because of |[x]s| > 1, we must have either s1(x′) > x′1 or s1(x′) < x′1. If s1(x′) < x′1,
then by Lemma 3.5.4 there exists x1 such that x′/N1x
1, |L(x′)| ≥ |L(x1)|, and x1 ∈ X∗.
If no faction in x1 has members in both N1 and I−1 \N1, we are done. If there are such
factions, then again we must have s1(x
1) 6= x11. If s1(x1) < x11, we repeat the same
argument until we find a profile of similar properties for which either the statement
holds, or where player 1 increases. Since negative contributions are not possible, player
1 cannot decrease forever.
If s1(x
′) > x′1, then let player 1 revise, and let the resulting profile be denoted
by x′′. For every i′ ∈ F ∩ N1 we have x′′(N i′) > x′′(N j) = 1, and we also have
j ∈ argmin j′∈F x′′(N j′). Hence, by Lemma 3.A.7 there exists a profile xˆ ∈ Rs(x′′)
and a partnership with a buffer B,C,D in xˆ such that C ⊆ argmin j′∈F x′′(N j′), and
D = NC ∩ I+−1(x′′) = NC ∩ F . Hence, B ∈ B(xˆ) with B ∩ N1 = ∅, a contradiction
by Proposition 3.4.7. Therefore, every faction of x′ is either completely inside or
completely outside N1. 
Lemma 3.5.8. Fix s ∈ S˜ such that s−1 = b−1 and for every x ∈ X it holds that
s1(x) ≤ 1. If there exists an x ∈ X with |[x]s| > 1 and x1 < 1, then there exists an
action profile y ∈ [x]s ∩ X∗, such that x /N1 y, for every F ∈ F(y) we either have
F ⊆ N1 or F ∩N1 = ∅, and for every F ∈ F1(y) it holds that F is a clique.
Proof. By Lemmas 3.5.4 and 3.5.6, and by the transitivity of /N1 we can take x ∈ X∗,
such that for every F ∈ F(x) we either have F ⊆ N1 or F ∩N1 = ∅. We prove that for
every such x, if there is a F ∈ F1(x) that is not a clique, then we have a y ∈ Rs(x)∩X∗
with x /N1 y and |L(y)| < |L(x)|.
Since there exists a F ∈ F1(x) that is not a clique, there exist players i, j, j′ ∈ F
with gij = gij′ = 1 but gjj′ = 0. Consider the profile x
′ = (s1(x), x−1). Clearly, x′ 6= x,
otherwise we have |[x]s| = 1.
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If s1(x) < x1, then by Lemma 3.5.4 there exists a x
′′ ∈ Rs(x′) ∩ X∗ such that
x′ /N1 x
′′ and L(x′′) ≤ L(x′). Since x′(N i) < 1 by player 1’s decrease, we must have
x′′ 6= x′ and x′′1 = x′1 < x1. We then consider the profile (s1(x′′), x′′−1), and if player 1
decreases again, we repeat the above argument. Since player 1 cannot decrease forever,
as in Lemma 3.5.6, we must have an effort profile x˜ ∈ Rs(x) ∩ X∗ with x /N1 x˜ and
L(x˜) ≤ L(x) such that s1(x˜) > x˜1. We therefore assume s1(x) > x1.
We discuss two cases.
Case 1: s1(x) ∈ (x1, 1). Then, it holds that x′(N i) = x′(N j) = x′(N j′) > 1. Let
x′′ denote the profile we get by letting j and j′ move to a best response, both of whom
decrease. Now we have x′′(N i) < x′′(N j) = x′′(N j′), and i ∈ argmin i′∈F x′′(N i′).
Take J = F ∩ I+−1(x′′). By Lemma 3.A.7 there exists an effort profile xˆ ∈ Rs(x′′) and a
partnership with a buffer B,C,D in xˆ such that C ⊆ argmin i′∈F x′′(N i′), D = NC∩F ,
Di(xˆ) ⊆ D, and x′′ /(C∪D)∩N1 xˆ.
Notice that x′′j > 0 and x
′′
j′ > 0 imply j ∈ D and j′ ∈ D respectively, as in this
case they are members of J , and of D0i (x
′′), hence xˆj = xˆj′ = 0. Since the players in
I−1\(C∪D) did not change their efforts between x and xˆ we clearly have x/N1\(C∪D) xˆ,
meaning that, by the Addition property of pillar sets, we have x /N1 xˆ as well. Since
no player who was a free rider in x has positive efforts in xˆ, but we had j, j′ ∈ L(x)
who are both free riders in xˆ, we must have L(xˆ) < L(x).
By Lemma 3.5.6, and by the transitivity of /N1 , there exists a y ∈ Rs(xˆ) which
returns all myopic players to playing best responses, satisfying all desired properties.
Case 2: s1(x) = 1. In this case, let x
′′ denote the profile we get by letting all of
N1 move to best response, leading to x
′′(N1) = 0. Then, for every i ∈ I \ N1 we
have x′′i = bi(x
′′), as every contributor is a member of a partnership, and should a free
rider j ∈ I \ N1 have a consumption lower than 1, by Lemma 3.4.4 we would have
a x˜ ∈ Rs(x′′) where {j} ∈ F(x˜), a contradiction by Proposition 3.4.7. Since every
myopic player is at best response in x′′ and we have s1(x′′) ≤ 1 by assumption, we
must have s1(x
′′) < 1, otherwise |[x′′]s| = 1, a contradiction.
Let player 1 move from x′′ and call the resulting effort profile xˆ. Since for every
j ∈ I \N1 we had xj = bj(x) while xˆj = bj(xˆ) holds as well, for every i ∈
⋃
F∈F1(x) F =
N1 ∩ I+−1(x) it must hold that xˆ(N i) = xˆ1. Let M be a maximum independent set of⋃
F∈F1(x) F . Notice that M ∈ Mx(N1). Let the members of M update in any order
and call the resulting effort profile yˆ. Then, for every i ∈ M we will have yˆi = 1− xˆ1
and for every j ∈ I \M we have yˆj = xˆj . Since the only pillar set of N1 in yˆ is M , we
have x /N1 yˆ. Furthermore, as there was a faction inside N1 in profile x that was not
a clique, whereas there are no such factions in yˆ, we must have L(yˆ) < L(x).
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If yˆ ∈ X∗, then we are done. Otherwise, Lemma 3.5.6 guarantees the existence of
y ∈ Rs(yˆ) which satisfies all desired properties. 
3.C Proofs of Propositions 3.6.2 and 3.6.8
Proposition 3.6.2. There exists δ such that for every G ∈ G1 and every δ > δ it holds
that
u(G) = u(G) = f1( max
M∈Mind1 (G)
|M |).
Proof. For x ∈ X let I1−1(x) = {i ∈ I−1 : xi = 1} denote the set of myopic players
with effort level 1. Let M be a maximum independent set of N1(G) and consider the
following strategy, s1 ∈ S˜1:
s1(x) =
0 if I1−1(x) ⊆M,1 otherwise.
To show the statement, we first argue that by the strategy profile s = (s1, b−1) the game
reaches an effort profile with probability 1 where the farsighted player’s instantaneous
payoff equals f1(|M |). Let xM ∈ X be the effort profile for which xi = 1 if i ∈ M
and xi = 0 otherwise. Notice that A(s) = {xM}, as in every other effort profile the
farsighted player or a member of M would change his effort. Furthermore, for every
x ∈ X it holds that xM ∈ Rs(x), and it is reachable by fewer than n + |M | revisions
as follows: If I1−1(x) 6⊆ M , then player 1 revises to play 1, then each of the myopic
players revise in any order to play 0. This takes n steps. Once all myopic players are
at 0, player 1 decreases his efforts to 0, and then the members of M revise in any order
all of them increasing to 1, reaching the profile xM in |M | more steps. If I1−1(x) ⊆M ,
then all members of M \ I1−1(x) revise any order, all of whom increasing to 1, once
again, reaching the profile xM in at most |M | steps.
With xM being the unique absorbing profile, and it being reachable in a bounded
number of steps for every ω ∈ Ω we have that
lim
t→∞u
t
1(ω, s) = f1(|M |).
Since there exists a strategy that guarantees a long-run payoff of f1(|M |) there must
be a sufficiently high δ such that for every δ > δ and every SSPE s∗ we have
lim
t→∞u
t
1(ω, s
∗) ≥ lim
t→∞u
t
1(ω, s) = f1(|M |).
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On the other hand, f1(|M |) = maxx∈X′ pi1(x), so by Lemma 3.3.8 and Remark 3.3.8
we also have
lim
t→∞u
t
1(ω, s
∗) ≤ f1(|M |).
Hence, u(G) = u(G) = f1(|M |). 
Proposition 3.6.8. For every G ∈ G it holds that
u(G) =
f1(e(G)) if e(G) > 0,f1(1)− c1 if e(G) = 0. .
Proof. We first consider the case that e(G) = 0. Clearly, in any network the farsighted
player can guarantee the long-run payoff f1(1)− c1 by playing the strategy s1(x) = 1
for every x ∈ X. Hence we must have u(G) ≥ f1(1) − c1. If e(G) = 0, then there
must exist an x˜ ∈ X˜ such that maxM∈Mind1 (G|I(x˜)) |M | = 0, which happens if and only
if N1 ∩ I(x˜) = ∅. Take ω = (x˜, 1). In this game, player 1 plays as if he was the only
player as he gets 0 from his neighbors and no player will change his effort level no
matter what player 1 does. Hence, in every SSPE we must have s∗1(x˜) = 1, meaning
that u(G) ≤ f1(1)− c1 also holds.
We now consider the case e(G) > 0. We first show that u(G) ≤ f1(e(G)). Let
x ∈ argmin x˜∈X˜ maxM∈Mind1 (G|I(x˜)) |M | and let Ω = {(x, i)|i∈I}.
Since in every SSPE, the players outside I(x) never change their efforts, and since
no player in I(x) is connected to a player outside of it with positive efforts, they do not
influence the other players’ payoffs in any way. We can therefore remove them from
the network and take the network G|I(x). Since I(x) ⊆ N1 we can apply Proposition
3.6.2. Hence for every ω ∈ Ω it holds that
u(G|I(x)) = f1(e(G|I(x))).
By the choice of x, we have f1(e(G|I(x))) = f1(e(G)), and we have u(G|I(x)) ≥ u(G)
due to
u(G) = inf
ω∈Ω,s∗∈S∗
lim
t→∞u
t
1(ω, s
∗) ≤ inf
ω∈Ω,s∗∈S∗
ut1(ω, s
∗).
Finally, we show that if e(G) > 0 then u(G) ≥ f1(e(G)) also holds. We prove this
by induction. For n = 2 the statement holds by Proposition 3.6.2. Now fix n and
assume that it holds for every network with fewer than n players. For networks that
belong to G1 the statement holds by Proposition 3.6.2, so we can assume that G /∈ G1.
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Suppose that u(G) < f1(e(G)). Let Xˆ = {xˆ ∈ X : B˜(xˆ) 6= ∅}. Since G /∈ G1,
Xˆ must be non-empty, as any effort profile xˆ for which xˆj = 1 for some j /∈ N1
and xˆ(Nj) = 0 will satisfy this property. For every xˆ ∈ Xˆ and every B ∈ B˜(xˆ) we
have that e(G) ≤ e(G|I\NB ), since combining any closed partnership in the reduced
network G|I\NB with B gives a closed partnership in G. We now construct a strategy
s∗∗ ∈ S˜1×{b−1} such that for every ω ∈ Ω it holds that limt→∞ ut1(ω, s∗∗) ≥ f1(e(G))
to achieve a contradiction.
Consider the following strategy:
s∗∗1 (x) =
0 if x ∈ X∗ and either x(N1) = 0 or x(N1) ≥ e(G),1 otherwise.
If player 1 adopts s∗∗1 , then by Lemma 3.4.1 the game eventually reaches a state y ∈ X∗
for which either y(N1) ≥≥ e(G) or y(N1) = 0 If it is the former, we are done. If it
is the latter, then by the definition of s∗∗, there exists y0 ∈ Rs∗∗(y) ∩ X∗+ for which
y0(N1) = 0 and y
0
1 = 0. There are two cases. If B˜(y0) 6= ∅, then take a B ∈ B˜(y0)
and remove NB from the game altogether. By the induction hypothesis it is true that
u(G|I\NB ) ≥ f1(G|I\NB ), hence player 1 has an SSPE in the reduced game with player
set I \NB which guarantees at least a payoff of f1(G|I\NB ) ≥ f1(e(G)).
If B˜(y0) = ∅, then there must exist i0 ∈ N1 with y0(N i0) < 1. By Lemma 3.4.4
there exists yˆ0 ∈ Rs∗∗(y0) in which yˆ0i0 = 1, yˆ0(Ni0) = 0, and for every j /∈ N i0 we
have yˆ0j = y
0
j .
Once i0 usurped his neighborhood’s efforts we again let every other myopic player
reach their best responses again without player 1 moving. By Lemma 3.4.1, there
exists a y1 ∈ Rs∗∗(yˆ0) ∩X∗ such that y11 = y01 = 0. Notice that y1i0 = yˆ0i0 = 1, while
y1(Ni0) = yˆ
0(Ni0) = 0. We now repeat the argument we had for y
0. If B˜(y1) 6= ∅, then
take a B ∈ B˜(y1), remove NB from the game, and apply the induction hypothesis to
show the statement. If not, and if e(G) = 1, then we are done. If not, and if e(G) > 1,
then there must exist an i1 ∈ N1 for which y1(N i1) < 1. Then, by Lemma 3.4.4 there
exists yˆ1 ∈ Rs∗∗(y1) for which yˆ1i1 = 1, yˆ1(Ni1) = 0, and for every i ∈ I \N i1 it holds
that yˆ1i = y
1
i .
We continue this way until, for some k ≤ |N1|, we reach a yˆk such that for every
i ∈ N1 we have yˆki = bi(yˆk). Notice that in yˆk a maximal independent set of N1 is
playing 1 while the rest of N1 is playing 0. Let this independent set be denoted by M
∗
and notice that e(G) ≤ |M∗|.
Once we reach yˆk we let all remaining myopic players reach their best replies as
per Lemma 3.4.1. Let this effort profile be denoted by y∗. It is easy to see that
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y∗ ∈ X∗, and that pi1(y∗) = f1(|M∗|) ≥ f1(e(G)). Note that the definition of s∗∗
ensures that we either find a closed partnership that we can remove, or the game
reaches y∗ with probability 1. Hence, a minimum long-run instantaneous payoff of
f1(e(G)) is attainable from any effort profile via strategy s
∗∗ and the same must hold
for every SSPE profile s∗. Hence u(G) ≥ f1(e(G)). 
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Chapter 4
Best-response dynamics in
directed network games
“I do detest everything which is not perfectly mutual.”
Lord Byron
This chapter1 studies the cycling behavior of a simple learning process in network games
of non-reciprocal relationships. Unlike in the well-studied case of reciprocal relations, in
directed network games one-sided best-response dynamics may produce cycles. This chapter
presents two subclasses of such games in which best-response cycles cannot occur, leading
to convergence to the set of Nash equilibria. The first such class features a hierarchical
relationship between the players, and is characterized by a directed acyclic network. The
second features weak interaction of the players, more specifically, the total external effects of
each player’s decision are lower than the effect on own payoffs.
4.1 Introduction
The Nash equilibrium is one of the central concepts of game theory. One of its most
attractive properties is that it applies to all games that can be represented in a nor-
mal form. This great generality, however, does not come with a flawless record in
1This chapter is based upon Bayer and Kozics (2019). I would like to thank Botond Ko˝szegi,
Miklo´s Pinte´r, and A´da´m Szeidl for comments on previous versions of this chapter, as well as Yannick
Viossat for feedback and suggestions.
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applied situations. The concept’s success as an accurate predictor of outcomes of real-
life strategic situations is mixed, giving excellent predictions in some (e.g. congestion
games), but poor ones in others (e.g. one-shot public goods games, beauty contests).
Nash equilibrium’s excellent theoretical properties and its shortcomings in applied set-
tings together imply that there are fundamental differences in behavior in games where
it provides an accurate prediction and in those where it fails to.
The theory of learning provides the toolkit to capture these differences. By hy-
pothesizing that equilibrium behavior arises through the adaptation rather than the
introspection of the players, learning serves as the principal toolkit to provide motiva-
tion to be interested in the equilibrium behavior in games: If general learning processes
converge to a Nash equilibrium, then it may be used as a prediction. Additionally, as
some Nash equilibria may be more likely to be limit points of learning processes than
others, learning may help resolve problems arising from equilibrium selection.
In this chapter, we analyze a generalized version of Chapter 2’s model of weighted
network games, called directed network games. As explained previously in Chapters
2 and 3, network games constitute an extremely rich framework, with a wide range of
applications in many fields of science. Unlike in the models of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3,
directed network games allow for players to have non-reciprocal relations to each other.
Non-reciprocal relationships may represent (1) one-sided links, in which case a player
influences another player’s payoffs but not vice versa, (2) two-sided, complementary,
but unequal links, in which case one player has more of an influence over another
player’s payoffs than the other way around, or (3) two-sided, parasitic links which
provide benefits for one player but provide harm to the other.
A brief overview of relevant theoretical literature is as follows: Public goods games
played on networks have been introduced by Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2007). For these
games, the stability of Nash equilibria with respect to a simple learning process, the
continuous best-response dynamic has been established by Bramoulle´ et al. (2014).
Uniform convergence of the continuous best-response dynamic to a single Nash equi-
librium in all such games has been shown by Bervoets and Faure (2019). Bervoets et
al. (2016) constructs an unsophisticated, convergent learning processes. All of these
papers assume reciprocal relations between the players of the network, relying on the
theory of potential games (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) to achieve their results. The
same assumption is made in Ballester et al. (2006)’s closely related model on peer
effects.
To our knowledge, this is the first model focusing on non-reciprocal relationships in
the class of network games. As shown by Monderer and Shapley (1996), the existence
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of a potential function is closely related to the reciprocity of interactions between every
pair of players, a property that cannot be exploited in our more general setting. We
focus on the cycling properties of one-sided best-response dynamics. It is easy to see
that even in a simple game of non-reciprocal interactions, a game played on a directed
cycle network, best-response cycles may emerge, leading to non-convergence, and a
lack of motivation for the Nash equilibrium. Nevertheless, classes of networks exist
that give rise to good cycling behavior.
In this chapter we identify two such subclasses, called hierarchical games, and games
of weak interaction. Hierarchical games are characterized by directed acyclic networks.
They are applicable in situations when pairwise interactions are one-sided, as described
by point (1). Populations that adhere to this criterion have some underlying hierarchy.
Players on the highest level are not affected by any other player, players on intermediate
levels are affected by those on higher levels but not by those on lower levels, while
players on the lowest level have no effect on any other player. A specific application of
hierarchical games in the realm of environmental economics is waste-water management
along a river. In this case the players of the game are municipalities located along the
river, while the hierarchy follows the flow of the river, with upstream municipalities at
the top of the hierarchy. Other examples of networks satisfying this criterion include
trophic networks and military command structures.
The second subclass of games with good cycling properties are games of weak in-
teraction. Such games are characterized by networks with weights that are relatively
small in absolute value. Specifically, for a game to be of weak interaction, every player’s
influence on his own payoffs has to be higher than his influence on every other player’s
payoff combined. The strength of the interactions represents the level of the intercon-
nectedness of the network. In social networks, low interconnection can be interpreted
as a form of individualism. In economics, weak interaction is a characteristic of effi-
cient markets, while strong interaction indicates the possibility of arbitrage. In biology,
weak, but non-negligible interaction is a characteristic of the foraging behavior of most
solitary animals, as well as of some social animals.
Our results imply that the Nash equilibrium retains some of its predictive power in
games on networks even if the relations are non-reciprocal. Specifically, the acyclicity
of the best-response dynamic means that many intuitive one-sided learning processes
converge for these two subclasses of games, if the strategy spaces are finite – which they
are in most applications. The predictive power of the Nash equilibrium is therefore
shown if (1) there is a clear hierarchy on the players, or (2) interactions are not too
strong.
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This chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 presents our two main concepts,
directed network games and best-response dynamics. Section 4.3 contains the main
results, the acyclicity of best-response dynamics in hierarchical games and games of
weak interaction. Section 4.4 concludes.
4.2 The model
Let I = {1, . . . , n} be the set of players. For i ∈ I and bounds xi < xi the set
Xi = [xi, xi] is called the action set of player i, X =
∏
i∈I Xi is called the set of action
profiles, and X−i =
∏
j 6=iXj the set of action profile for all players except i. Let
xi ∈ Xi denote the action taken by player i, x−i ∈ X−i the truncated action profile of
all players except player i, and x = (xi)i∈I the action profile of all players.
Definition 4.2.1. The tuple G = (I,X, (pii)i∈I) is called a directed network game with
payoff functions pii : X → R given by
pii(x) = fi
∑
j∈I
wijxj
− cixi, (4.1)
where for every i ∈ I, we have that fi : R → R is twice differentiable, f ′i > 0, f ′′i < 0,
wij ∈ R, ci ≥ 0.
The interpretation is the following. Each player produces a specialized good with linear
production technology, incurring costs ci for every unit of the good produced. Players
derive benefits from the consumption of their own goods and they are affected by their
opponents’ production decisions. Player i’s enjoyment of player j’s good is represented
by the weight wij ∈ R. Crucially, unlike in Chapters 2 and 3, we do not impose
reciprocal relations, i.e. wij 6= wji may hold. As before, we normalize the interaction
parameter of each player i with himself, wii, to 1. The overall benefits of player i are
given by the benefit function fi over the weighted sum of his and his opponents’ goods.
Note that if wij > 0 and wji > 0, then the goods of players i and j are strategic
substitutes. If wij < 0 and wji < 0 then their goods are strategic complements. If
wij > 0 and wji < 0, then players i and j share a parasitic link.
Since the benefit functions fi are increasing and concave, and the cost parameters
ci are positive, for a given x−i, there is a unique value of xi that maximizes pii(x). For
player i ∈ I, let bi denote the best-response functions, i.e. for every i ∈ I and x ∈ X,
bi(x) = argmax xi pii(x). Let the target values ti be implicitly defined by f
′
i(ti) = ci
as in Chapter 2. Unlike in Chapter 3 we do not assume that players have symmetric
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target consumption levels. If f ′i is always larger (smaller) than ci then ti is defined as
positive (negative) infinity.
Lemma 4.2.2. Let G = (I,X, (pii)i∈I) be a weighted network game. Then, for every
i ∈ I and x ∈ X the best response functions are the following:
bi(x) =

xi if ti −
∑
j 6=i wijxj < xi,
ti −
∑
j 6=i wijxj if ti −
∑
j 6=i wijxj ∈ [xi, xi],
xi if ti −
∑
j 6=i wijxj > xi.
(4.2)
Proof. First, we calculate the unconstrained best response for player i. The first-order
condition is:
∂pii(x)
∂x
= f ′i
∑
j∈I
wijxj
− ci = 0, (4.3)
as wii = 1. Combining with f
′
i(ti) = ci, we get that the unconstrained best response,
b˜i(x) is
b˜i(x) = ti −
∑
j 6=i
wijxj . (4.4)
As the second-order condition is
∂2pii(x)
∂x2
= f ′′i
∑
j∈I
wijxj
 < 0, (4.5)
b˜i(x) is indeed maximizing the payoff. This means, that for every xi > bi(x), a marginal
increase of xi decreases pii(x), while for every xi < bi(x), a marginal increase of xi
increases pii(x). Therefore, if b˜i(x) ∈ [xi, xi], then bi(x) = b˜i(x). If b˜i(x) < xi, then
bi(x) = xi, as choosing a larger xi would decrease the payoff. Similarly, if b˜i(x) > xi,
then bi(x) = xi. 
Lemma 4.2.3. Every directed network game has a Nash equilibrium.
Bramoulle´ et al. (2014)’s analogue result using Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem for a
positive and symmetric weight matrix is directly applicable in the directed network
case. Let the set of Nash equilibria be denoted by X∗.
Although Lemmas 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 have close analogues in existing models with
symmetric interaction, most results, especially those concerning the cycling and con-
vergence of best-response dynamics do not hold in the directed network case. We raise
an example of a well-known case of non-reciprocal interaction.
107
Example 4.2.4. Let I = {1, 2, 3}, let Xi = [0, 1] for i ∈ I, t = (1, 1, 1)>, and
W =

1 0 1
1 1 0
0 1 1
 .
By Lemma 4.2.2, the best-response functions are b1(x) = 1 − x3, b2(x) = 1 − x1,
b3(x) = 1− x2. The only Nash equilibrium is x∗ = (0.5, 0.5, 0.5)>.
Example 4.2.4 is inspired by games with cyclic best-response dynamics, such as the
rock-paper-scissors game. Such games are extensively used in applications involving
evolutionary game theory, particularly in modeling ecological interactions.
We now introduce the class of learning processes this chapter is focused on, the
best-response dynamic.
Definition 4.2.5. A sequence of action profiles (xk)k∈N is called a one-sided best-
response dynamic, or best-response dynamic for short, if for every k ∈ N there exists
an ik ∈ I such that xk−ik = xk+1−ik and xk+1ik = bik(xk).
The set of sequences that satisfy Definition 4.2.5 are the same as the infinite best-
response compatible paths of Chapter 2. In a one-sided learning process, each period
sees exactly one player changing his action. As in Chapter 2 we make no explicit
assumptions on how the revision opportunities are assigned, only that each period sees
only one player revising. In a one-sided process governed by the best-response dynamic,
every player revises to his best response given the previous period’s action profile. The
actions of every other player remain the same. It is possible that the actions of all
players remain the same, i.e. xk = xk+1 for some k, but only if at least one player’s
action was already his best response.
Definition 4.2.6. A sequence of action profiles (xk)k∈N has a cycle if there exist three
time periods, k < k′ < k′′ such that xk = xk
′′
, but xk 6= xk′ .
A process has a cycle, if it revisits an action profile in two different time periods,
between which there is a time when it moves away from it. Cycling properties are
extremely important for the convergence of the learning process. For instance, in case
the absence of cycles can be shown for a process, then it will always converge in a finite
(i.e. discretized) setting of the game.
Cycles in a best-response dynamic are called best-response cycles. As shown in
Chapter 2’s Section 4, in games with a symmetric weight matrix there are no best-
response cycles. However, this is not true in general for directed network games. This
is shown by the following example.
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k xk1 x
k
2 x
k
3 i
k
∑
j∈I wikjxj bik(xik)
0 1 0 0 3 0 1
1 1 0 1 1 2 0
2 0 0 1 2 0 1
3 0 1 1 3 2 0
4 0 1 0 1 0 1
5 1 1 0 2 2 0
6 1 0 0
Table 4.1: The best-response cycle of Example 4.2.7.
Example 4.2.7. Consider the game outlined in Example 4.2.4, with I = {1, 2, 3},
Xi ∈ [0, 1] for i ∈ I, t = (1, 1, 1)> and
W =

1 0 1
1 1 0
0 1 1
 .
Notice that the game has a single Nash equilibrium, x∗ = (0.5, 0.5, 0.5)>.
Suppose that the initial action profile of the players is x0 = (1, 0, 0)>. Table 4.1
shows a best-response cycle of length 6.
We recall another definition from Chapter 2, that of a best-response potential game.
Definition 4.2.8. [Best-response potential game (Voorneveld, 2000)] A game G =
(I,X, (pii)i∈I) is a best-response potential game, if there exists a best-response potential
function φ : X → R such that for every i ∈ I, and every x−i ∈ X−i it holds that
argmax
xi∈Xi
pii(x) = argmax
xi∈Xi
φ(x). (4.6)
The symmetry of the weight matrix W and the game having a best-response potential
are tightly related. For symmetric weight matrices, Bramoulle´ et al. (2014) has shown
that the function φ(x) = x>t− 12x>Wx is an exact potential of Ballester et al. (2006)’s
game of negative externalities, given by the following, quadratic payoff functions:
ui(x) = tixi − 1
2
x2i −
∑
j 6=i
wijxixj .
Since ui and pii give rise to the same best-response functions, φ is, as discussed in
Chapter 2, a best-response potential. However, by Theorem 4.5 of Monderer and Shap-
109
ley (1996), φ can only be an exact potential of the game characterized by (I,X, (ui)i∈I),
if for every i, j ∈ I we have
∂2ui
∂xi∂xj
=
∂2uj
∂xi∂xj
,
which amounts to
wij = wji.
This suggests that φ has no analogous forms that could serve as a best-response po-
tential for the wij 6= wji case. As shown in Example 4.2.7, non-reciprocal relationships
allow for the emergence of best-response cycles, the absence of a best-response poten-
tial, and thus, non-convergence.
4.3 Classes of games with acyclical best-response dy-
namics
As shown in the previous section, allowing for non-reciprocal interactions in network
games has grave consequences on the convergence properties of even the simplest learn-
ing processes, i.e. the one-sided best-response dynamic which may now produce best-
response cycles. Nevertheless, there are useful classes of network games where the
absence of cycles can still be shown without restrictive assumptions on the learning
process. In this section we present two of them, hierarchical games and games with
weak interactions.
Consider the following example.
Example 4.3.1. Let I = {1, 2, 3} be a set of three cities with industrial zones located
along a river. The river flows from city 1 to city 2 and then to city 3. Each city i
decides on the amount of money spent on cleaning the industrial waste in the river
out of a budget of 2, i.e. Xi = [0, 2]. The cities’ target values describe the point at
which the marginal benefits of an extra euro’s worth of cleaner water are the same
as the costs for that city, and are as follows: t = (1, 2, 3)>. The targets increase
downstream, indicating that in the absence of cleaning expenses from other cities,
a downstream city requires higher cleaning efforts due to the extra pollution from its
upstream counterparts’ industries. The interaction weights between the cities are given
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as follows:
W =

1 0 0
0.5 1 0
0.25 0.5 1
 .
City 1 is unaffected by the decisions of cities 2 and 3 due to its upstream position. City
2 derives benefits from city 1’s cleaning efforts, but less so than from that of its own.
City 3 derives benefits from both cities’ cleaning efforts, again less so than from that
of its own, and less so for the more distant city 1.
As per Lemma 4.2.2 the best-response functions of the three players are as follows:
b1(x) = 1, b2(x) = min{2,max{0, 2− 0.5x1}}, and b3(x) = min{2,max{0, 3− 0.25x1 −
0.5x2}}. The unique Nash equilibrium is x∗ = (1, 1.5, 2)>.
Example 4.3.1 reflects a much-stylized situation, inspired by one-dimensional models
of river pollution such as the one appearing in Pimpunchat et al. (2009). As suggested
by the example, typical models of pollution cannot be accommodated by a symmetric
interaction matrix, as the external effects typically go only one way. A further char-
acteristic of this example is the hierarchical relationship of the best-responses, as the
payoffs of cities are independent of the actions of downstream cities, and the underlying
network has no cycles.
In addition to river pollution, such hierarchies are present in most production chains
where goods – and therefore externalities – flow downwards in the production chain,
or in some social networks such as the military where orders are traveling down the
chain of command. Many trophic networks also have hierarchical features with apex
predators on the highest level of the hierarchy and prey animals located on lower levels.
A formal characterization of such networks is as follows.
Definition 4.3.2. A game is called hierarchical if for its underlying network W it
holds that wij = 0 for every i < j ∈ I.
In other words, if the underlying network is acyclic, we have a hierarchical game. In
Definition 4.3.2 it is assumed that players with lower indices are higher up in the
hierarchy, i.e. player 1 is unaffected by any other player’s action, player 2 is only
affected by player 1, etc., which is without loss of generality.
Proposition 4.3.3. For every hierarchical game and every best-response dynamic
(xk)k∈N it holds that there are no cycles in (xk)k∈N.
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Proof. Suppose that there is a cycle (xk)k∈{`,...,`′′} with ` < `′′ such that x` = x`
′′
but
x` 6= x`′ for some `′ ∈ {`, . . . , `′′}. Let i denote the player with the lowest index such
that there exists an `i ∈ {`, . . . , `′′} with x`i 6= x`ii . Such a player must exist, otherwise
no player has changed his action during this time period, contradicting the definition
of a cycle.
Since for every player i′ < i we have that x`i′ = x
`+1
i′ = . . . = x
`′′
i′ , by the definition
of hierarchical games we have that
∑
j 6=i wijx
`
j =
∑
j 6=i wijx
`+1
j =
∑
j 6=i wijx
`′′
j and
hence bi(x
`) = bi(x
`+1) = . . . = bi(x
`′′). However, since (xk)k∈{`,...,`′′} comes from a
best-response dynamic, this contradicts the x`i 6= x`ii . 
The idea behind the proof of Proposition 4.3.3 is the observation that for a player to
revisit an action played earlier, a player in a higher level of the hierarchy must have
changed his action at some point. Because of this, the player at the highest level cannot
revisit earlier actions, as once he reaches his best response, he stays there indefinitely,
for the movements on the lower levels do not change his payoffs, and therefore, his
best response. Hence, the highest level player must not change his action throughout
a cycle, meaning that the second highest player also cannot revisit earlier actions, and
so on.
To set up the next class of games, consider a parametric version of Examples 4.2.4
and 4.2.7.
Example 4.3.4. Consider a game with circular externalities, similar to the one pre-
sented in Example 4.2.4, with the strength of the interactions represented by the pa-
rameter δ ∈ [0, 1].
W =

1 0 δ
δ 1 0
0 δ 1
 .
By Lemma 4.2.2, the best-response functions are b1(x) = 1 − δx3, b2(x) = 1 − δx1,
b3(x) = 1− δx2. The only Nash equilibrium is x∗ = (1/(1 + δ), 1/(1 + δ), 1/(1 + δ))>.
If the strength of the interaction is high, i.e. δ = 1, then best-response cycles may
exist as per Example 4.2.7. If the strength of the interaction is zero, i.e. δ = 0, then
the game is a hierarchical game, as well as a weighted network game, meaning that
best-response cycles cannot exist.
In Table 4.2 we show the sequence of action profiles that follows if players receive
revision opportunities in the same order as in the best-response cycle of Example 4.2.7,
starting, again, in the action profile (1, 0, 0)>. It is clear from the table and from the
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k xk1 x
k
2 x
k
3 i
k
∑
j∈I wikjxj bik(xik)
0 1 0 0 3 0 1
1 1 0 1 1 δ 1− δ
2 1− δ 0 1 2 δ − δ2 1− δ + δ2
3 1− δ 1− δ + δ2 1 3 δ − δ2 + δ3 1− δ + δ2 − δ3
Table 4.2: The best-response dynamic of Example 4.3.4.
best-response functions, that in this order of revisions, the player holding the revision
opportunity in period k will play
∑k
`=0(−δ)` = (1− (−δ)k+1)/(1 + δ) in the next, for
parameter values of δ < 1. Playing on in this order will produce no cycles, and lead to
convergence to the Nash equilibrium.
Intuition suggests that if the interaction parameters are low enough, then the game
maintains the good cycling and convergence properties characteristic of games with
reciprocal interaction. Example 4.3.4 suggests that the critical value of cross-player
interaction which leads to cycling is the value by which players interact with themselves.
In the next definition we introduce games of weak interaction along the above ideas,
formally.
Definition 4.3.5. A game is of weak interaction if for every i ∈ I the underlying
network satisfies
∑
j∈I\{i} |wji| < 1.
By Definition 4.3.5, a game is said to be of weak interaction if the sum of absolute
value of every player’s outgoing weights is lower than unity, i.e. the player’s interaction
parameter with himself. In such games, the total external effects of a player’s actions
on other players’ best-responses are lower than the effect of his actions on his own
best-response. Notice that the definition does not impose that the incoming weights,
i.e. a player’s sensitivity to the other players’ actions, be lower than unity. Crucially,
weak interaction is markedly different from no interaction, as the external effects are
of the same order as the players’ influence on themselves. However, as the number of
players grow large, the per capita level of interaction approaches zero.
Examples of games of low interaction include games in efficient financial and eco-
nomic networks. In this context, low interaction means that the players’ own financial
or production decisions affect own profits more than other players on the market. If
the converse was true, there would be a possibility of arbitrage by increasing the profits
of other agents (by increasing volume if the weights are positive, and by dropping it
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if the weights are negative), and being compensated by them in return. A biological
example of low interaction would be foraging games, where, typically, animals’ foraging
strategies affect the given animal more than its opponents.
The final result of this chapter states that games of weak interaction can never give
rise to best-response cycles.
Proposition 4.3.6. For every game of weak interaction and every best-response dy-
namic (xk)k∈N it holds that there are no cycles in (xk)k∈N.
Proof. Let the function L : X → R be defined as follows:
L(x) =
∑
i∈I
|xi − bi(x)|.
Clearly, the function’s value is 0 if and only if x is a Nash equilibrium.
Fix k ∈ N. We now calculate the change in the value of L between periods k and
k + 1. If xkik = bik(x
k), then xk+1 = xk, hence the change is zero. If xkik = x
k+1
ik
+ d =
bik(x
k) + d for some d 6= 0, then by the properties of best-response dynamics we have
L(xk+1)− L(xk) =
∑
j 6=ik
|xkj − bj(xk+1)| −
∑
j 6=ik
|xkj − bj(xk)| − |d|.
For every j ∈ I \ {ik} we have |xkj − bj(xk+1)| − |xkj − bj(xk)| ≤ |bj(xk) − bj(xk+1)|,
hence we get
L(xk+1)− L(xk) ≤
∑
j 6=ik
|bj(xk)− bj(xk+1)| − |d|.
Finally, by the properties of the best-response functions we have
L(xk+1)− L(xk) ≤
∑
j 6=ik
|wji||d| − |d| < 0,
where the last inequality is due to the weak interaction property.
Hence, every time a player changes his action in a best-response dynamic, L’s value
strictly decreases, meaning that we cannot get cycles. 
Proposition 4.3.6 is shown directly by calculating the change in the aggregated distances
from their current best responses, as players revise their actions. The weak interaction
property guarantees that the total distance can never increase along a best-response
dynamic, meaning that acyclicity is guaranteed. Since all inequalities used in the proof
are tight, the result itself is tight. As demonstrated by Example 4.2.7, allowing the
total magnitude of the interaction parameters to sum up to 1 leads to the emergence
of best-response cycles.
114
Since the weakness of interaction is a good measure of the individualism present
in a social network, this result implies that more individualistic societies allow for an
increased predictive power of the concept of Nash equilibrium, as games played on these
societies will have better convergence properties. In games played on financial networks
our result hints that more efficient markets allow for more accurate predictions of the
Nash equilibrium.
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we analyze the cycling behavior of a simple learning process, called
the best-response dynamic in directed network games. Directed network games are an
extension of the private provision of public goods game, or local public goods game,
allowing for players to have non-reciprocal relationships with one another. To our
knowledge, the paper on which this chapter is based is the first to consider such relations
in this gameclass. Non-reciprocity of relations occurs in social networks between two
agents if a link goes only one way, a link is more significant for one than for the other,
or the relationship is beneficial for one party and harmful for the other. In economics,
most externalities, such as pollution are non-reciprocal: they either only travel one
way, or the magnitude by which the agents affect one another is different. In biology,
trophic networks typically feature one-way interactions, while many other interspecies
relations, such as parasitism may be grossly non-reciprocal.
There are several existing results on the acyclicity and convergence of several learn-
ing processes if relationships are reciprocal. These results rely on the theory of potential
games, particularly on the fact that classic results by Monderer and Shapley (1996) im-
ply that reciprocal relationships give way to the existence of a best-response potential
function. Because of this, every one-sided best-response update, or any update taking
the player closer to his current best response will increase the value of the potential,
meaning that these processes are acyclical.
While best-response potentials do not exist in general for games featuring non-
reciprocal relations, alternative methods may be used to analyze learning in subclasses
of directed network games. In this chapter we present two such subclasses, hierarchical
games and games of weak interaction. Hierarchical games are characterized by directed
acyclical networks, featuring one-way links with no cycles. Games of weak interaction
are networks in which every player’s actions affect the other players’ decisions less so
than his own. Both games have a wide range of applications and together they cover
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a significant part of the applications featuring non-reciprocal interaction.
In this chapter we show that both of the above mentioned subclasses lead to acyclical
best-response dynamics with strong implications on the convergence of these learning
processes. In discretized games, acyclicity is a sufficient condition for convergence.
In case of a best-response dynamic, the convergence is to the set of Nash equilibria.
As most applications are closely captured by discretized strategy spaces, our results
show that the predictive power of the Nash equilibrium extends beyond games with
reciprocal relationships.
Additional work is needed to establish convergence conditions in games with con-
tinuous strategy spaces. By introducing additional assumptions, such as on the order
of players receiving revision opportunities, further classes of games may be identified
with good cycling and convergence properties. These plans are left for future research.
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Chapter 5
A two-phenotype model of
immune evasion by cancer
cells
“And now for something completely different.”
Monty Python
This chapter1 proposes a model with two types of cancer cells differentiated by their defense
mechanisms against the immune system. “Selfish” cancer cells develop defense mechanisms
that benefit the individual cell, whereas “cooperative” cells deploy countermeasures that in-
crease the chance of survival of every cell. Our phenotypes capture the two main features of
the tumor’s efforts to avoid immune destruction, crypticity against immune cells for the self-
ish cells, and tumor-induced immunosuppression for the cooperative cells. We identify steady
states of the system and show that only homogeneous tumors can be stable in both size and
composition. We show that under generic parameter values, a tumor of selfish cells is more
benign than a tumor of cooperative cells, and that a treatment against cancer crypticity may
promote immunosuppression and increase cancer growth.
1This chapter is based upon Bayer, Brown, and Stanˇkova´ (2018). The majority of this project was
conceived during my research visit at the University of Illinois at Chicago between July 23 and August
23, 2016. The visit was sponsored by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation
program. I would like to thank Jessica Cunningham, Abdel Halloway, and Christopher Whelan for
feedback and suggestions.
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Valorization
“We must know. We will know.”
David Hilbert
This addendum discusses the value-creation opportunities of the research presented in
this dissertation. According to the Regulation Governing the Attainment of Doctoral
Degrees of Maastricht University, examples of value-creation include “patents, licences,
open source tools, software, making models and systems available, co-publications
with social and/or economic stakeholders, publications in journals and newspapers,
non-academic publications, appearances in the media, contributions to public debates,
advice for social organisations or companies, projects for the SME portal, policy rec-
ommendations for governments, training programmes for professionals, public-sector
workers, organisations or companies, participation in Top Institutes, in United Brains
Limburg, collaborations in BioPartner, the Chemelot Campus, the Maastricht Health
Campus, Campus Greenport Venlo, the Smart Services Campus, spin-offs and start-up
companies, special collections, putting together exhibitions and/or catalogues, partic-
ipation in administrative bodies.”
Of the twenty-one items listed (counting the collaborations with the various local
institutes as one), one is directly applicable to the body of work presented: publications
in journals and newspapers. The paper based upon Chapter 5 was published in the
Journal of Theoretical Biology in 2018, while the paper based upon Chapter 2 is, at
the moment of writing, in submission. The papers based upon Chapters 3 and 4 are
planned for submission in early 2019.
Given the theoretical nature of the research in this dissertation, other opportuni-
ties of value-creation – in the sense that the term was used in the regulations – are
indirect and speculative. The remainder of this addendum hypothesizes on the value
of each chapter, possibly falling in the contributions to public debates, advice for social
organizations or companies, and policy recommendations for governments categories.
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Fulfilling some other categories, such as software, making models and systems available,
co-publications with social and/or economics stakeholders, non-academic publications,
and appearances in the media, might follow from this body of research, but are impos-
sible to speculate.
Chapter 2 considers the properties of the Nash equilibrium in network games. The
relevance and value of the Nash equilibrium is, as I was led to believe, beyond dispute.
With applications in many distinct fields of science, such as economics, computer sci-
ence, and biology, the same seems true for networks. The chapter’s main result states
that, in a setting featuring sequential updates, if each player’s update takes him closer
to his current best choice, then for any initial condition and for any weighted network
the play of the game approaches equilibrium. This result ties in, somewhat indirectly,
with one of the most important central policy questions in economics, whether mar-
kets should be nationalized, regulated, or left alone. The first step in answering this
question for a given market is figuring out the implications of a laissez-faire approach.
This chapter’s result states that weighted network games do not require regulations to
reach an equilibrium state.
The core issue in Chapter 3 is the value of foresight in network games. The
level of the agents’ foresight is a central characteristic of the agents of financial and
economic models. The existence and convergence results of the chapter guarantee
that the value of foresight can be calculated for any simple graph. Additionally, the
convergence results ensure that the main results of Chapter 2 remain true in case of
a single farsighted player whenever the network is characterized by a simple graph.
Finally, the chapter’s results allow for a qualitative description of the change in the
value that the farsighted player receives upon the addition or the removal of a link.
Part of the final result, the fact that the farsighted player is better off if two of his
neighbors sever contact, is reminiscent of a type of jealousy, implying an indirect but
nonetheless interesting connection between network games and psychology.
The topic of Chapter 4 is very similar to that of Chapter 2. It focuses on the
effect of introducing non-reciprocal relationships into the game, represented by a more
general class of graphs, called directed networks. The chapter’s main result identifies
two classes of networks in which best-response cycles cannot exist, and hence, with
some permissive assumptions, the convergence results of Chapter 2 remain true in these
two classes as well. This result also extends the implications made on the laissez-faire
approach in Chapter 2 to situations where the players’ relationship is hierarchical,
or when the own effects of the players are larger than their external effects. It is
noteworthy, however, that convergence is not generally established for the whole class
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of directed networks, hence the results, and therefore the implications, of Chapter 2
may not be robust for non-reciprocal relationships.
Chapter 5 is written with a specific application, cancer therapy, in mind. While
it remains a theoretical work, the potential for value-creation is more direct and less
general. The chapter’s main result is that immunotherapy of cancer may worsen the
patient’s prognosis if it causes the tumor to switch from a selfish immune evasion
strategy – such as hiding from the killer T-cells – to a cooperative one – such as
immunosuppression. It is left for future research to assess the practical extent of this
result and address it in a change in therapy as necessary. The model itself is part of a
growing strand of literature aiming to understand cancer by the tools and paradigms
of game theory, adding to the value of both research fields.
I conclude this addendum by a reflection on the value-creation process of science.
Given the many global problems that humanity will need to solve for a sustainable,
prosperous, and healthy existence, I fully sympathize with the goal of making science
useful. There are two issues to note, however. The first is that no discovery exists in a
vacuum; the value of individual pieces of research may not be immediately visible, may
be uncertain at the time of their writing, or may come in a way that no one, including
the researcher, expects. By having researchers focus on creating value in the short run,
society deprives itself from broader discoveries and a deeper understanding, maybe even
from value, in the long run. The second is that, as David Hilbert’s quote also seems
to suggest, human curiosity is tricky; the drive for discovery is often separate from the
drive to create value. I find it therefore a non-trivial question whether any focus on
value-creation is needed, be it in the short- or the long-run, in order to maximize the
societal value of research.
I do not make these points to criticize any particular standing policy. However,
I do find it troublesome when researchers self-select on the basis of the perceived
usefulness or uselessness of their fields because it interferes with the communication
between disciplines. If I am advocating for anything, it is for theorists to try to be
interested in some of the more practical questions. Their more abstract thinking may
make a connection that an applied person is too focused to make. On the other hand,
I wish to reiterate the concerns that a friend of mine had against, as he/she called
it, the “marginalization of fundamental research”. Even if the amount of theoretical
knowledge that will ever prove itself useful for humans is finite, I am quite positive we
have not reached it yet. We should keep going.
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